Narrative:

On the bucko 3 arrival, altitude 8000' approaching armel with a 80-100 KT tailwind, continuous moderate chop, rain in IMC. The captain was PF. After armel we were cleared to 3000', direct bonds IAF. We recognized that we were high and fast and full speed brakes were deployed. As we descended, the wind direction changed to a tailwind of 60-80 KTS. We were cleared for the approach prior to bonds. The captain disconnected the autoplt as we passed over bonds 1500-2000' high. Abrupt heading and altitude changes were made as we drifted to the north of track and attempted to descend. We leveled off prior to the minimum altitude of 2100' and the aircraft slowed down. We had a wind correction angle of approximately 30 degrees; however, we were still north of track. Continuous moderate chops made it difficult to read approach plates and instruments. We received a frequency change to tower control. I did not notice that descent had been initiated again. I then realized we were not yet at the 7 DME fix and called out, 'you are below altitude!' captain replied, 'we can go to 1500',' point to the CDU. I called, out, 'climb, climb,' then again, 'go around.' captain initiated the go around, however we bottomed out 300-400' below 1500' minimum altitude at 6.9 DME still to the north of track. We reached VMC at approximately 1600'. We were radar vectored back for the approach again and noticed 30-40 degree wind correction angle was required to stay on track and difficulty maintaining airspeed and altitude until VMC was reached. We landed with no further problems. Contributing factors: 1) kept high by approach control. 2) accepting a clearance for a non precision approach high and fast. 3) failed to use autoplt during non precision approach at a time of high workload. 4) failed to brief on how the approach would be conducted. 5) PF overestimating his current ability to hand-fly during IMC, as autoplt is recommended and used most of the time. 6) failed to recognize as we passed bonds that we went from strong tailwind (approximately 300 KTS ground speed), slowing and turning into the wind (approximately 140 KTS ground speed), to no longer being high. 7) I should have suggested that we ask for a 360 degree turn approaching bonds to descend and slow down to be established properly on the approach. 8) I should have suggested we use autoplt as we drifted north of track and asked for radar vectors back around for the approach. 9) passing bonds, I set 2100' in the altitude window. I should have called out, 'maintain 2100' till 7 DME,' as the data base generated VOR DME approach on the CDU did not show the 7 DME step down fix and led the captain to believe he could down to 1500'. 10) I failed to continuously xchk the INS and recognize the potential danger early on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT GOT WELL BELOW MINIMUM CROSSING ALT AT 7 MILE DME FIX.

Narrative: ON THE BUCKO 3 ARR, ALT 8000' APCHING ARMEL WITH A 80-100 KT TAILWIND, CONTINUOUS MODERATE CHOP, RAIN IN IMC. THE CAPT WAS PF. AFTER ARMEL WE WERE CLRED TO 3000', DIRECT BONDS IAF. WE RECOGNIZED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND FAST AND FULL SPD BRAKES WERE DEPLOYED. AS WE DSNDED, THE WIND DIRECTION CHANGED TO A TAILWIND OF 60-80 KTS. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH PRIOR TO BONDS. THE CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AS WE PASSED OVER BONDS 1500-2000' HIGH. ABRUPT HDG AND ALT CHANGES WERE MADE AS WE DRIFTED TO THE N OF TRACK AND ATTEMPTED TO DSND. WE LEVELED OFF PRIOR TO THE MINIMUM ALT OF 2100' AND THE ACFT SLOWED DOWN. WE HAD A WIND CORRECTION ANGLE OF APPROX 30 DEGS; HOWEVER, WE WERE STILL N OF TRACK. CONTINUOUS MODERATE CHOPS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO READ APCH PLATES AND INSTRUMENTS. WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR CTL. I DID NOT NOTICE THAT DSNT HAD BEEN INITIATED AGAIN. I THEN REALIZED WE WERE NOT YET AT THE 7 DME FIX AND CALLED OUT, 'YOU ARE BELOW ALT!' CAPT REPLIED, 'WE CAN GO TO 1500',' POINT TO THE CDU. I CALLED, OUT, 'CLB, CLB,' THEN AGAIN, 'GO AROUND.' CAPT INITIATED THE GAR, HOWEVER WE BOTTOMED OUT 300-400' BELOW 1500' MINIMUM ALT AT 6.9 DME STILL TO THE N OF TRACK. WE REACHED VMC AT APPROX 1600'. WE WERE RADAR VECTORED BACK FOR THE APCH AGAIN AND NOTICED 30-40 DEG WIND CORRECTION ANGLE WAS REQUIRED TO STAY ON TRACK AND DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING AIRSPD AND ALT UNTIL VMC WAS REACHED. WE LANDED WITH NO FURTHER PROBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) KEPT HIGH BY APCH CTL. 2) ACCEPTING A CLRNC FOR A NON PRECISION APCH HIGH AND FAST. 3) FAILED TO USE AUTOPLT DURING NON PRECISION APCH AT A TIME OF HIGH WORKLOAD. 4) FAILED TO BRIEF ON HOW THE APCH WOULD BE CONDUCTED. 5) PF OVERESTIMATING HIS CURRENT ABILITY TO HAND-FLY DURING IMC, AS AUTOPLT IS RECOMMENDED AND USED MOST OF THE TIME. 6) FAILED TO RECOGNIZE AS WE PASSED BONDS THAT WE WENT FROM STRONG TAILWIND (APPROX 300 KTS GND SPD), SLOWING AND TURNING INTO THE WIND (APPROX 140 KTS GND SPD), TO NO LONGER BEING HIGH. 7) I SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE ASK FOR A 360 DEG TURN APCHING BONDS TO DSND AND SLOW DOWN TO BE ESTABLISHED PROPERLY ON THE APCH. 8) I SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED WE USE AUTOPLT AS WE DRIFTED N OF TRACK AND ASKED FOR RADAR VECTORS BACK AROUND FOR THE APCH. 9) PASSING BONDS, I SET 2100' IN THE ALT WINDOW. I SHOULD HAVE CALLED OUT, 'MAINTAIN 2100' TILL 7 DME,' AS THE DATA BASE GENERATED VOR DME APCH ON THE CDU DID NOT SHOW THE 7 DME STEP DOWN FIX AND LED THE CAPT TO BELIEVE HE COULD DOWN TO 1500'. 10) I FAILED TO CONTINUOUSLY XCHK THE INS AND RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL DANGER EARLY ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.