Narrative:

Revenue flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ cruising at 33;000 ft. Approaching the TOD (top of descent). Crew received multiple failure messages: avnx MAU3A fail; spoiler fault; ADS3 fail; FMS2 fail; spdbk fail; and other associated messages populated EICAS during approach and landing. Crew performed QRH procedures for the annunciated EICAS messages. Crew found that QRH flight ctrl (flight control) page 12 'spoiler fault' stated that the landing distance will be increased by 1.78 and QRH FMS page 6 avnx MAU3A fail stated relevant inoperative items (ADS3; GPS2; APU; multi-function spoiler L3; R3; L4 R4; Autopilot2; right aileron indication; auto throttle; speed brake; FMS2). Flight crew decided that the best course of action was to [request priority handling]. Captain briefed the flight attendants. Pax briefed by captain; flight attendant (flight attendants) and instructed to brace upon landing. Aircraft landed safely and has deplaned. It was a very good CRM from all crew. During the decent and approach phase captain searched for unfactored landing distance in the tlr (takeoff/landing report) for the temperature and specific runway for xxr at ZZZ and aircraft gross landing weight of 70;000 lb was 5;000 ft. And added 78% on the landing distance according to QRH; came out of 8;900 ft. Of runway required. ZZZ runway xxr [had sufficient length]. His decision to [request priority handling] was based upon the landing distance required and the amount of usable runway. After captain [requested priority handling]; ATC instructed to descend to 12;000 ft. Since speed brakes was inoperative flight crew requested a shallower descend into ZZZ area maintaining a rate of descent of 1;000 ft. Per minute until 10;000 ft. Captain changed ap source to the left side; LNAV mode was still operative and maintained during the STAR. The aircraft was vectored by ATC until intercepting final approach course and once visual with the field ATC cleared for visual approach. On short final EICAS populated 'brakes fault' advisory message and the autobrake failed upon landing. Captain performed the landing touching the runway at the 500 ft. Mark and exited the runway xxr at xy intersection. Aircraft proceeded to the gate normally where the passengers deplaned.the recurrent training provided by the company to the whole crew came to be very effective for the compliance of the procedures. Training department should continue emphasizing emergency scenario for flight crew and flight attendants during their annual training.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ175 flight crew reported multiple EICAS failure messages while in cruise.

Narrative: Revenue flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ cruising at 33;000 ft. approaching the TOD (Top of Descent). Crew received multiple failure messages: AVNX MAU3A FAIL; SPOILER FAULT; ADS3 FAIL; FMS2 FAIL; SPDBK FAIL; and other associated messages populated EICAS during approach and landing. Crew performed QRH procedures for the annunciated EICAS messages. Crew found That QRH FLT CTRL (Flight Control) page 12 'Spoiler Fault' stated that the landing distance will be increased by 1.78 and QRH FMS page 6 AVNX MAU3A FAIL stated relevant inoperative items (ADS3; GPS2; APU; Multi-Function Spoiler L3; R3; L4 R4; Autopilot2; Right Aileron indication; Auto throttle; Speed brake; FMS2). Flight crew decided that the best course of action was to [request priority handling]. Captain briefed the flight attendants. Pax briefed by Captain; FA (Flight Attendants) and instructed to brace upon landing. Aircraft landed safely and has deplaned. It was a very good CRM from all crew. During the decent and approach phase Captain searched for unfactored landing distance in the TLR (Takeoff/Landing Report) for the temperature and specific runway for XXR at ZZZ and aircraft Gross Landing Weight of 70;000 lb was 5;000 ft. and added 78% on the landing distance according to QRH; came out of 8;900 ft. of runway required. ZZZ Runway XXR [had sufficient length]. His decision to [request priority handling] was based upon the landing distance required and the amount of usable runway. After Captain [requested priority handling]; ATC instructed to descend to 12;000 ft. Since speed brakes was inoperative flight crew requested a shallower descend into ZZZ area maintaining a rate of descent of 1;000 ft. per minute until 10;000 ft. Captain changed AP source to the left side; LNAV mode was still operative and maintained during the STAR. The aircraft was vectored by ATC until intercepting final approach course and once visual with the field ATC cleared for visual approach. On short final EICAS populated 'Brakes Fault' advisory message and the Autobrake failed upon landing. Captain performed the landing touching the runway at the 500 ft. mark and exited the runway XXR at XY intersection. Aircraft proceeded to the gate normally where the passengers deplaned.The recurrent training provided by the company to the whole crew came to be very effective for the compliance of the procedures. Training department should continue emphasizing emergency scenario for flight crew and flight attendants during their annual training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.