Narrative:

Aircraft X was performing maneuvers to check the ILS system at a satellite airport. I received a briefing from my supervisor when I arrived and he told me what to expect; as is now required. I assume everyone else got the same briefing. I got back from break and begin working the assist position. At this time; aircraft X had already departed and began the inspection at the satellite airport. I took over the departure control position. As I was taking the position; I heard a supervisor on the phone talking to the tower about how aircraft X was going to start performing the arc turns. I had assumed the previous departure controller already pointed out aircraft X to the tower; since aircraft X was already performing the inspection and I heard the supervisor talking on the phone about it. After reviewing the tapes; the supervisor also called the local position to make sure the tower was watching him; the same time I was taking the briefing. The tower called to change to north flow. In hindsight; perhaps I should have called the tower again to reiterate the point out but at this time I considered it known traffic to them. A couple aircraft had arrived and then departed after the runway change with aircraft X in the area but resulted in no conflict which reinforced to me that tower was aware of what was going on. A strip for aircraft Y came down the drop tube without any restrictions while aircraft X was turning back on the arc opposite direction. I called the tower to make sure they were watching aircraft X and they stated they had not taken a point-out. The trainee tried to approve the point out reference to the departing traffic but at this point it was too late as aircraft X was in conflict with a runway heading departure. I advised local to 'miss him.' the tower called back and told me aircraft Y would be on a 270 heading. I considered the 270 heading coordination to be a reasonable solution but later learned they turned aircraft Y to a 050 heading directly towards aircraft X. It would have been better to keep aircraft Y on the ground obviously. I advised aircraft X of the traffic departing dsm on what I thought would be a 270 heading. Aircraft Y reported responding to an RA (resolution advisory).I have a few suggestions to help avoid such situations again. Train on fewer positions during special events such as flight checks or vip movements. Yes; training is important but the risk multiplies with every trainee on position. Let one person train while the others work or watch and gain a knowledge base. I don't think this would have happened with 3 fully certified controllers on position. We need to have an all hands meeting or recurrent training about these and other operations. I thought everyone here was on the same page about what happens during flight check operations but apparently that is not the case. We should have a group briefing instead of individual verbal briefings prior to any special event. We need to have a culture of helping each other out. If tower believes they didn't get a point out on the flight check aircraft; they should have said something during the twenty minutes the aircraft was operating in their airspace prior to this conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DSM Tower and TRACON controllers reported confusing communication of a Flight Check aircraft after a runway change resulted in a confliction with a departing aircraft.

Narrative: Aircraft X was performing maneuvers to check the ILS system at a satellite airport. I received a briefing from my Supervisor when I arrived and he told me what to expect; as is now required. I assume everyone else got the same briefing. I got back from break and begin working the assist position. At this time; Aircraft X had already departed and began the inspection at the satellite airport. I took over the Departure Control position. As I was taking the position; I heard a Supervisor on the phone talking to the Tower about how Aircraft X was going to start performing the arc turns. I had assumed the previous Departure Controller already pointed out Aircraft X to the Tower; since Aircraft X was already performing the inspection and I heard the Supervisor talking on the phone about it. After reviewing the tapes; the Supervisor also called the Local position to make sure the Tower was watching him; the same time I was taking the briefing. The Tower called to change to North Flow. In hindsight; perhaps I should have called the Tower again to reiterate the point out but at this time I considered it known traffic to them. A couple aircraft had arrived and then departed after the runway change with Aircraft X in the area but resulted in no conflict which reinforced to me that Tower was aware of what was going on. A strip for Aircraft Y came down the drop tube without any restrictions while Aircraft X was turning back on the arc opposite direction. I called the Tower to make sure they were watching Aircraft X and they stated they had NOT taken a point-out. The trainee tried to approve the point out reference to the departing traffic but at this point it was too late as Aircraft X was in conflict with a runway heading departure. I advised Local to 'Miss him.' The Tower called back and told me Aircraft Y would be on a 270 heading. I considered the 270 heading coordination to be a reasonable solution but later learned they turned Aircraft Y to a 050 heading directly towards Aircraft X. It would have been better to keep Aircraft Y on the ground obviously. I advised Aircraft X of the traffic departing DSM on what I thought would be a 270 heading. Aircraft Y reported responding to an RA (Resolution Advisory).I have a few suggestions to help avoid such situations again. Train on fewer positions during special events such as Flight Checks or VIP movements. Yes; training is important but the risk multiplies with every trainee on position. Let one person train while the others work or watch and gain a knowledge base. I don't think this would have happened with 3 fully certified controllers on position. We need to have an all hands meeting or Recurrent Training about these and other operations. I thought everyone here was on the same page about what happens during Flight Check Operations but apparently that is not the case. We should have a group briefing instead of individual verbal briefings prior to any special event. We need to have a culture of helping each other out. If Tower believes they didn't get a point out on the Flight Check aircraft; they should have said something during the twenty minutes the aircraft was operating in their airspace prior to this conflict.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.