Narrative:

I was the first officer and pilot flying on this leg; my first on a trip assigned to me to keep my landing currency. We were set up for a straight in visual approach. The radio altimeter was inoperative on my side; but was working fine on the captain's side and was meled appropriately. On final approach; I called for 'check spoilers; flaps 45; before landing check.' shortly after these were completed; the '500' annunciation played. It came sooner than I expected; but I wasn't checking the radio altimeter as often as I regularly do; since I had to look at the captain's side to do so. At that point the approach was stable and we continued to land. Afterwards on the taxi to the gate; I realized that with the short time between us becoming fully configured for landing; and the 500 feet call; we were probably not fully configured at 1;000 feet above the threshold and should have executed a go-around. During the debrief discussion; the captain agreed.cause - my lapse in situational awareness; allowing a descent through 1;000 feet without being fully configured to land. Contributing factor: over-reliance on using my radio altimeter to stay aware of my height AGL during approaches; and not briefing my inoperative radio altimeter as a threat during my arrival briefing.recognizing my inoperative radio altimeter was a threat and briefing a mitigation strategy; even though we were flying a visual approach and the captain's side was working. Perhaps a callout at 1;000 feet similar to the '500 to go' call; but i understand there are exceptions and reasons why it isn't required in the procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported an unstable approach while on flight to maintain landing currency.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and pilot flying on this leg; my first on a trip assigned to me to keep my landing currency. We were set up for a straight in visual approach. The radio altimeter was inoperative on my side; but was working fine on the Captain's side and was MELed appropriately. On final approach; I called for 'check spoilers; flaps 45; before landing check.' Shortly after these were completed; the '500' annunciation played. It came sooner than I expected; but I wasn't checking the radio altimeter as often as I regularly do; since I had to look at the Captain's side to do so. At that point the approach was stable and we continued to land. Afterwards on the taxi to the gate; I realized that with the short time between us becoming fully configured for landing; and the 500 feet call; we were probably not fully configured at 1;000 feet above the threshold and should have executed a go-around. During the debrief discussion; the Captain agreed.Cause - My lapse in situational awareness; allowing a descent through 1;000 feet without being fully configured to land. Contributing factor: over-reliance on using my radio altimeter to stay aware of my height AGL during approaches; and not briefing my inoperative radio altimeter as a threat during my arrival briefing.Recognizing my inoperative radio altimeter was a threat and briefing a mitigation strategy; even though we were flying a visual approach and the Captain's side was working. Perhaps a callout at 1;000 feet similar to the '500 to go' call; but i understand there are exceptions and reasons why it isn't required in the procedure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.