Narrative:

When we got clearance to taxi in bos, we were told that we would have 15 min delay if we wanted to take 22, the ATIS advertised runway, but that we could get right out if we took 15. The winds were favorable, so I decided on 15. We did the checklists and were given 'position and hold.' as we took the runway, the before takeoff checklist was accomplished up to the 'lights.' I heard the clearance to takeoff and turned on the lights and turned the throttles over to the copilot, since it was his leg. As we were rolling at about 60 KTS, I was nagged by the feeling that perhaps I rushed the takeoff, but before I could call the tower, we got a yellow caution light on our EICAS which distracted me. The runway was wet, so I did not want to abort since we were now over 100 KTS and the runway was clear. As we were rolling along, the tower gave us a heading of 090 degrees, which is different from the SID. This made sense since they were shooting approachs to 27, but it added to my uneasiness because this should have been given at the takeoff clearance, although the aircraft that took off in front of us was not so cleared. Anyhow, we departed and climbed to FL390 where we got a smooth ride and things seemed to settle down. About 200 mi out of atl, we were told to descend to FL310. We started getting moderate turbulence almost immediately after leaving FL390. At level off, we were really bouncing around, so we decided to ask for lower and was given FL180 with a crossing restriction to cross ? Intersection at 12000'. I was trying to get the ATIS as we were descending and look at the radar at the same time. I did not read the radar correctly. There was considerable 'red' returns in front of us, but we could see the clouds layer and it just looked like a stratus layer below us and there were no reported buildups. Just as soon as we leveled off in the clouds which did have light rain in them), there was a streak of blue on my side and a huge explosion which knocked off the autoplt and, of course, set off all the flashing lights and warning horns. Both the copilot and I was flash-blinded, but I could still make out the INS, so I took over the aircraft and kept us level while we determined what the problem was. We were still in the rain and were getting constant static discharges. I don't think that I would have been too upset if I had been in an large transport X, but it shook me up somewhat in the large transport Y because of its electronic dependence. Anyway, we continued to make our crossing restriction and got out of the heavy electrical activity. Since it was CAT III WX, I continued to fly the aircraft and had the descent and approach checklists accomplished. We were given clearance to descend, a heading and clearance to shoot the approach to 8L. The aircraft did not lock on the ILS as we crossed the inbound heading, although the ILS showed that it was armed and the glide path was indeed locked on. We could see we where we were because the FMS was set up, but the autoplt would not lock on the localizer, so I called the tower that we were abandoning the approach. The WX had improved to CAT I minimums, so I turned the aircraft back over to the copilot and double-checked the frequency. Just as I thought, the copilot had tuned the wrong frequency. This is why we got the G/south lock on, but not the localizer. The flight director looked like it was giving good information as far as the x-hairs, but the 'localizer' never turned green, telling us that it was really locked on. On our initial approach, we had compared approach plates and briefed as by standard procedures, but I did not check the identify myself since I was both flying and covering the radios. The copilot was under the impression that the systems were malfunctioning and the heavy electrical discharges that we had just experienced led some credence to that idea. Anyhow, another approach was made successfully. I did not immediately inform the copilot what the problem was since I was very upset and we had yet another leg to fly that night and I did not want to shake him up more than he was. Later I explained to him what had happened and told him that this was a 'live and learn' situation, but I was not happy with our performance. This is very embarrassing for me to relate this to you, but maybe it will be of some worth to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF WITHOUT CLRNC. ACFT EQUIPMENT PROBLEM. FLT CREW DISTR TASK.

Narrative: WHEN WE GOT CLRNC TO TAXI IN BOS, WE WERE TOLD THAT WE WOULD HAVE 15 MIN DELAY IF WE WANTED TO TAKE 22, THE ATIS ADVERTISED RWY, BUT THAT WE COULD GET RIGHT OUT IF WE TOOK 15. THE WINDS WERE FAVORABLE, SO I DECIDED ON 15. WE DID THE CHKLISTS AND WERE GIVEN 'POS AND HOLD.' AS WE TOOK THE RWY, THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED UP TO THE 'LIGHTS.' I HEARD THE CLRNC TO TKOF AND TURNED ON THE LIGHTS AND TURNED THE THROTTLES OVER TO THE COPLT, SINCE IT WAS HIS LEG. AS WE WERE ROLLING AT ABOUT 60 KTS, I WAS NAGGED BY THE FEELING THAT PERHAPS I RUSHED THE TKOF, BUT BEFORE I COULD CALL THE TWR, WE GOT A YELLOW CAUTION LIGHT ON OUR EICAS WHICH DISTRACTED ME. THE RWY WAS WET, SO I DID NOT WANT TO ABORT SINCE WE WERE NOW OVER 100 KTS AND THE RWY WAS CLR. AS WE WERE ROLLING ALONG, THE TWR GAVE US A HDG OF 090 DEGS, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THE SID. THIS MADE SENSE SINCE THEY WERE SHOOTING APCHS TO 27, BUT IT ADDED TO MY UNEASINESS BECAUSE THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AT THE TKOF CLRNC, ALTHOUGH THE ACFT THAT TOOK OFF IN FRONT OF US WAS NOT SO CLRED. ANYHOW, WE DEPARTED AND CLBED TO FL390 WHERE WE GOT A SMOOTH RIDE AND THINGS SEEMED TO SETTLE DOWN. ABOUT 200 MI OUT OF ATL, WE WERE TOLD TO DSND TO FL310. WE STARTED GETTING MODERATE TURB ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING FL390. AT LEVEL OFF, WE WERE REALLY BOUNCING AROUND, SO WE DECIDED TO ASK FOR LOWER AND WAS GIVEN FL180 WITH A XING RESTRICTION TO CROSS ? INTXN AT 12000'. I WAS TRYING TO GET THE ATIS AS WE WERE DSNDING AND LOOK AT THE RADAR AT THE SAME TIME. I DID NOT READ THE RADAR CORRECTLY. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE 'RED' RETURNS IN FRONT OF US, BUT WE COULD SEE THE CLOUDS LAYER AND IT JUST LOOKED LIKE A STRATUS LAYER BELOW US AND THERE WERE NO RPTED BUILDUPS. JUST AS SOON AS WE LEVELED OFF IN THE CLOUDS WHICH DID HAVE LIGHT RAIN IN THEM), THERE WAS A STREAK OF BLUE ON MY SIDE AND A HUGE EXPLOSION WHICH KNOCKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND, OF COURSE, SET OFF ALL THE FLASHING LIGHTS AND WARNING HORNS. BOTH THE COPLT AND I WAS FLASH-BLINDED, BUT I COULD STILL MAKE OUT THE INS, SO I TOOK OVER THE ACFT AND KEPT US LEVEL WHILE WE DETERMINED WHAT THE PROB WAS. WE WERE STILL IN THE RAIN AND WERE GETTING CONSTANT STATIC DISCHARGES. I DON'T THINK THAT I WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO UPSET IF I HAD BEEN IN AN LGT X, BUT IT SHOOK ME UP SOMEWHAT IN THE LGT Y BECAUSE OF ITS ELECTRONIC DEPENDENCE. ANYWAY, WE CONTINUED TO MAKE OUR XING RESTRICTION AND GOT OUT OF THE HVY ELECTRICAL ACTIVITY. SINCE IT WAS CAT III WX, I CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT AND HAD THE DSNT AND APCH CHKLISTS ACCOMPLISHED. WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO DSND, A HDG AND CLRNC TO SHOOT THE APCH TO 8L. THE ACFT DID NOT LOCK ON THE ILS AS WE CROSSED THE INBND HDG, ALTHOUGH THE ILS SHOWED THAT IT WAS ARMED AND THE GLIDE PATH WAS INDEED LOCKED ON. WE COULD SEE WE WHERE WE WERE BECAUSE THE FMS WAS SET UP, BUT THE AUTOPLT WOULD NOT LOCK ON THE LOC, SO I CALLED THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABANDONING THE APCH. THE WX HAD IMPROVED TO CAT I MINIMUMS, SO I TURNED THE ACFT BACK OVER TO THE COPLT AND DOUBLE-CHKED THE FREQ. JUST AS I THOUGHT, THE COPLT HAD TUNED THE WRONG FREQ. THIS IS WHY WE GOT THE G/S LOCK ON, BUT NOT THE LOC. THE FLT DIRECTOR LOOKED LIKE IT WAS GIVING GOOD INFO AS FAR AS THE X-HAIRS, BUT THE 'LOC' NEVER TURNED GREEN, TELLING US THAT IT WAS REALLY LOCKED ON. ON OUR INITIAL APCH, WE HAD COMPARED APCH PLATES AND BRIEFED AS BY STANDARD PROCS, BUT I DID NOT CHK THE IDENT MYSELF SINCE I WAS BOTH FLYING AND COVERING THE RADIOS. THE COPLT WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SYSTEMS WERE MALFUNCTIONING AND THE HVY ELECTRICAL DISCHARGES THAT WE HAD JUST EXPERIENCED LED SOME CREDENCE TO THAT IDEA. ANYHOW, ANOTHER APCH WAS MADE SUCCESSFULLY. I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE COPLT WHAT THE PROB WAS SINCE I WAS VERY UPSET AND WE HAD YET ANOTHER LEG TO FLY THAT NIGHT AND I DID NOT WANT TO SHAKE HIM UP MORE THAN HE WAS. LATER I EXPLAINED TO HIM WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS A 'LIVE AND LEARN' SITUATION, BUT I WAS NOT HAPPY WITH OUR PERFORMANCE. THIS IS VERY EMBARRASSING FOR ME TO RELATE THIS TO YOU, BUT MAYBE IT WILL BE OF SOME WORTH TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.