Narrative:

Lgb to ord. FAA inspector in the jump seat. I was acting first officer and also the PF. Immediately after rotation the autofunction of the pressurization system failed and automatically xferred to standby mode as a matter of normal function. It is a busy departure out of lgb, many heading and altitude changes. The captain was uncertain that the system was functioning properly, so he took control of the aircraft as we were climbing through 6000' for 7000', and requested that I check the system. All was normal. During the confusion, however, we did exceed the 250 KT below 10000' restriction by ten KT for a brief period of time. Maybe 30-45 seconds. The a/T was operating but apparently had a high tolerance. After turning the aircraft back over to me, the captain got the book out and silently ran the emergency checklist for the pressure problem. Flight proceeded normally. On descent into ord, the captain noticed at about 12000' MSL, that the cabin had not descended. He again took control of the aircraft and told me to fix it. I fixed it by putting the proper altitude in the cabin altitude window, and the cabin obediently descended. We arrived in ord west/O incident. There is an additional procedure in the book for this irregular operation. We did not get it out and look at it. The procedure is not referred to by the emergency checklist we both looked at. I feel that any additional procedure or checklist for clean up should always be listed on the previously referred to checklist. Some may consider this redundant, but with a two man crew, workload is high enough west/O playing hide and seek.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE EXCHANGING PLT FLYING DUTIES CAPT AND FO EXPERIENCED A PRESSURIZATION PROBLEM. AIRSPEED RESTRICTION WAS EXCEEDED BRIEFLY.

Narrative: LGB TO ORD. FAA INSPECTOR IN THE JUMP SEAT. I WAS ACTING F/O AND ALSO THE PF. IMMEDIATELY AFTER ROTATION THE AUTOFUNCTION OF THE PRESSURIZATION SYS FAILED AND AUTOMATICALLY XFERRED TO STANDBY MODE AS A MATTER OF NORMAL FUNCTION. IT IS A BUSY DEP OUT OF LGB, MANY HDG AND ALT CHANGES. THE CAPT WAS UNCERTAIN THAT THE SYS WAS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, SO HE TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 6000' FOR 7000', AND REQUESTED THAT I CHK THE SYS. ALL WAS NORMAL. DURING THE CONFUSION, HOWEVER, WE DID EXCEED THE 250 KT BELOW 10000' RESTRICTION BY TEN KT FOR A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME. MAYBE 30-45 SECS. THE A/T WAS OPERATING BUT APPARENTLY HAD A HIGH TOLERANCE. AFTER TURNING THE ACFT BACK OVER TO ME, THE CAPT GOT THE BOOK OUT AND SILENTLY RAN THE EMER CHKLIST FOR THE PRESSURE PROB. FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. ON DSNT INTO ORD, THE CAPT NOTICED AT ABOUT 12000' MSL, THAT THE CABIN HAD NOT DSNDED. HE AGAIN TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND TOLD ME TO FIX IT. I FIXED IT BY PUTTING THE PROPER ALT IN THE CABIN ALT WINDOW, AND THE CABIN OBEDIENTLY DSNDED. WE ARRIVED IN ORD W/O INCIDENT. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL PROC IN THE BOOK FOR THIS IRREGULAR OPERATION. WE DID NOT GET IT OUT AND LOOK AT IT. THE PROC IS NOT REFERRED TO BY THE EMER CHKLIST WE BOTH LOOKED AT. I FEEL THAT ANY ADDITIONAL PROC OR CHKLIST FOR CLEAN UP SHOULD ALWAYS BE LISTED ON THE PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO CHKLIST. SOME MAY CONSIDER THIS REDUNDANT, BUT WITH A TWO MAN CREW, WORKLOAD IS HIGH ENOUGH W/O PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.