Narrative:

After swapping into a new aircraft; I completed the lights test; as a part of my preflight procedure. I noted that the wheel well fire light; APU and engine fire handles illuminated improperly (they operated normally during the fire test). I called maintenance to come to the aircraft. When the mechanic arrived; I duplicated the failed test and let the mechanic know that I had the exact same issue several weeks ago that necessitated a swap of the fire control panel. The mechanic stated that the repair would take four hours to complete. He then said the aircraft was grounded. As we were partially boarded; we began deplaning passengers. The mechanic then noted that MEL relief was available using 33-xx-xx. I was surprised as this remedy was not suggested in the earlier occurrence. I had the mechanic read the MEL; as I was on the phone to maintenance control.the provisos of the MEL didn't seem to apply to our situation. In fact; they were exactly opposite of the indications we were experiencing. Maintenance control stated that they had 'kicked it around' with engineering and were of the opinion that it was a result of the dimming function of the switch and thus deferrable. I unsuccessfully tried to explain that an opinion from engineering delivered via the phone didn't supersede the approved MEL in front of me and asked to be transferred to the chief pilot on call. I detailed the situation with the chief pilot on call and reviewed the MEL. The chief pilot disagreed that it was a safety issue and that the MEL was instead poorly written and didn't fully capture the 'intent'. I declined to accept the aircraft; as I still strongly feel that the MEL was improperly assigned; and accepting the aircraft with an improperly applied MEL would result in taking an unairworthy aircraft airborne.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 pilot reported they refused an aircraft for maintenance issues even though the Chief Pilot and Maintenance tried to persuade them to take the aircraft.

Narrative: After swapping into a new aircraft; I completed the lights test; as a part of my preflight procedure. I noted that the Wheel Well Fire light; APU and engine fire handles illuminated improperly (they operated normally during the fire test). I called Maintenance to come to the aircraft. When the Mechanic arrived; I duplicated the failed test and let the Mechanic know that I had the exact same issue several weeks ago that necessitated a swap of the fire control panel. The Mechanic stated that the repair would take four hours to complete. He then said the aircraft was grounded. As we were partially boarded; we began deplaning passengers. The Mechanic then noted that MEL relief was available using 33-XX-XX. I was surprised as this remedy was not suggested in the earlier occurrence. I had the Mechanic read the MEL; as I was on the phone to Maintenance Control.The provisos of the MEL didn't seem to apply to our situation. In fact; they were exactly OPPOSITE of the indications we were experiencing. Maintenance Control stated that they had 'kicked it around' with Engineering and were of the opinion that it was a result of the dimming function of the switch and thus deferrable. I unsuccessfully tried to explain that an opinion from engineering delivered via the phone didn't supersede the approved MEL in front of me and asked to be transferred to the Chief Pilot on Call. I detailed the situation with the Chief Pilot on Call and reviewed the MEL. The Chief Pilot disagreed that it was a safety issue and that the MEL was instead poorly written and didn't fully capture the 'intent'. I declined to accept the aircraft; as I still strongly feel that the MEL was improperly assigned; and accepting the aircraft with an improperly applied MEL would result in taking an unairworthy aircraft airborne.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.