Narrative:

This occurred during a flight from sitka to juneau, ak. It was night (shortly after sunset), and flight conditions were solid IMC with continuous light to moderate turbulence. This particular segment is quite short (approximately 25 mins), with a cruising altitude of 1600'. Prior to takeoff, therefore, I had briefed the first officer on the MEA's for both the en route (V428/7000'), as well as the approach portions of the trip, since approach clrncs are customarily given prior to beginning descent, which may then be made to the MEA prior to the IAF. (It should also probably be noted that an FAA aci was riding in the jump seat.) prior to descent into jnu, an approach clearance was issued by zan approximately as follows: 'cleared for the lda-DME 2 approach to the jnu airport, to cross 17 mi south of the sisters island VOR (ssr) at or below 10000'. Maintain 8000' until established on published portion of the approach.' the first officer received the clearance and read it back, and I acknowledged hearing it with words to the effect of, 'cleared for the approach, cross 17 south at 10.' as I mentioned, this is a very short segment, and the 10000' crossing restriction meant that I had to start my descent immediately and hustle a bit to get down to meet it, and wound up crossing 17 mi at almost exactly 10000'. I now slowed to 250 KTS and continued my descent to 7000'. (In my rush to make the one restriction, I had completely missed the second restriction--I literally had not heard it!) about 5 mi south of ssr at around 8200', the first officer said something like, 'there's 8000,' to which I replied with words to the effect that 'the MEA is 7000,' and that we were ok. For some reason he did not tell me that the clearance was 8000', I guess assuming that I knew, while I assumed that we had the boiler plate approach clearance with the one restriction, and were good to 7000'. The net effect of the whole thing was that we passed over ssr at 7300', and were both very red-faces when we sorted the thing out with the inspector after we arrived at the gate. The whole thing could have possibly been avoided if the first officer had made the required '1000 to go' call at 9000'. That would have given us a chance to get it sorted out before we were in trouble. There was 1 other factor that which may have been at work, and that was the presence of the FAA inspector. It is my feeling that his merely being in the cockpit had an inhibiting affect on the first officer (who tended to be a rather reticent person in the first place), making him feel nervous about attempting to correct me in his (the aci's) presence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT CREW MISSES ALT RESTRICTION ON DESCENT.

Narrative: THIS OCCURRED DURING A FLT FROM SITKA TO JUNEAU, AK. IT WAS NIGHT (SHORTLY AFTER SUNSET), AND FLT CONDITIONS WERE SOLID IMC WITH CONTINUOUS LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB. THIS PARTICULAR SEGMENT IS QUITE SHORT (APPROX 25 MINS), WITH A CRUISING ALT OF 1600'. PRIOR TO TKOF, THEREFORE, I HAD BRIEFED THE F/O ON THE MEA'S FOR BOTH THE ENRTE (V428/7000'), AS WELL AS THE APCH PORTIONS OF THE TRIP, SINCE APCH CLRNCS ARE CUSTOMARILY GIVEN PRIOR TO BEGINNING DSNT, WHICH MAY THEN BE MADE TO THE MEA PRIOR TO THE IAF. (IT SHOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE NOTED THAT AN FAA ACI WAS RIDING IN THE JUMP SEAT.) PRIOR TO DSNT INTO JNU, AN APCH CLRNC WAS ISSUED BY ZAN APPROX AS FOLLOWS: 'CLRED FOR THE LDA-DME 2 APCH TO THE JNU ARPT, TO CROSS 17 MI S OF THE SISTERS ISLAND VOR (SSR) AT OR BELOW 10000'. MAINTAIN 8000' UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON PUBLISHED PORTION OF THE APCH.' THE F/O RECEIVED THE CLRNC AND READ IT BACK, AND I ACKNOWLEDGED HEARING IT WITH WORDS TO THE EFFECT OF, 'CLRED FOR THE APCH, CROSS 17 S AT 10.' AS I MENTIONED, THIS IS A VERY SHORT SEGMENT, AND THE 10000' XING RESTRICTION MEANT THAT I HAD TO START MY DSNT IMMEDIATELY AND HUSTLE A BIT TO GET DOWN TO MEET IT, AND WOUND UP XING 17 MI AT ALMOST EXACTLY 10000'. I NOW SLOWED TO 250 KTS AND CONTINUED MY DSNT TO 7000'. (IN MY RUSH TO MAKE THE ONE RESTRICTION, I HAD COMPLETELY MISSED THE SECOND RESTRICTION--I LITERALLY HAD NOT HEARD IT!) ABOUT 5 MI S OF SSR AT AROUND 8200', THE F/O SAID SOMETHING LIKE, 'THERE'S 8000,' TO WHICH I REPLIED WITH WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT 'THE MEA IS 7000,' AND THAT WE WERE OK. FOR SOME REASON HE DID NOT TELL ME THAT THE CLRNC WAS 8000', I GUESS ASSUMING THAT I KNEW, WHILE I ASSUMED THAT WE HAD THE BOILER PLATE APCH CLRNC WITH THE ONE RESTRICTION, AND WERE GOOD TO 7000'. THE NET EFFECT OF THE WHOLE THING WAS THAT WE PASSED OVER SSR AT 7300', AND WERE BOTH VERY RED-FACES WHEN WE SORTED THE THING OUT WITH THE INSPECTOR AFTER WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE. THE WHOLE THING COULD HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN AVOIDED IF THE F/O HAD MADE THE REQUIRED '1000 TO GO' CALL AT 9000'. THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN US A CHANCE TO GET IT SORTED OUT BEFORE WE WERE IN TROUBLE. THERE WAS 1 OTHER FACTOR THAT WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN AT WORK, AND THAT WAS THE PRESENCE OF THE FAA INSPECTOR. IT IS MY FEELING THAT HIS MERELY BEING IN THE COCKPIT HAD AN INHIBITING AFFECT ON THE F/O (WHO TENDED TO BE A RATHER RETICENT PERSON IN THE FIRST PLACE), MAKING HIM FEEL NERVOUS ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO CORRECT ME IN HIS (THE ACI'S) PRESENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.