Narrative:

There were numerous abnormalities prior to takeoff. Covid-19 procedures were in progress. Crew and passengers were required to wear masks. I had a line check scheduled for the ZZZ1 - ZZZ return flight and the check airman was deadheading on the ZZZ - ZZZ1 flight. The first officer had under 100 hours and was assigned to this trip to progress toward consolidation. Upon arrival at the aircraft at the start of the day; I noticed one of the windshield wipers was not parked correctly. It was angled onto the right windscreen. I turned the windshield wipers on; then off to get them to park. The left wiper parked but the right wiper would not turn off. It ran continuously though the wiper switch was selected off. I called maintenance; made a maintenance write-up in the electronic maintenance log; and a mechanic came to address that issue. Just as the mechanic completed his work and the wipers were working properly; I went to the gate agent to tell her we were ready to begin boarding. She told me that she had just made a gate change announcement. That is when I found out that we were going to switch to another aircraft. I called the dispatcher and asked if we could keep then first aircraft. The dispatcher called the system controller and that request was denied. The other crew members and I relocated to the new aircraft. The replacement aircraft had no APU; no external air hooked up; and was heat-soaked. The outside air temperature was in the mid 80s. The temperature inside the aircraft was 100 deg F. The aircraft also needed to be fueled. In addition to the normal workload; I was busy with managing the cabin temperature; requesting fuel; briefing the first officer on how to do an external air start and cross-bleed start; briefing the ground crew on the abnormal start procedure which would be conducted with the jet bridge attached and the main cabin door open; and making passenger announcements at the gate and in the aircraft to apologize for hot cabin; the delay and to provide an updated arrival time.after over an hour delay; we were pushed back from the gate. We performed a cross-bleed start and a taxi checklist. Then a pitch feel fault status message appeared not the cas stack. I called maintenance and they guided me through a reset procedure that involved pulling 4 circuit breakers; waiting; and then resetting them within 5 seconds to make the aircraft perform an enhanced self-test of the flight spoilers control unit. That procedure cleared the message and we began to taxi. We were assigned a different runway than the one we planned so we completed a full runway and performance change checklist after updating the FMS and performance data. The rest of the taxi and takeoff were normal. While climbing out of ZZZ airport; we were restricted to 250 kt by the zzzzz departure. We were passed from ZZZ departure to ZZZ center as we passed 10;000 feet on the way to 15;000 feet. I changed radio frequencies; as I was pilot monitoring; and made the 10;000 feet sterile cockpit ending chimes.the center frequency was congested with the controller giving instructions to other aircraft. I commented to the first officer that 'the hard work was over.' by that; I meant that the numerous abnormalities were behind us and we could now perform a normal flight. Then my attention went to trying to get my radio check in on the center frequency. The autopilot was engaged climbing through 12;000 feet. I wanted to check in on the radio and receive a higher climb clearance before we reached 15;000 feet so the autopilot would not capture 15;000 feet but I was not able to because of frequency congestion. As the autopilot began to capture 15;000 feet; the first officer changed the speed bug from 250 kt to 290 kt and I acknowledged it. This speed increases is in accordance with our SOP; however; we were still speed restricted by the SID. The aircraft accelerated. I was still listening to the radio with my finger ready on the transmit button. As the speed reached 280 kti recognized that we should still be at 250 and I told the first officer. He began reducing speed and he bugged 250. At that time I was able to check in on the radio and requested normal speed. We were given normal speed by the controller. The speed was still around 280 and the first officer bugged 290 and accelerated to 290. There was about 30 seconds between when our speed exceeded the restriction and when the restriction was lifted. The controller did not acknowledge that we had exceeded 250. No other outcome arose from the momentary speed excursion. During the debrief; the first officer stated that he had heard the controller assign normal speed to another aircraft and thought that we had received the normal speed clearance already. The cause of the event was distraction. I was focused on communication and did not put enough attention on monitoring the PF. Though the acceleration would be normal on any other flight; we were speed restricted by the SID; so it was not appropriate. The first officer having low time in the aircraft and at ZZZ may have been a contributing factor. The numerous abnormalities that we experienced prior to takeoff may have been a distraction as well. I was thinking about all the unusual things that happened prior to takeoff and beginning to analyze what we could have done differently. Aviate; navigate; communicate prioritization for the pilot monitoring would mitigate this problem. The last 1;000 feet of climb or descent before a level off is a critical phase of flight and an area of vulnerability. It is appropriate to delay communication with ATC during that part of the flight. There is a desire to make the flight smooth; limit the level-off and thrust changes for passenger comfort. That should not be allowed to create a distraction that can lead to a SID-assigned speed deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported after a mechanical issue; switching planes and a lengthy delay; they had a speed deviation on the departure SID.

Narrative: There were numerous abnormalities prior to takeoff. COVID-19 procedures were in progress. Crew and passengers were required to wear masks. I had a line check scheduled for the ZZZ1 - ZZZ return flight and the Check Airman was deadheading on the ZZZ - ZZZ1 flight. The First Officer had under 100 hours and was assigned to this trip to progress toward consolidation. Upon arrival at the aircraft at the start of the day; I noticed one of the windshield wipers was not parked correctly. It was angled onto the right windscreen. I turned the windshield wipers on; then off to get them to park. The left wiper parked but the right wiper would not turn off. It ran continuously though the wiper switch was selected off. I called maintenance; made a maintenance write-up in the electronic maintenance log; and a mechanic came to address that issue. Just as the mechanic completed his work and the wipers were working properly; I went to the gate Agent to tell her we were ready to begin boarding. She told me that she had just made a gate change announcement. That is when I found out that we were going to switch to another aircraft. I called the Dispatcher and asked if we could keep then first aircraft. The Dispatcher called the system controller and that request was denied. The other crew members and I relocated to the new aircraft. The replacement aircraft had no APU; no external air hooked up; and was heat-soaked. The outside air temperature was in the mid 80s. The temperature inside the aircraft was 100 deg F. The aircraft also needed to be fueled. In addition to the normal workload; I was busy with managing the cabin temperature; requesting fuel; briefing the First Officer on how to do an external air start and cross-bleed start; briefing the ground crew on the abnormal start procedure which would be conducted with the jet bridge attached and the main cabin door open; and making passenger announcements at the gate and in the aircraft to apologize for hot cabin; the delay and to provide an updated arrival time.After over an hour delay; we were pushed back from the gate. We performed a cross-bleed start and a taxi checklist. Then a PITCH FEEL FAULT status message appeared not the CAS stack. I called maintenance and they guided me through a reset procedure that involved pulling 4 circuit breakers; waiting; and then resetting them within 5 seconds to make the aircraft perform an enhanced self-test of the flight spoilers control unit. That procedure cleared the message and we began to taxi. We were assigned a different runway than the one we planned so we completed a full Runway and Performance Change Checklist after updating the FMS and performance data. The rest of the taxi and takeoff were normal. While climbing out of ZZZ airport; we were restricted to 250 kt by the ZZZZZ departure. We were passed from ZZZ departure to ZZZ Center as we passed 10;000 feet on the way to 15;000 feet. I changed radio frequencies; as I was pilot monitoring; and made the 10;000 feet sterile cockpit ending chimes.The Center frequency was congested with the Controller giving instructions to other aircraft. I commented to the FO that 'the hard work was over.' By that; I meant that the numerous abnormalities were behind us and we could now perform a normal flight. Then my attention went to trying to get my radio check in on the center frequency. The autopilot was engaged climbing through 12;000 feet. I wanted to check in on the radio and receive a higher climb clearance before we reached 15;000 feet so the autopilot would not capture 15;000 feet but I was not able to because of frequency congestion. As the autopilot began to capture 15;000 feet; the First Officer changed the speed bug from 250 kt to 290 kt and I acknowledged it. This speed increases is in accordance with our SOP; however; we were still speed restricted by the SID. The aircraft accelerated. I was still listening to the radio with my finger ready on the transmit button. As the speed reached 280 ktI recognized that we should still be at 250 and I told the FO. He began reducing speed and he bugged 250. At that time I was able to check in on the radio and requested normal speed. We were given normal speed by the Controller. The speed was still around 280 and the FO bugged 290 and accelerated to 290. There was about 30 seconds between when our speed exceeded the restriction and when the restriction was lifted. The Controller did not acknowledge that we had exceeded 250. No other outcome arose from the momentary speed excursion. During the debrief; the FO stated that he had heard the controller assign normal speed to another aircraft and thought that we had received the normal speed clearance already. The cause of the event was distraction. I was focused on communication and did not put enough attention on monitoring the PF. Though the acceleration would be normal on any other flight; we were speed restricted by the SID; so it was not appropriate. The FO having low time in the aircraft and at ZZZ may have been a contributing factor. The numerous abnormalities that we experienced prior to takeoff may have been a distraction as well. I was thinking about all the unusual things that happened prior to takeoff and beginning to analyze what we could have done differently. Aviate; navigate; communicate prioritization for the pilot monitoring would mitigate this problem. The last 1;000 feet of climb or descent before a level off is a critical phase of flight and an area of vulnerability. It is appropriate to delay communication with ATC during that part of the flight. There is a desire to make the flight smooth; limit the level-off and thrust changes for passenger comfort. That should not be allowed to create a distraction that can lead to a SID-assigned speed deviation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.