Narrative:

About a year ago perhaps longer; the dg manifest would frequently indicate the need to turn on either the fcac (fwd cargo a/C) and/or acac (aft cargo a/C) due to dry ice without any prior notice via a remark on the flight plan. Obviously; this takes a few minutes to resolve:informing operations and having them calculate new burn numbers; verifying adequate fuel for the flight; repositioning the lower cargo temp switches as necessary; and changing the ff (fuel flow) in the FMS. It's a pain; but it literally happens with such frequency now; that I can make the changes pretty quick assuming the fuel load is still good and operations is on their game. After the first few times; I asked operations what was up with the lack of coordination? It was blamed on the dg (dangerous goods) specialist not communicating with operations and they appeared to be aware of the problem. Obviously; the lack of coordination persists. However; today was a bit different and confusing. I have attached a copy of the dg manifest. Note the following in the middle of the page:alert: fcac must be selected on because of dry ice in the fwd belly fcac must be selected on because of dry ice in the aft belly the second line made no sense. We assumed they meant acac on for the aft belly. We consulted operations and they agreed; so we used a ff +.8 and selected both fcac and acac on. I spoke with the departure ramp agent; but it's unclear whether or not he understood my explanation of the discrepancy. We had lots of fuel and a looming curfew in ZZZZ; so it seemed safe to continue having chosen the most conservative option. I assume an error was made with regard to the fcac on remark for the aft belly. Additionally; a lack of coordination between dg specialist and operations.the lack of coordination between the dg specialist and operations needs to be addressed. I'm sure crews have missed the alert on the dg manifest and not turned on the fcac and/or acac or perhaps they noticed; but neglected to factor in the increased fuel burn on a flight were it really matters (i.e. A long leg and the winds are worse than forecasted). At the very least; we need to create some awareness within the crew force via an fcif (flight crew information file) or recurrent training hot topic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-777 Captain reported a dangerous situation as related to the carriage of DG [Dangerous Goods] due primarily to a communication breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch/DG Specialist.

Narrative: About a year ago perhaps longer; the DG manifest would frequently indicate the need to turn on either the FCAC (Fwd Cargo A/C) and/or ACAC (Aft Cargo A/C) due to dry ice without any prior notice via a remark on the flight plan. Obviously; this takes a few minutes to resolve:Informing Operations and having them calculate new burn numbers; verifying adequate fuel for the flight; repositioning the Lower Cargo Temp switches as necessary; and changing the FF (fuel flow) in the FMS. It's a pain; but it literally happens with such frequency now; that I can make the changes pretty quick assuming the fuel load is still good and Operations is on their game. After the first few times; I asked Operations what was up with the lack of coordination? It was blamed on the DG (Dangerous Goods) Specialist not communicating with Operations and they appeared to be aware of the problem. Obviously; the lack of coordination persists. However; today was a bit different and confusing. I have attached a copy of the DG manifest. Note the following in the middle of the page:ALERT: FCAC must be selected ON because of dry ice in the FWD Belly FCAC must be selected ON because of dry ice in the AFT Belly The second line made no sense. We assumed they meant ACAC ON for the AFT Belly. We consulted Operations and they agreed; so we used a FF +.8 and selected both FCAC and ACAC ON. I spoke with the departure ramp agent; but it's unclear whether or not he understood my explanation of the discrepancy. We had lots of fuel and a looming curfew in ZZZZ; so it seemed safe to continue having chosen the most conservative option. I assume an error was made with regard to the FCAC ON remark for the AFT Belly. Additionally; a lack of coordination between DG specialist and Operations.The lack of coordination between the DG specialist and Operations needs to be addressed. I'm sure crews have missed the ALERT on the DG manifest and not turned on the FCAC and/or ACAC or perhaps they noticed; but neglected to factor in the increased fuel burn on a flight were it really matters (i.e. a long leg and the winds are worse than forecasted). At the very least; we need to create some awareness within the crew force via an FCIF (Flight Crew Information File) or recurrent training hot topic.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.