Narrative:

This jet had a recent history of engine bleed work and complaints of very loud cabin pack noise. Shortly after takeoff we received an ECAM advisory for a #2 engine high nacelle temperature (250 C/ 482F). We were being vectored around thunderstorms in the departure area and took a radar vector north and a continued climb clearance. We swapped controls and I reviewed the applicable QRH supplementary section. We turned the #2 bleed off and that had no effect. We went to manual throttles and reduced power but that did not have a significant effect on the abnormally high temperature. As we climbed to fl 290 the ambient temperature dropped and the nacelle temp dropped but only slightly. It got to 215 C at the lowest point but that was still well above the 100 C of the number one engine and was still a flashing monitor. We continued the climb to see if the advisory would go away in cruise. We contacted ground operations on VHF and requested some maintenance control input into our decision making process. When we leveled off at fl 290 about 80 miles north of ZZZ; the advisory continued and nacelle temp began to climb again. Maintenance and dispatch could not provide us any relevant information or recommendations. The QRH directs the crew to consider shutting down the motor if there are secondary indications. There was none.based on this information; I thought that we had significant bleed air leak that I could not control with the engine bleed valve or thrust and that may lead to a fire or engine damage if we continued to proceed. I asked myself how would company training; company ops and the FAA view my judgement six months from now by overflying several good airports with a known engine problem just to bring ZZZ1 a broken jet (does ZZZ1 have power plant support?).we decided to turn back to ZZZ and landed. We did not request priority handling; no fuel was dumped. We did not land over max landing gross weight and no hazmat issue. I give myself a solid B for my performance and an a for my first officer. We sat in a hot jet for over an hour since we have lost confidence in the data from auto verify information and felt that sitting in a hot jet is safer than hanging out together in the crew room (covid petri dish). Running the APU in the airbus without the landing gear doors down often results in a bleed leak that requires further maintenance. The quality of this risk management decision should not be viewed by the outcome but by the relevant facts that I had perceived at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported an air turnback due to high nacelle temperature caused by an engine bleed problem.

Narrative: This jet had a recent history of engine bleed work and complaints of very loud cabin pack noise. Shortly after takeoff we received an ECAM Advisory for a #2 engine high Nacelle Temperature (250 C/ 482F). We were being vectored around thunderstorms in the departure area and took a radar vector north and a continued climb clearance. We swapped controls and I reviewed the applicable QRH supplementary section. We turned the #2 bleed off and that had no effect. We went to manual throttles and reduced power but that did not have a significant effect on the abnormally high temperature. As we climbed to FL 290 the ambient temperature dropped and the nacelle temp dropped but only slightly. It got to 215 C at the lowest point but that was still well above the 100 C of the number one engine and was still a flashing monitor. We continued the climb to see if the advisory would go away in cruise. We contacted Ground Operations on VHF and requested some Maintenance Control input into our decision making process. When we leveled off at FL 290 about 80 miles north of ZZZ; the advisory continued and nacelle temp began to climb again. Maintenance and Dispatch could not provide us any relevant information or recommendations. The QRH directs the crew to consider shutting down the motor if there are secondary indications. There was none.Based on this information; I thought that we had significant bleed air leak that I could not control with the engine bleed valve or thrust and that may lead to a fire or engine damage if we continued to proceed. I asked myself how would Company Training; Company Ops and the FAA view my judgement six months from now by overflying several good airports with a known engine problem just to bring ZZZ1 a broken jet (does ZZZ1 have power plant support?).We decided to turn back to ZZZ and landed. We did not request priority handling; no fuel was dumped. We did not land over max landing gross weight and no hazmat issue. I give myself a solid B for my performance and an A for my FO. We sat in a hot jet for over an hour since we have lost confidence in the data from auto verify information and felt that sitting in a hot jet is safer than hanging out together in the crew room (Covid petri dish). Running the APU in the Airbus without the landing gear doors down often results in a bleed leak that requires further maintenance. The quality of this risk management decision should not be viewed by the outcome but by the relevant facts that I had perceived at the time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.