Narrative:

Aircraft X was a return to gate due to a reported fueling imbalance issue. After the aircraft was received; the fuelers (abm) and the pilots determined that maintenance was necessary to address the situation. While the mechanics were working with the fuelers and pilots to troubleshoot the problem; I was the only remaining [ramp agent] to stay with the aircraft. I was pulling bags for rerouting in coordination with the gate agent. The pilot told me he 'did not think this plane is going anywhere'. I apprised operation of what the pilot had told me. Because of the misconnects that had already been removed from the flight and the probability that the mechanical delay would be extended; I decided to bring the remaining gate checked bags up to the jetbridge. As I was doing that; the flight attendant told me that he deboarded the aircraft because of the 3 hour rule. He and I brought the gate check bags up to the gate podium; where the passengers were waiting to speak to the gate agent. I told the gate agent that I would offload the remaining baggage and take it to the bagroom for the bagroom to reroute off of meters. When I came back down the jetbridge and out on to the jetbridge stairs; to head to the rear pit and offload the bags; one of the mechanics was standing at the bottom of the stairs. He said they were running the engines. I then noticed that the engines were; in fact; running. I told him that no one had notified me that they wanted to do an engine start; and that this was not the proper procedure for conducting and engine start at the gate. He said that the pilot had called about it. I said no one had told me; and I am the only rse at the gate. I went to talk to the pilot about the engine start (while the engines are still running). I asked him why he never said anything to me about starting the engines; so that we could follow SOP. He said he did call the ramp. I said 'you mean you called ops?' he said no; he called ramp; I asked him who on the ramp he called because no one had notified me. He said 'I called this frequency number 130.0; and they said it was fine.' I said you called ramp tower. You have to let us know; so that we can follow the appropriate engine start and engines running at the gate procedures. The fueler told me that he had not been told about the engine start either.this is the 3rd airstart/engine start gsap-able even on my shift in the last 7 days. I told the rse lead involved in the more serious of the 2 last week to gsap himself because we have a need for training and lessons on the steps of airstart/engine start. In ZZZ; there is no formal training for this process. You only learn what's involved with the airstart/engine start procedure by happenstance. I do not know what type of training is available in other stations for this task. There is no computer/video lesson available or required that I am aware of. There is no relevant verbiage in the ramp manual or safety manual; that I am aware of. Of all the work we do on the ramp; the airstart/engine start at the gates is probably the most dangerous and complicated function that we do; yet there is no formal universal instruction for it.I am unaware of what the [airline] or [airline] pilot training regarding these functions is; but I would have to assume that whatever it is; it at least for this particular pilot; inadequate. Furthermore; the [company] ground mechanics seem to be completely oblivious to any requirements for this function; as this is the 2nd occurrence in the past month of no communication regarding the engine start. I caught the last one before it could happen; only because ops called me on the radio to say that they (company) needed me to move a beltloader for them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Ramp agent reported non-standard operation and safety issue with regard to starting an aircraft engine at the gate.

Narrative: Aircraft X was a return to gate due to a reported fueling imbalance issue. After the aircraft was received; the fuelers (ABM) and the pilots determined that maintenance was necessary to address the situation. While the mechanics were working with the fuelers and pilots to troubleshoot the problem; I was the only remaining [ramp agent] to stay with the aircraft. I was pulling bags for rerouting in coordination with the gate agent. The pilot told me he 'did not think this plane is going anywhere'. I apprised operation of what the pilot had told me. Because of the misconnects that had already been removed from the flight and the probability that the mechanical delay would be extended; I decided to bring the remaining gate checked bags up to the jetbridge. As I was doing that; the flight attendant told me that he deboarded the aircraft because of the 3 hour rule. He and I brought the gate check bags up to the gate podium; where the passengers were waiting to speak to the gate agent. I told the gate agent that I would offload the remaining baggage and take it to the bagroom for the bagroom to reroute off of meters. When I came back down the jetbridge and out on to the jetbridge stairs; to head to the rear pit and offload the bags; one of the mechanics was standing at the bottom of the stairs. He said they were running the engines. I then noticed that the engines were; in fact; running. I told him that no one had notified me that they wanted to do an engine start; and that this was not the proper procedure for conducting and engine start at the gate. he said that the pilot had called about it. I said no one had told me; and I am the only RSE at the gate. I went to talk to the pilot about the engine start (while the engines are still running). I asked him why he never said anything to me about starting the engines; so that we could follow SOP. He said he did call the ramp. I said 'you mean you called Ops?' he said no; he called ramp; I asked him who on the ramp he called because no one had notified me. He said 'I called this frequency number 130.0; and they said it was fine.' I said you called Ramp Tower. You have to let us know; so that we can follow the appropriate engine start and engines running at the gate procedures. The fueler told me that he had not been told about the engine start either.This is the 3rd airstart/engine start GSAP-able even on my shift in the last 7 days. I told the RSE lead involved in the more serious of the 2 last week to GSAP himself because we have a need for training and lessons on the steps of airstart/engine start. In ZZZ; there is no formal training for this process. You only learn what's involved with the airstart/engine start procedure by happenstance. I do not know what type of training is available in other stations for this task. There is no computer/video lesson available or required that I am aware of. There is no relevant verbiage in the Ramp Manual or Safety Manual; that I am aware of. Of all the work we do on the ramp; the airstart/engine start at the gates is probably the most dangerous and complicated function that we do; yet there is no formal universal instruction for it.I am unaware of what the [airline] or [airline] pilot training regarding these functions is; but I would have to assume that whatever it is; it at least for this particular pilot; inadequate. Furthermore; the [company] Ground Mechanics seem to be completely oblivious to any requirements for this function; as this is the 2nd occurrence in the past month of no communication regarding the engine start. I caught the last one before it could happen; only because Ops called me on the radio to say that they (company) needed me to move a beltloader for them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.