Narrative:

During the takeoff roll; the at (auto throttle) did not engage. VNAV was selected and armed but never engage. LNAV was selected and armed but never engage. Between 700-1;000 ft.; captain's flight director disappeared; around 1;200 ft. First officer (first officer's) flight director LNAV bar disappeared. First officer flight director did come back but was not accurate; it was giving false course guidance. Captain's flight director never appeared. We decided not to engage the autopilot as the flight director was giving us inaccurate guidance. We could not comply with rvsm regulations and requested a lower flight level. Requested heading vector to destination. I landed at the destination without any further issues.I learned I need to pay closer attention and notice earlier if the selected modes are not being engaged/activated. I recently had to practice more hands-on flying which I think made a big difference in how to handle the situation. I guess my suggestion would encourage more pilot to hand fly raw data.during the takeoff rollout and after requesting thrust [set] I noticed the at did not engage and the captain mention something about the light. I proceeded to advance the throttles to to (take off) power and requested for to thrust to be set. After takeoff at 400 ft. I requested LNAV; it was selected and armed I continue to follow the flight director. At 1;000 ft. I requested VNAV it was selected and armed. I noticed the flight director was not pitching down to start accelerating. At this point is when I realized that LNAV and VNAV were not activating/engaging. Between 800 - 1;000 ft.; captain lost his flight director. Around 1;200 ft. I lost my lateral guidance but maintain the vertical. I initiated the left turn to continue flying the departure procedure. On the turn to [the fix]; departure questioned [our] position; we requested heading vectors and advised [of] our situation. As we continued assessing the situation; what was working and providing correct information; we decided the best course was not to engage the autopilot and continue to destination and flying without at and on heading select.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported auto-thrust did not engage and loss of both flight directors during climb.

Narrative: During the takeoff roll; the AT (Auto Throttle) did not engage. VNAV was selected and armed but never engage. LNAV was selected and armed but never engage. Between 700-1;000 ft.; Captain's flight director disappeared; around 1;200 ft. FO (First Officer's) flight director LNAV bar disappeared. FO flight director did come back but was not accurate; it was giving false course guidance. Captain's flight director never appeared. We decided not to engage the autopilot as the flight director was giving us inaccurate guidance. We could not comply with RVSM regulations and requested a lower Flight Level. Requested heading vector to destination. I landed at the destination without any further issues.I learned I need to pay closer attention and notice earlier if the selected modes are not being engaged/activated. I recently had to practice more hands-on flying which I think made a big difference in how to handle the situation. I guess my suggestion would encourage more pilot to hand fly raw data.During the takeoff rollout and after requesting thrust [set] I noticed the AT did not engage and the Captain mention something about the light. I proceeded to advance the throttles to TO (Take Off) power and requested for TO thrust to be set. After takeoff at 400 ft. I requested LNAV; it was selected and armed I continue to follow the flight director. At 1;000 ft. I requested VNAV it was selected and armed. I noticed the flight director was not pitching down to start accelerating. At this point is when I realized that LNAV and VNAV were not activating/engaging. Between 800 - 1;000 ft.; Captain lost his flight director. Around 1;200 ft. I lost my lateral guidance but maintain the vertical. I initiated the left turn to continue flying the departure procedure. On the turn to [the fix]; Departure questioned [our] position; we requested heading vectors and advised [of] our situation. As we continued assessing the situation; what was working and providing correct information; we decided the best course was not to engage the autopilot and continue to destination and flying without AT and on heading select.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.