Narrative:

After ATC handoff to ewr tower during approach to runway 22L; the captain pm (pilot monitoring); was unable to get any reply (after 2-3 check-in transmissions) from the tower controller; who seemed highly preoccupied with conversations/clearances to aircraft on the ground taxiways. At the 1000 afe (above field elevation); both pm and PF (pilot flying) verified 'no landing clearance' and; at approximately 500 afe 'runway is clear. 'Thereafter; it was my expectation that we would either get a late landing clearance during a break in the tower comms; or that we would execute a go-around from a safe in-close altitude. Nonetheless; I continually scanned the runway and adjacent taxiways (as well as monitoring the tower frequency for possible runway conflicts; all of which presented no apparent hazards. No break in the tower comms with other aircraft (all/most of which were on the ground) occurred. At approximately 150-200 AGL on a perfectly stabilized approach; I verbalized 'we don't have a landing clearance' to my fellow pilots. The captain then directed the PF to land the aircraft. While this surprised me; it was clear that the runway and adjacent taxiways were clear; and that a forced 'go around' from my seat could prove hazardous; considering our very low altitude ~100 afe; and any delay/confusion from the contradictory messages. Of secondary concern was the additional comm load and confusion we would create on the already jammed tower frequency by executing what would likely be a very surprising go-around; back into his airspace. Landing; taxi to the gate; and all subsequent ATC communications were uneventful. After engine shutdown and completion of the parking checklist; we pilots discussed the events in detail. This conversation made clear that each of us was monitoring many considerations all the way down the approach; constantly evaluating the safest comm and maneuvering options. Each of us did what we felt was safest; moment to evolving moment; and also would have changed certain choices considering how the event played out. In retrospect; I regret that we landed without a clearance. We had plenty of fuel and clear skies; a crew-coordinated go-around from a safe altitude (above ~ 150-200 AGL) perhaps would have been the better option. Every second of any pilot talking (especially me; the international relief officer) created another possible missed radio call; of course; but I likely could have better addressed the creeping threat by asking early - perhaps approaching 500 AGL - 'are we prepared to go missed?' if a directed go-around later became necessary; at least it would come as less of a startling or confusion-inducing surprise.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew reported the inability to obtain landing clearance at Newark due to frequency congestion; ultimately resulted in a landing without clearance after visually clearing the runway.

Narrative: After ATC handoff to EWR tower during approach to runway 22L; the Captain PM (Pilot Monitoring); was unable to get any reply (after 2-3 check-in transmissions) from the tower controller; who seemed highly preoccupied with conversations/clearances to aircraft on the ground taxiways. At the 1000 AFE (Above Field Elevation); both PM and PF (Pilot Flying) verified 'no landing clearance' and; at approximately 500 AFE 'runway is clear. 'Thereafter; it was my expectation that we would either get a late landing clearance during a break in the Tower COMMs; or that we would execute a go-around from a safe in-close altitude. Nonetheless; I continually scanned the runway and adjacent taxiways (as well as monitoring the Tower frequency for possible runway conflicts; all of which presented no apparent hazards. No break in the Tower COMMs with other aircraft (all/most of which were on the ground) occurred. At approximately 150-200 AGL on a perfectly stabilized approach; I verbalized 'We don't have a landing clearance' to my fellow pilots. The Captain then directed the PF to land the aircraft. While this surprised me; it was clear that the runway and adjacent taxiways were clear; and that a forced 'Go around' from my seat could prove hazardous; considering our very low altitude ~100 AFE; and any delay/confusion from the contradictory messages. Of secondary concern was the additional COMM load and confusion we would create on the already jammed Tower frequency by executing what would likely be a very surprising go-around; back into his airspace. Landing; taxi to the gate; and all subsequent ATC communications were uneventful. After engine shutdown and completion of the Parking Checklist; we pilots discussed the events in detail. This conversation made clear that each of us was monitoring many considerations all the way down the approach; constantly evaluating the safest COMM and maneuvering options. Each of us did what we felt was safest; moment to evolving moment; and also would have changed certain choices considering how the event played out. In retrospect; I regret that we landed without a clearance. We had plenty of fuel and clear skies; a crew-coordinated go-around from a safe altitude (above ~ 150-200 AGL) perhaps would have been the better option. Every second of any pilot talking (especially me; the IRO) created another possible missed radio call; of course; but I likely could have better addressed the creeping threat by asking early - perhaps approaching 500 AGL - 'Are we prepared to go missed?' If a directed go-around later became necessary; at least it would come as less of a startling or confusion-inducing surprise.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.