Narrative:

The event being reported is a mistaken; inadvertent gear up landing at ZZZ in a cessna P210 after a short flight from ZZZ1. At the time of this incident; I had 775 hours in type (in this particular aircraft); 997 hours total time in retractable gear aircraft; and 1560+ hours flight time logged. This gear up landing is a first time event for me; I have never before had even an 'almost' gear up landing incident or event. I have no good excuses for what happened; I have been thoroughly trained and practiced religiously; without fail (I thought); in my 1560+ hours of total flight time to always do a pre-landing checklist from memory (or paper); as well as an on final checklist from memory. But once I realized that a gear up landing had taken place; I knew that I had not done either in this instance. I have no good excuse or reason why that did not happen in this instance; but on reflection; I realize that several factors may have contributed to the incident.background on the events leading up to this occurrence. My plan for the day was to fly from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and pick up another pilot there; then take off and fly from ZZZ to ZZZ2 via the transition to zzzzz. Later in the day; I was going to return from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 as the other pilot was going to be picking up his C210 at ZZZ2. I had filed flight plans and obtained weather briefings using foreflight for the two initial planned segments: planning to depart ZZZ1 at xa:30 am local; and then ZZZ at xb:00 am - but time was not critical for anyone involved. The weather was solid VFR (6+ mile visibility and unlimited ceiling); with light surface winds from the west or northwest. Local sunrise was at about xa:30 am. I had called ahead to the FBO at ZZZ1 and my aircraft was out of the hangar on the northwest side of the field and on the ramp when I arrived at xa:15 am; about 10 minutes later than expected. My normal preflight inspection (- 20 minutes) was uneventful; the fuel tanks had been topped off after the previous flight (approx. 121 gal. On board).I started up; did a run up; called ground and picked up my clearance and taxied to runway xxr for takeoff. After a normal takeoff and contacting approach; I proceeded direct towards ZZZ; a short flight - about 10 - 15 mins; I had planned to fly at 2;000 feet MSL but after a frequency change with approach as I approached the river; ATC requested that I not go above 1;500 feet. Once on course; I was heading almost directly into the bright sun on a clear VFR day; I had expected that during my preflight analysis; but the sun was very bright and impeded forward visibility much more than expected - so I was splitting time watching for potentially conflicting traffic out the window (squinting) and on the ads-B display inside. Approach did not call any traffic for me. After crossing the river; approach requested me to report ZZZ in sight. I did not immediately spot the ZZZ field; but then did as I turned to the south and began a descent to enter a left base approach to ZZZ; approach authorized a frequency change. I switched to the CTAF for ZZZ and made an initial approach announcement for runway xy at ZZZ - no responses heard. Normally; I put the gear down; and verify that the gear is down and locked using both the 'down' green light on the panel and the gear inspection mirrors under the wings at no later than this point - at or during a final descent to the landing pattern altitude close to the airport or upon entry into the pattern. For unknown reasons I failed to do that then or later. Perhaps one reason for that failure is that because I knew I had full fuel; and had planned before take-off not to switch fuel tanks on this short flight. So I did not begin or do the usual fuel - undercarriage checklist call out at that point. Why I don't know: I did put the mixture control full in and propeller control full forward.just before turning onto final for runway xy; I made a second CTAF announcement; nothing heard. I went from flaps 10 to20 to 30 degrees on final approach and had a stable descent; well lined up approach - initially slightly high; but very controlled. There was a very slight crosswind from the left on final approach; but it was minimal and corrected for with a very slight crab angle. For unknown reasons I again did not do my standard oral fuel - undercarriage call out on the final approach as I had failed to do at my normal pre-landing checklist point of descent to the pattern altitude. Why I didn't do that I do not know! I have done these steps routinely on thousands of landings in retractable gear aircraft; and I do them routinely even when flying in fixed gear aircraft.touch down was very close to center line (about 15 in. Off) and lined up straight down the runway. Right about the time of the touch down; I realized something was not right; the aircraft attempted a slight tip to the left which I corrected for with slight right rudder/ aileron; initially thinking that there might be a tire problem (blowout) with the left main tire; a short moment later; I realized the attitude / position of the aircraft relative to the runway was considerably lower than normal and simultaneously noticed bent tips in the still rotating prop blades (due to strike on the runway surface). Oh [expletive] I called out; thinking how did I possibly do this? Nevertheless; I concentrated on controlling the aircraft as it slid down the runway on its belly. Realizing that I had just done a gear up landing; I thought (instinctively; but stupidly - without adequate thought) that I should try to move the aircraft toward the side of the runway to minimize blockage of the runway; and used a slight amount of rudder to do that. The aircraft came to rest at the edge of the runway; partially on and partially off of the paved runway surface. The good news. I was the only one in the aircraft; I suffered no injury and did not even feel bumping or abrupt aircraft movements - almost felt like a smooth; normal landing- except for the initial bump(s) when the prop blades struck the runway. The aircraft remained under control on the runway and slid smoothly forward; if l had a 'do over'; I would have kept the ground slide path on the centerline. Moving the aircraft to the side of the runway accomplished nothing (and potentially could have caused damage had the aircraft departed from the runway - it didn't) - the runway still had to be closed. The aircraft wings never touched the runway or the ground and there is no (apparent) breakage or cracking of any fuel; hydraulic or oil line or component(s); no dripping or leakage from the aircraft. Later in the morning the aircraft was raised by a large crane with two slings; one just aft of the front gear door and the other just aft of the main gear wheel wells. Once the aircraft was raised by the crane; its landing gear was lowered and locked down using the aircraft's electric hydraulic system which was still functioning. The aircraft was then towed to a tie-down; using a normal aircraft tow bar and airport tractor. As already noted; I have no good excuse for not doing my two 'normal' oral - out loud/ memory checklists (pre-landing and on final); either of which would have caught the 'gear up' condition in time to prevent this incident. I have done both of those checklists thousands of times on thousands of landings. I think some possible contributing 'human factors' may have been: (1) I was running about 15 minutes late - although time was not critical in any respect - this may have been in the back of my mind and perhaps made me feel hurried; (2) flying almost directly into the sun (although I have done it many times; and anticipated it for this flight) on a such short flight was quite distracting - and continued until I turned south and started descending to pattern altitude - the time when the first checklist should have been done; but wasn't; (3) the ATC request that I remain at 1;500 ft. Meant I was just slightly above normalpattern altitude for ZZZ; in retrospect; that factor speeded up the approach once the airport was spotted from the beginning because the normal; expected approach profile which would have allowed additional time that was not available to me for this approach; (4) while I am not and have never been dependent upon the 'gear up' warning horn and have only rarely heard it during intentional 'gear up'' descent maneuvers at altitude; I did not hear the 'gear up' warning horn during this approach and landing (I don't know; but suspect it might not have functioned); and (5) in looking through my logged time during the past three months to answer a reporting form question; I realize I have flown less during the last three months (due to an unusual busyness with other matters); than I have at any similar period during the past 8 years; however; I regarded myself as 100% current; proficient; well rested; etc. For this particular flight. Less than two weeks earlier I had flown a series of instrument approaches (with full exercise and use of the landing gear on each approach and missed approach) for 2.7 hours with a flight instructor - no problems or potential problems noted with checklists; call outs or handling of the landing gear. I have undergone considerable flight training during the past three years; obtaining new pilot ratings as well as multiple flight instructor ratings; and I have been actively working toward [my] last rating.I have had considerable mental turmoil trying to figure out how this happened - and so far; the above is the best I can do. I have consistently gone to great lengths to keep myself well trained and proficient; and I have never considered myself to be a reckless; careless or non-diligent pilot or aircraft owner in any respect. The damaged aircraft is repairable; and I plan to have it repaired and made airworthy again; and I plan to continue flying. But this unexpected incident has given me a lot to think about: I intend to continue to seek advice and counsel from experienced flight instructors and experienced pilots on all aspects of flying. Hopefully; I will not have another such mistake or error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Cessna 210 pilot reported a gear up landing.

Narrative: The event being reported is a mistaken; inadvertent gear up landing at ZZZ in a Cessna P210 after a short flight from ZZZ1. At the time of this incident; I had 775 hours in type (in this particular aircraft); 997 hours total time in retractable gear aircraft; and 1560+ hours flight time logged. This gear up landing is a first time event for me; I have never before had even an 'almost' gear up landing incident or event. I have no good excuses for what happened; I have been thoroughly trained and practiced religiously; without fail (I thought); in my 1560+ hours of total flight time to always do a PRE-LANDING CHECKLIST from memory (or paper); as well as an ON FINAL CHECKLIST from memory. But once I realized that a gear up landing had taken place; I knew that I had not done either in this instance. I have no good excuse or reason why that did not happen in this instance; but on reflection; I realize that several factors may have contributed to the incident.Background on the events leading up to this occurrence. My plan for the day was to fly from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and pick up another pilot there; then take off and fly from ZZZ to ZZZ2 via the transition to ZZZZZ. Later in the day; I was going to return from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 as the other pilot was going to be picking up his C210 at ZZZ2. I had filed flight plans and obtained weather briefings using Foreflight for the two initial planned segments: planning to depart ZZZ1 at XA:30 am local; and then ZZZ at XB:00 am - but time was not critical for anyone involved. The weather was solid VFR (6+ mile visibility and unlimited ceiling); with light surface winds from the west or northwest. Local sunrise was at about XA:30 am. I had called ahead to the FBO at ZZZ1 and my aircraft was out of the hangar on the northwest side of the field and on the ramp when I arrived at XA:15 am; about 10 minutes later than expected. My normal preflight inspection (- 20 minutes) was uneventful; the fuel tanks had been topped off after the previous flight (approx. 121 gal. on board).I started up; did a run up; called Ground and picked up my clearance and taxied to Runway XXR for takeoff. After a normal takeoff and contacting Approach; I proceeded direct towards ZZZ; a short flight - about 10 - 15 mins; I had planned to fly at 2;000 feet MSL but after a frequency change with Approach as I approached the river; ATC requested that I not go above 1;500 feet. Once on course; I was heading almost directly into the bright sun on a clear VFR day; I had expected that during my preflight analysis; but the sun was very bright and impeded forward visibility much more than expected - so I was splitting time watching for potentially conflicting traffic out the window (squinting) and on the ADS-B display inside. Approach did not call any traffic for me. After crossing the river; Approach requested me to report ZZZ in sight. I did not immediately spot the ZZZ field; but then did as I turned to the south and began a descent to enter a left base approach to ZZZ; Approach authorized a frequency change. I switched to the CTAF for ZZZ and made an initial approach announcement for Runway XY at ZZZ - no responses heard. Normally; I put the gear down; and verify that the gear is down and locked using both the 'down' green light on the panel and the gear inspection mirrors under the wings at no later than this point - at or during a final descent to the landing pattern altitude close to the airport or upon entry into the pattern. For unknown reasons I failed to do that then or later. Perhaps one reason for that failure is that because I knew I had full fuel; and had planned before take-off not to switch fuel tanks on this short flight. So I did not begin or do the usual Fuel - Undercarriage Checklist call out at that point. Why I don't know: I did put the mixture control full in and propeller control full forward.Just before turning onto final for Runway XY; I made a second CTAF announcement; nothing heard. I went from flaps 10 to20 to 30 degrees on final approach and had a stable descent; well lined up approach - initially slightly high; but very controlled. There was a very slight crosswind from the left on final approach; but it was minimal and corrected for with a very slight crab angle. For unknown reasons I again did not do my standard oral Fuel - Undercarriage call out on the final approach as I had failed to do at my normal Pre-Landing Checklist point of descent to the pattern altitude. Why I didn't do that I do not know! I have done these steps routinely on thousands of landings in retractable gear aircraft; and I do them routinely even when flying in fixed gear aircraft.Touch down was very close to center line (about 15 in. off) and lined up straight down the runway. Right about the time of the touch down; I realized something was not right; the aircraft attempted a slight tip to the left which I corrected for with slight right rudder/ aileron; initially thinking that there might be a tire problem (blowout) with the left main tire; a short moment later; I realized the attitude / position of the aircraft relative to the runway was considerably lower than normal and simultaneously noticed bent tips in the still rotating prop blades (due to strike on the runway surface). Oh [expletive] I called out; thinking how did I possibly do this? Nevertheless; I concentrated on controlling the aircraft as it slid down the runway on its belly. Realizing that I had just done a gear up landing; I thought (instinctively; but stupidly - without adequate thought) that I should try to move the aircraft toward the side of the runway to minimize blockage of the runway; and used a slight amount of rudder to do that. The aircraft came to rest at the edge of the runway; partially on and partially off of the paved runway surface. The good news. I was the only one in the aircraft; I suffered no injury and did not even feel bumping or abrupt aircraft movements - almost felt like a smooth; normal landing- except for the initial bump(s) when the prop blades struck the runway. The aircraft remained under control on the runway and slid smoothly forward; if l had a 'do over'; I would have kept the ground slide path on the centerline. Moving the aircraft to the side of the runway accomplished nothing (and potentially could have caused damage had the aircraft departed from the runway - it didn't) - the runway still had to be closed. The aircraft wings never touched the runway or the ground and there is no (apparent) breakage or cracking of any fuel; hydraulic or oil line or component(s); no dripping or leakage from the aircraft. Later in the morning the aircraft was raised by a large crane with two slings; one just aft of the front gear door and the other just aft of the main gear wheel wells. Once the aircraft was raised by the crane; its landing gear was lowered and locked down using the aircraft's electric hydraulic system which was still functioning. The aircraft was then towed to a tie-down; using a normal aircraft tow bar and airport tractor. As already noted; I have no good excuse for not doing my two 'normal' oral - out loud/ memory checklists (Pre-Landing and On Final); either of which would have caught the 'gear up' condition in time to prevent this incident. I have done both of those checklists thousands of times on thousands of landings. I think some possible contributing 'human factors' may have been: (1) I was running about 15 minutes late - although time was not critical in any respect - this may have been in the back of my mind and perhaps made me feel hurried; (2) flying almost directly into the sun (although I have done it many times; and anticipated it for this flight) on a such short flight was quite distracting - and continued until I turned south and started descending to pattern altitude - the time when the first checklist should have been done; but wasn't; (3) the ATC request that I remain at 1;500 ft. meant I was just slightly above normalpattern altitude for ZZZ; in retrospect; that factor speeded up the approach once the airport was spotted from the beginning because the normal; expected approach profile which would have allowed additional time that was not available to me for this approach; (4) while I am not and have never been dependent upon the 'gear up' warning horn and have only rarely heard it during intentional 'gear up'' descent maneuvers at altitude; I did not hear the 'gear up' warning horn during this approach and landing (I don't know; but suspect it might not have functioned); and (5) in looking through my logged time during the past three months to answer a reporting form question; I realize I have flown less during the last three months (due to an unusual busyness with other matters); than I have at any similar period during the past 8 years; however; I regarded myself as 100% current; proficient; well rested; etc. for this particular flight. Less than two weeks earlier I had flown a series of instrument approaches (with full exercise and use of the landing gear on each approach and missed approach) for 2.7 hours with a flight instructor - no problems or potential problems noted with checklists; call outs or handling of the landing gear. I have undergone considerable flight training during the past three years; obtaining new pilot ratings as well as multiple flight instructor ratings; and I have been actively working toward [my] last rating.I have had considerable mental turmoil trying to figure out how this happened - and so far; the above is the best I can do. I have consistently gone to great lengths to keep myself well trained and proficient; and I have never considered myself to be a reckless; careless or non-diligent pilot or aircraft owner in any respect. The damaged aircraft is repairable; and I plan to have it repaired and made airworthy again; and I plan to continue flying. But this unexpected incident has given me a lot to think about: I intend to continue to seek advice and counsel from experienced flight instructors and experienced pilots on all aspects of flying. Hopefully; I will not have another such mistake or error.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.