Narrative:

Flight was uneventful until approaching zzzzz; the final approach fix for runway xxr in ZZZ. When we placed the gear handle down; we received an ECAM for the landing gear doors not closed. The ECAM showed the gear down and locked but the gear doors in the fully extended position. I have seen the main gear doors open on the ground and know ground clearance is very close. Not knowing if they would clear on touchdown; I elected to go-around but kept the gear extended; planning to contact maintenance for guidance. The first officer flew the go-around and I asked her to stay below 220 kts. At 10;000 ft. MSL. I gave her the radios and asked her to tell ATC we would need delay vectors to troubleshoot the problem; while starting the ECAM procedure. I also made a PA announcement to the passengers quickly explaining the problem and telling them we were trouble shooting the problem.I referenced the QRH for left/G doors not closed; but the procedure is for when the doors don't retract on takeoff. The procedure directs to recycle the gear if the gear handle is up but does not address if the gear handle is down. I elected to cycle the gear up and down but the gear doors remained in the extended position. While I was doing this; I sent a message to dispatch to 'call me' and received no response. After several more minutes; I sent 'call me now.' I have a screen shot of the airinc frequencies on my ipad and was starting to retrieve it when I received the frequency on ACARS. I called ZZZ1 airinc but was not able to get immediate service because another aircraft was on the frequency. Eventually; I was patched to [another sector] and requested maintenance airframe. Waiting for maintenance; I continued running the ECAM when I received another ECAM F/control slat system 2 fault; and then a circuit breaker tripped ECAM for circuit breaker tripped on the aft panel followed by another ECAM for circuit breaker tripped on the overhead panel. The time delays were costing us valuable fuel which was now below 5;000 pounds. When we initiated the go-around; we had 7;700 pounds of fuel remaining but with the gear doors open and gear down our fuel was rapidly being depleted. I discovered after searching for tripped cbs they were associated with lgciu 1 and in lieu of the rapidly depleting fuel and the time delays; I elected to reset tripped cbs; hoping they might be the cause and the solution to the problem. The overhead circuit breaker reset but the aft one did not. I left the aft out.during all of this I noticed ATC had moved us to the south of the airport by almost 30 miles and I asked the first officer to have ATC keep us within 20 miles of the airport and a lot closer. Approach eventually worked us of to just southwest of the airport.by this time maintenance came on; we were down to almost 4;300 pounds of fuel; and I explained the situation with the cbs and the gear doors. Maintenance asked if the gear showed down and locked which it did and I asked if there was a possibility of the gear doors impacting the runway on landing. The maintenance controller said there was a possibility [of] the gear doors sparking on landing. I am not sure how I ended the conversation with the controller other than to say we will have to land with the doors open. At this point I called the flight attendants and told them to do a cabin prep for evacuation. I asked them how much time they needed and they replied 10 minutes. I said unable; you have five minutes. I made a PA announcement to the passengers and explained the situation and told them it is possible the gear doors might be a problem and we would be landing soon.the first officer had set up the FMGC for xxr and [requested priority handling from] ATC. I quickly briefed the approach and took the aircraft and asked her to tell ATC we needed to get the aircraft on the ground. I reminded her if the gear doors cause a problem and it leads to an evacuation; to grab the qrc and read the checklist. Just prior to landing; we received an ACARS message that said 'upon furtherreview; the gear doors should not be a problem.' great news but a little late. By now we were within the FAF for xxr. The approach was normal and at 500 feet AGL; I gave a 'brace brace brace' PA and the fas started their commands. I made a very smooth touchdown and the arff crew said there were no sparks on landing. We rolled to a stop on the high-speed taxiway with NWS and LGCIU1 inop; and I made a PA to 'remain seated; remain seated.' fuel was less than 3;400 pounds. We waited for a ground crew to come out and tow the airplane and they needed the gear pins that are stowed in the cockpit. We threw them out the first officer's side window to the ground crew. The ground crew's interphone radio initially was very readable but became very scratchy and unreadable. It might have been because there was a different cord with the tug. We used hand signals to verify brakes released. We made the slow trip to the terminal where I briefed the mechanics; and flight ops representatives. A couple of lessons.the QRH needs to address landing gear doors extended on landing. Would it have been better to retract the gear rather than leave them down? This would have reduced the fuel consumption rate and given us more time to trouble shoot the situation once maintenance was on the line.the fuel consumption rates with the gear doors open and gear down is incredibly high. The QRH says 15% for the doors only. We were fortunate we were tankering fuel to ZZZ and had extra; but if we had been at normal landing fuel amounts; the situation would have been worse. Also; the noise level with the gear doors open is very loud.I had multiple ecams popping up on top of each other; with the cbs tripping. I never did see an ECAM for LGCIU1 fault but it was listed in the inoperative systems. I was saturated.the lack of response from dispatch was frustrating and wasted valuable time and fuel exacerbating our situation. When I did get through to the maintenance controller; I was left with very little time to be able to make any evaluative decisions and had to go with what I knew at the time.having to go through a middle man (airinc) wastes time and when you get there you are on a party line.when I originally elected to go-around; I had no idea it would take us almost 35 minutes to get the aircraft back on the ground. The sense of time was very compressed. Had I known the gear doors would not be a hazard with them in the extended position; I probably would have elected to come back around immediately; evaluating the existing ECAM instead of wasting valuable time trying to contact maintenance; but I was trying to use all our available resources. They weren't readably available.training kicks in very fast. The flight attendants did a wonderful job preparing the cabin in a very short amount of time. It was the purser's second trip since training. The first officer; still on probation; did an outstanding job communicating to ATC; flying the aircraft; and setting us up for the follow-on approach. We were together as a crew; divided our tasks; and then came back together for the approach.I checked with maintenance the following day and the mechanics had not been able to fix the problems.writing this type of report has caused me to second guess and question all of my decisions. I should be satisfied the result was successful with no damage and no body injured. But I have to ask what could I; should I; have done better?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported that troubleshooting a landing gear door malfunction caused the aircraft to land with critically low fuel.

Narrative: Flight was uneventful until approaching ZZZZZ; the final approach fix for Runway XXR in ZZZ. When we placed the gear handle down; we received an ECAM for the landing gear doors not closed. The ECAM showed the gear down and locked but the gear doors in the fully extended position. I have seen the main gear doors open on the ground and know ground clearance is very close. Not knowing if they would clear on touchdown; I elected to go-around but kept the gear extended; planning to contact Maintenance for guidance. The First Officer flew the go-around and I asked her to stay below 220 kts. at 10;000 ft. MSL. I gave her the radios and asked her to tell ATC we would need delay vectors to troubleshoot the problem; while starting the ECAM procedure. I also made a PA announcement to the passengers quickly explaining the problem and telling them we were trouble shooting the problem.I referenced the QRH for L/G Doors not Closed; but the procedure is for when the doors don't retract on takeoff. The procedure directs to recycle the gear if the gear handle is up but does not address if the gear handle is down. I elected to cycle the gear up and down but the gear doors remained in the extended position. While I was doing this; I sent a message to Dispatch to 'Call Me' and received no response. After several more minutes; I sent 'Call ME NOW.' I have a screen shot of the AIRINC frequencies on my IPAD and was starting to retrieve it when I received the frequency on ACARS. I called ZZZ1 AIRINC but was not able to get immediate service because another aircraft was on the frequency. Eventually; I was patched to [another sector] and requested Maintenance Airframe. Waiting for Maintenance; I continued running the ECAM when I received another ECAM F/CTL Slat SYS 2 Fault; and then a CB tripped ECAM for CB tripped on the AFT panel followed by another ECAM for CB tripped on the overhead panel. The time delays were costing us valuable fuel which was now below 5;000 pounds. When we initiated the go-around; we had 7;700 pounds of fuel remaining but with the gear doors open and gear down our fuel was rapidly being depleted. I discovered after searching for tripped CBs they were associated with LGCIU 1 and in lieu of the rapidly depleting fuel and the time delays; I elected to reset tripped CBs; hoping they might be the cause and the solution to the problem. The overhead CB reset but the AFT one did not. I left the AFT out.During all of this I noticed ATC had moved us to the south of the airport by almost 30 miles and I asked the First Officer to have ATC keep us within 20 miles of the airport and a lot closer. Approach eventually worked us of to just southwest of the airport.By this time Maintenance came on; we were down to almost 4;300 pounds of fuel; and I explained the situation with the CBs and the gear doors. Maintenance asked if the gear showed down and locked which it did and I asked if there was a possibility of the gear doors impacting the runway on landing. The Maintenance Controller said there was a possibility [of] the gear doors sparking on landing. I am not sure how I ended the conversation with the Controller other than to say we will have to land with the doors open. At this point I called the Flight Attendants and told them to do a Cabin Prep for Evacuation. I asked them how much time they needed and they replied 10 minutes. I said unable; you have five minutes. I made a PA announcement to the passengers and explained the situation and told them it is possible the gear doors might be a problem and we would be landing soon.The First Officer had set up the FMGC for XXR and [requested priority handling from] ATC. I quickly briefed the approach and took the aircraft and asked her to tell ATC we needed to get the aircraft on the ground. I reminded her if the gear doors cause a problem and it leads to an evacuation; to grab the QRC and read the checklist. Just prior to landing; we received an ACARS message that said 'Upon furtherreview; the gear doors should not be a problem.' Great news but a little late. By now we were within the FAF for XXR. The approach was normal and at 500 feet AGL; I gave a 'BRACE BRACE BRACE' PA and the FAs started their commands. I made a very smooth touchdown and the ARFF crew said there were no sparks on landing. We rolled to a stop on the high-speed taxiway with NWS and LGCIU1 inop; and I made a PA to 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated.' Fuel was less than 3;400 pounds. We waited for a ground crew to come out and tow the airplane and they needed the gear pins that are stowed in the cockpit. We threw them out the FO's side window to the ground crew. The ground crew's interphone radio initially was very readable but became very scratchy and unreadable. It might have been because there was a different cord with the tug. We used hand signals to verify brakes released. We made the slow trip to the terminal where I briefed the mechanics; and Flight Ops representatives. A couple of lessons.The QRH needs to address Landing Gear Doors Extended on Landing. Would it have been better to retract the gear rather than leave them down? This would have reduced the fuel consumption rate and given us more time to trouble shoot the situation once Maintenance was on the line.The fuel consumption rates with the gear doors open and gear down is incredibly high. The QRH says 15% for the doors only. We were fortunate we were tankering fuel to ZZZ and had extra; but if we had been at normal landing fuel amounts; the situation would have been worse. Also; the noise level with the gear doors open is very loud.I had multiple ECAMS popping up on top of each other; with the CBs tripping. I never did see an ECAM for LGCIU1 fault but it was listed in the INOP systems. I was saturated.The lack of response from Dispatch was frustrating and wasted valuable time and fuel exacerbating our situation. When I did get through to the Maintenance Controller; I was left with very little time to be able to make any evaluative decisions and had to go with what I knew at the time.Having to go through a middle man (AIRINC) wastes time and when you get there you are on a party line.When I originally elected to go-around; I had no idea it would take us almost 35 minutes to get the aircraft back on the ground. The sense of time was very compressed. Had I known the gear doors would not be a hazard with them in the extended position; I probably would have elected to come back around immediately; evaluating the existing ECAM instead of wasting valuable time trying to contact Maintenance; but I was trying to use all our available resources. They weren't readably available.Training kicks in very fast. The Flight Attendants did a wonderful job preparing the cabin in a very short amount of time. It was the Purser's second trip since training. The First Officer; still on probation; did an outstanding job communicating to ATC; flying the aircraft; and setting us up for the follow-on approach. We were together as a crew; divided our tasks; and then came back together for the approach.I checked with Maintenance the following day and the mechanics had not been able to fix the problems.Writing this type of report has caused me to second guess and question all of my decisions. I should be satisfied the result was successful with no damage and no body injured. But I have to ask what could I; should I; have done better?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.