Narrative:

On approach to pit, ATIS information was reporting runway 28R in use and on initial call to control we were given runway 28R as our runway. We were given descent to 3000' on radar vector. The first officer had tuned and idented the localizer for runway 28R. All indications seemed normal. At a point when it appeared that we were on a downwind for runway 28R, approach control gave us a left turn to 350 degrees to intercept the localizer, cleared for an approach to runway 32. By the time we got the FMC reporgrammed, we were not in position to make an approach. We requested to be vectored back around for another approach. He gave us a left turn around. As we turned the localizer with the autoplt on, the localizer still showed off to the right. The autoplt locked on and started a left turn. We did a quick check of the radios and they were tuned properly. At this point, I declared a missed approach and I was still thinking of missed approach altitude for runway 28R which is 5000'. As we went through 4000', approach control told us to maintain 4000'. I requested vectors downwind so as to give us a chance to see if we could figure out the indication problem. The FMC and localizer were both set up right. We did a raw data approach and had no problem. I feel that this was caused by confusion of which runway was in use and by myself accepting an approach that I had not reviewed and an indication problem that I still cannot explain. I should have requested extra vectors to review the approach. Supplemental information from acn 170237. As we began the approach, we noted that the computed map data was offset to the left from the raw data localizer. As we approached triny (OM), the localizer was indicating deflection to the right with the F/D commanding a left turn. My FMC CRT blinked off momentarily as if to be resyncing, however no such message was annunciated (no FMC entry had been made in several mins). Too many confusing indications were occurring. The captain again initiated a go around. We came around and completed the next approach on raw data. All indications appeared normal this time. In making a manual go around, with these occurrences, the captain's attention was diverted to the point that he was unable to stop the acfts climb by 3000'. I became so distraction by the instrument indications and raising the gear and flaps that I did not adequately monitor the go around. In short, we became very busy very fast. When it first became apparent that we were having problems, we should have informed approach control and requested a vector to allow us time to identify the problems. Only then should we have accepted an approach clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ADVTECH WDB FLC EXPERIENCES DIFFICULTY ON APCH TO PIT.

Narrative: ON APCH TO PIT, ATIS INFO WAS RPTING RWY 28R IN USE AND ON INITIAL CALL TO CTL WE WERE GIVEN RWY 28R AS OUR RWY. WE WERE GIVEN DSNT TO 3000' ON RADAR VECTOR. THE F/O HAD TUNED AND IDENTED THE LOC FOR RWY 28R. ALL INDICATIONS SEEMED NORMAL. AT A POINT WHEN IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE ON A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 28R, APCH CTL GAVE US A L TURN TO 350 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, CLRED FOR AN APCH TO RWY 32. BY THE TIME WE GOT THE FMC REPORGRAMMED, WE WERE NOT IN POS TO MAKE AN APCH. WE REQUESTED TO BE VECTORED BACK AROUND FOR ANOTHER APCH. HE GAVE US A L TURN AROUND. AS WE TURNED THE LOC WITH THE AUTOPLT ON, THE LOC STILL SHOWED OFF TO THE R. THE AUTOPLT LOCKED ON AND STARTED A L TURN. WE DID A QUICK CHK OF THE RADIOS AND THEY WERE TUNED PROPERLY. AT THIS POINT, I DECLARED A MISSED APCH AND I WAS STILL THINKING OF MISSED APCH ALT FOR RWY 28R WHICH IS 5000'. AS WE WENT THROUGH 4000', APCH CTL TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 4000'. I REQUESTED VECTORS DOWNWIND SO AS TO GIVE US A CHANCE TO SEE IF WE COULD FIGURE OUT THE INDICATION PROB. THE FMC AND LOC WERE BOTH SET UP R. WE DID A RAW DATA APCH AND HAD NO PROB. I FEEL THAT THIS WAS CAUSED BY CONFUSION OF WHICH RWY WAS IN USE AND BY MYSELF ACCEPTING AN APCH THAT I HAD NOT REVIEWED AND AN INDICATION PROB THAT I STILL CANNOT EXPLAIN. I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED EXTRA VECTORS TO REVIEW THE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 170237. AS WE BEGAN THE APCH, WE NOTED THAT THE COMPUTED MAP DATA WAS OFFSET TO THE L FROM THE RAW DATA LOC. AS WE APCHED TRINY (OM), THE LOC WAS INDICATING DEFLECTION TO THE R WITH THE F/D COMMANDING A L TURN. MY FMC CRT BLINKED OFF MOMENTARILY AS IF TO BE RESYNCING, HOWEVER NO SUCH MESSAGE WAS ANNUNCIATED (NO FMC ENTRY HAD BEEN MADE IN SEVERAL MINS). TOO MANY CONFUSING INDICATIONS WERE OCCURRING. THE CAPT AGAIN INITIATED A GO AROUND. WE CAME AROUND AND COMPLETED THE NEXT APCH ON RAW DATA. ALL INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL THIS TIME. IN MAKING A MANUAL GO AROUND, WITH THESE OCCURRENCES, THE CAPT'S ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO THE POINT THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO STOP THE ACFTS CLB BY 3000'. I BECAME SO DISTR BY THE INSTRUMENT INDICATIONS AND RAISING THE GEAR AND FLAPS THAT I DID NOT ADEQUATELY MONITOR THE GO AROUND. IN SHORT, WE BECAME VERY BUSY VERY FAST. WHEN IT FIRST BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WERE HAVING PROBS, WE SHOULD HAVE INFORMED APCH CTL AND REQUESTED A VECTOR TO ALLOW US TIME TO IDENTIFY THE PROBS. ONLY THEN SHOULD WE HAVE ACCEPTED AN APCH CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.