Narrative:

This aircraft has had a torque matching problem for several months. Maintenance has attempted to correct problem but to no avail. Sometimes during the takeoff and/or landing torque/temperature matching seems to creep up or down when takeoff or hover power is demanded. I, plus others, have complained that this problem cannot continue. During the scene call I was given landing information by a fireman on the radio. He stated 'you have a clear approach path from the west. Wires are north, south, and east of the landing area with 150' trees on either side. The winds are calm and variable.' on final approach at approximately 100' the helicopter encountered settling with power. A strong tailwind had ensued my helicopter. I immediately took evasive action flying forward, but due to the fact that tall trees were approaching me, I applied takeoff power. Verifying my departure path, I again executed my power settings and saw that my torque/temperature had split. Because of the situation I was unsure if I had exceeded any limitations. I then made an approach from the east over the trees and landed at the scene. At that time I was reviewing the past 5 mins. The crew was also preparing and transporting the severely injured person to my ship. I decided the helicopter was safe to fly but further investigation into a review of what exact numbers were pulled would be necessary. While waiting at the hospital, I reviewed the incident. I discovered that due to the fact that the cockpit lights were turned down to a dim setting, so that the dark areas around the accident site were clearly visible, I had actually pulled 850 degree total on #2 engine and not 810-820 degree. The #2 torque had only produced 127 percent. Total on #1 was below 800 degree. I was now in this situation for several seconds before clearing the trees, while attempting to match torque to a lower setting. The manual says for one engine operation you may pull 147 percent but for two engines may only pull 131 percent. Since one engine was split for below the other which limitation applied? Later the lead pilot, I and a mechanic decided that I had indeed exceeded a limitation. The question still remains, should I be penalized for reporting the truth? I felt the helicopter was not unsafe for flight and transported a dying man to the nearest hospital. According to my company, I should have left that man there (hoping that the ambulance ride would not cause that man's death) and returned to the airport. In the future, I will not allow an operator to coerce me into flying an aircraft which I feel is on the border of safe operations!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING NIGHT APCH TO OFF ARPT SCENE TO PICK UP INJURED PASSENGER, PLT OF HELICOPTER OVER TORQUED #2 ENGINE WITH RESULTANT OVERTEMP. PLT MADE DECISION TO TKOF WITH PASSENGER AND FLEW TO HOSPITAL. LATER LEAD PLT AND MAINTENANCE DECIDED PLT SHOULD NOT HAVE FLOWN THE PASSENGER TO HOSPITAL.

Narrative: THIS ACFT HAS HAD A TORQUE MATCHING PROB FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. MAINT HAS ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT PROB BUT TO NO AVAIL. SOMETIMES DURING THE TKOF AND/OR LNDG TORQUE/TEMP MATCHING SEEMS TO CREEP UP OR DOWN WHEN TKOF OR HOVER PWR IS DEMANDED. I, PLUS OTHERS, HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THIS PROB CANNOT CONTINUE. DURING THE SCENE CALL I WAS GIVEN LNDG INFO BY A FIREMAN ON THE RADIO. HE STATED 'YOU HAVE A CLR APCH PATH FROM THE W. WIRES ARE N, S, AND E OF THE LNDG AREA WITH 150' TREES ON EITHER SIDE. THE WINDS ARE CALM AND VARIABLE.' ON FINAL APCH AT APPROX 100' THE HELI ENCOUNTERED SETTLING WITH PWR. A STRONG TAILWIND HAD ENSUED MY HELI. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK EVASIVE ACTION FLYING FORWARD, BUT DUE TO THE FACT THAT TALL TREES WERE APCHING ME, I APPLIED TKOF PWR. VERIFYING MY DEP PATH, I AGAIN EXECUTED MY PWR SETTINGS AND SAW THAT MY TORQUE/TEMP HAD SPLIT. BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION I WAS UNSURE IF I HAD EXCEEDED ANY LIMITATIONS. I THEN MADE AN APCH FROM THE E OVER THE TREES AND LANDED AT THE SCENE. AT THAT TIME I WAS REVIEWING THE PAST 5 MINS. THE CREW WAS ALSO PREPARING AND TRANSPORTING THE SEVERELY INJURED PERSON TO MY SHIP. I DECIDED THE HELI WAS SAFE TO FLY BUT FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO A REVIEW OF WHAT EXACT NUMBERS WERE PULLED WOULD BE NECESSARY. WHILE WAITING AT THE HOSPITAL, I REVIEWED THE INCIDENT. I DISCOVERED THAT DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE COCKPIT LIGHTS WERE TURNED DOWN TO A DIM SETTING, SO THAT THE DARK AREAS AROUND THE ACCIDENT SITE WERE CLRLY VISIBLE, I HAD ACTUALLY PULLED 850 DEG TOTAL ON #2 ENG AND NOT 810-820 DEG. THE #2 TORQUE HAD ONLY PRODUCED 127 PERCENT. TOTAL ON #1 WAS BELOW 800 DEG. I WAS NOW IN THIS SITUATION FOR SEVERAL SECS BEFORE CLRING THE TREES, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MATCH TORQUE TO A LOWER SETTING. THE MANUAL SAYS FOR ONE ENG OPERATION YOU MAY PULL 147 PERCENT BUT FOR TWO ENGS MAY ONLY PULL 131 PERCENT. SINCE ONE ENG WAS SPLIT FOR BELOW THE OTHER WHICH LIMITATION APPLIED? LATER THE LEAD PLT, I AND A MECH DECIDED THAT I HAD INDEED EXCEEDED A LIMITATION. THE QUESTION STILL REMAINS, SHOULD I BE PENALIZED FOR RPTING THE TRUTH? I FELT THE HELI WAS NOT UNSAFE FOR FLT AND TRANSPORTED A DYING MAN TO THE NEAREST HOSPITAL. ACCORDING TO MY COMPANY, I SHOULD HAVE LEFT THAT MAN THERE (HOPING THAT THE AMBULANCE RIDE WOULD NOT CAUSE THAT MAN'S DEATH) AND RETURNED TO THE ARPT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT ALLOW AN OPERATOR TO COERCE ME INTO FLYING AN ACFT WHICH I FEEL IS ON THE BORDER OF SAFE OPS!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.