Narrative:

Pilot reported the aircraft had an abnormally low RPM indication and a lower-than-normal rate of climb during initial climb-out; followed by smoke emanating from the cowling after landing.upon rotation and takeoff from runway xx at ZZZ; I realized that the aircraft performance was sluggish; and I was not attaining my normal rate of climb for the aircraft. At approximately 600 feet. MSL I was reading 2600 RPM (1000 lower than normal) and 63-65 kts for best rate of climb; but became concerned. At that point I retracted flaps and lowered the nose to gain airspeed; increasing it to approximately 73-75 kts; but without appreciable improvement in rate of climb.at that point I decided to return to the airport and called ATC; first reporting; as I recall; insufficient power and immediately thereafter returning to land.the engine continued at about the same RPM and the aircraft continued to climb to approx. 900 feet MSL when I was ready to turn base. I made a normal; stable approach; increasing from takeoff to full flaps and approximately 70 kts. I landed without incident and made the first taxi turn off to ZZZ south ramp; with instructions from ATC to proceed to tie down. ATC inquired whether I needed assistance; and I responded; 'negative.'I taxied normally to [gate] and turned for line up to the tie down. At that point smoke started emanating from the cowling with an acrid smell; and my G1000 gave warnings of engine overheat and low oil pressure. I immediately shut off the engine (mixture idle cutoff; throttle idle) and turned the fuel selector to off. I then turned off the ignition and the master switch and lights. My passenger and I then disembarked the aircraft. Smoke continued coming from the cowling; but there was no evidence of fire.thinking that I had failed to tighten the oil dipstick before departing and that oil had leaked on the engine; I walked around the nose and checked; but the dipstick was tight. At that point I walked back around the nose of the aircraft and realized that the cowl flaps were still installed. I removed them immediately to allow the engine to cool.analysis of cause:root cause of this engine failure was obviously pilot failure to perform all elements of the pre-flight checklist. The background and reason for this pilot failure was an attempt to expedite the pre-flight check externally by working from memory; exacerbated by having a new; non-pilot passenger with whom I was conversing; and a suspense to return the airplane for the next rental. I had scheduled the aircraft for XA00; but the flight school office did not open until XB00; and I had not made prior arrangement to obtain the keys and flight book early. In addition; when reserving the aircraft; I realized that another pilot had reserved the aircraft for XC00; and I wanted to maximize the amount of time my passenger and I would have in the air.my passenger and I arrived at the airfield early; at approx. XA15; and knowing the aircraft rental office and keys were unavailable; we went immediately to the aircraft to do the external pre-flight check. I first checked the oil and ordered fuel. We then removed the canopy cover; stall horn plug; and pitot cover; but failed to complete the nose check of the aircraft or to notice and remove the cowl plugs. I untied the aircraft at all points; checked aircraft surfaces; and placed all equipment near the rear passenger canopy ready to stow.I returned to the office to pick up the flight book and keys; and subsequently for a pair of headphones.upon returning to the aircraft; I was mindful of the time; but did not rush; anticipating that I would have a full 30 minutes of flight time; which was sufficient for the purpose of introducing my passenger to the airplane and his second flight in a small aircraft (first in the diamond). I first used the allen wrenches in the flight book to tighten all the nuts in the nose wheel fairing; and missing the opportunity to checkthe nose or notice the installed cowling plugs. Knowing I had not checked the fuel; I retrieved the fuel drainer and checked for contamination at all three points; finding none and returning the fuel to the tanks; but again failing to notice in crossing in front of the nose that the cowl flaps remained installed.before entering the aircraft; I activated the master switch; adjusted the electrically-powered rudder pedals; turned on the lights and checked all the lights on the wings and the pitot heat; passing in front of the nose once again and failing to notice that the cowl plugs remained installed.after entering the aircraft; I went through the entire pre-start checklist; including the exterior; but only looked at the exterior portions cursorily; believing that I had covered them all. I would note at this point; that I also failed to do a final 360 degree walk around of the aircraft.because overnight temperatures were at freezing; I used the cold start procedures; and the engine turned over normally. Pre-taxi checks were normal; and I departed the tie down for runway xx and the run up.in hindsight; the aircraft did not seem as lively as it usually is during taxi; but power application running from 1000-1400 RPM all seemed normal.run up appeared normal; except that in circulating the propeller three times; the recovery to 2000 RPM was more sluggish than normal. I attributed this; however; to the cold weather.upon receipt of take-off clearance from ATC; I moved to runway centerline and again checked all engine instruments; all of which were reading mid-green. Engine oil pressure at 1000 RPM was - as is usual - just in the yellow; but responded immediately to mid-green when I advanced the throttle.when I began the take-off roll; the aircraft did not seem to accelerate as quickly as it normally does; and it seemed to take a split second longer to go from 55 kts to rotation at 60 kts. I do not recall if; during the take-off roll; I noticed that the RPM reached only 2600 rather than the full 2700.in hindsight - between the sluggish propeller response and the sluggish acceleration - I should have aborted the take-off. Lessons learned:1. Use and follow every step of the checklist; ensuring that a written or electronic form is in hand when one begins the pre-flight.2. Do not attempt to expedite procedures due to artificial time constraints. Better to cancel the flight than rush the procedures.3. When introducing a passenger to the aircraft or to flying; ask him / her to assist by using and calling out checklist items. This will ensure full involvement and avoid distractions.4. Despite how well you believe you know the aircraft and its procedures; the occasional pilot should not trust that he / she has them committed to memory.5. Buy new cowling plugs with the little flags that stick up over the cowling so the pilot will notice them if not removed. (Closing the barn door after the horse has left.)6. Although not part of the official diamond da-40 pre-flight checklist; safety advocates and the aircraft rental and training facility leasing the aircraft; procedures call for a 360 final walk-around prior to engine start up. This should be used.7. My story now fits those of other pilots; whose emergency occurrences in some of my recent reading have prompted a similar observation - pay attention to those nagging little details (some would call it intuition) that don't seem right. Better to cancel or abort the flight and start all over again than to ascribe an unusual performance to benign causes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA-40 pilot reported a loss of power during climb; resulting in a precautionary landing and smoke emanating from the engine after landing.

Narrative: Pilot reported the aircraft had an abnormally low RPM indication and a lower-than-normal rate of climb during initial climb-out; followed by smoke emanating from the cowling after landing.Upon rotation and takeoff from Runway XX at ZZZ; I realized that the aircraft performance was sluggish; and I was not attaining my normal rate of climb for the aircraft. At approximately 600 feet. MSL I was reading 2600 RPM (1000 lower than normal) and 63-65 kts for best rate of climb; but became concerned. At that point I retracted flaps and lowered the nose to gain airspeed; increasing it to approximately 73-75 kts; but without appreciable improvement in rate of climb.At that point I decided to return to the airport and called ATC; first reporting; as I recall; insufficient power and immediately thereafter returning to land.The engine continued at about the same RPM and the aircraft continued to climb to approx. 900 feet MSL when I was ready to turn base. I made a normal; stable approach; increasing from takeoff to full flaps and approximately 70 kts. I landed without incident and made the first taxi turn off to ZZZ south ramp; with instructions from ATC to proceed to tie down. ATC inquired whether I needed assistance; and I responded; 'Negative.'I taxied normally to [gate] and turned for line up to the tie down. At that point smoke started emanating from the cowling with an acrid smell; and my G1000 gave warnings of engine overheat and low oil pressure. I immediately shut off the engine (mixture idle cutoff; throttle idle) and turned the fuel selector to off. I then turned off the ignition and the master switch and lights. My passenger and I then disembarked the aircraft. Smoke continued coming from the cowling; but there was no evidence of fire.Thinking that I had failed to tighten the oil dipstick before departing and that oil had leaked on the engine; I walked around the nose and checked; but the dipstick was tight. At that point I walked back around the nose of the aircraft and realized that the cowl flaps were still installed. I removed them immediately to allow the engine to cool.Analysis of Cause:Root cause of this engine failure was obviously pilot failure to perform all elements of the pre-flight checklist. The background and reason for this pilot failure was an attempt to expedite the pre-flight check externally by working from memory; exacerbated by having a new; non-pilot passenger with whom I was conversing; and a suspense to return the airplane for the next rental. I had scheduled the aircraft for XA00; but the flight school office did not open until XB00; and I had not made prior arrangement to obtain the keys and flight book early. In addition; when reserving the aircraft; I realized that another pilot had reserved the aircraft for XC00; and I wanted to maximize the amount of time my passenger and I would have in the air.My passenger and I arrived at the airfield early; at approx. XA15; and knowing the aircraft rental office and keys were unavailable; we went immediately to the aircraft to do the external pre-flight check. I first checked the oil and ordered fuel. We then removed the canopy cover; stall horn plug; and pitot cover; but failed to complete the nose check of the aircraft or to notice and remove the cowl plugs. I untied the aircraft at all points; checked aircraft surfaces; and placed all equipment near the rear passenger canopy ready to stow.I returned to the office to pick up the flight book and keys; and subsequently for a pair of headphones.Upon returning to the aircraft; I was mindful of the time; but did not rush; anticipating that I would have a full 30 minutes of flight time; which was sufficient for the purpose of introducing my passenger to the airplane and his second flight in a small aircraft (first in the Diamond). I first used the Allen wrenches in the flight book to tighten all the nuts in the nose wheel fairing; and missing the opportunity to checkthe nose or notice the installed cowling plugs. Knowing I had not checked the fuel; I retrieved the fuel drainer and checked for contamination at all three points; finding none and returning the fuel to the tanks; but again failing to notice in crossing in front of the nose that the cowl flaps remained installed.Before entering the aircraft; I activated the master switch; adjusted the electrically-powered rudder pedals; turned on the lights and checked all the lights on the wings and the pitot heat; passing in front of the nose once again and failing to notice that the cowl plugs remained installed.After entering the aircraft; I went through the entire pre-start checklist; including the exterior; but only looked at the exterior portions cursorily; believing that I had covered them all. I would note at this point; that I also failed to do a final 360 degree walk around of the aircraft.Because overnight temperatures were at freezing; I used the cold start procedures; and the engine turned over normally. Pre-taxi checks were normal; and I departed the tie down for Runway XX and the run up.In hindsight; the aircraft did not seem as lively as it usually is during taxi; but power application running from 1000-1400 RPM all seemed normal.Run up appeared normal; except that in circulating the propeller three times; the recovery to 2000 RPM was more sluggish than normal. I attributed this; however; to the cold weather.Upon receipt of take-off clearance from ATC; I moved to runway centerline and again checked all engine instruments; all of which were reading mid-green. Engine oil pressure at 1000 RPM was - as is usual - just in the yellow; but responded immediately to mid-green when I advanced the throttle.When I began the take-off roll; the aircraft did not seem to accelerate as quickly as it normally does; and it seemed to take a split second longer to go from 55 kts to rotation at 60 kts. I do not recall if; during the take-off roll; I noticed that the RPM reached only 2600 rather than the full 2700.In hindsight - between the sluggish propeller response and the sluggish acceleration - I should have aborted the take-off. Lessons Learned:1. Use and follow every step of the checklist; ensuring that a written or electronic form is in hand when one begins the pre-flight.2. Do not attempt to expedite procedures due to artificial time constraints. Better to cancel the flight than rush the procedures.3. When introducing a passenger to the aircraft or to flying; ask him / her to assist by using and calling out checklist items. This will ensure full involvement and avoid distractions.4. Despite how well you believe you know the aircraft and its procedures; the occasional pilot should not trust that he / she has them committed to memory.5. Buy new cowling plugs with the little flags that stick up over the cowling so the pilot will notice them if not removed. (Closing the barn door after the horse has left.)6. Although not part of the official Diamond DA-40 pre-flight checklist; safety advocates and the aircraft rental and training facility leasing the aircraft; procedures call for a 360 final walk-around prior to engine start up. This should be used.7. My story now fits those of other pilots; whose emergency occurrences in some of my recent reading have prompted a similar observation - pay attention to those nagging little details (some would call it intuition) that don't seem right. Better to cancel or abort the flight and start all over again than to ascribe an unusual performance to benign causes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.