Narrative:

We were making a visual approach to 27R in clear VFR conditions with light winds down the runway. When we were less than 1000 feet [AGL]; we saw an airbus crossing at the end of the runway and both commented that was tight for us. It was tight but he was safely off the runway when we arrived at the runway. In the flare; the aircraft rolled hard left. The captain applied opposite aileron and partially recovered. We ballooned during the maneuver and elected to go around. While spooling the engines (iae); we hit the runway and rolled a few hundred feet before lifting off again. Once we began the climb we had all sorts of bells and whistles and I called out that we lost both of our ailerons and were in a degraded law. We had our hands full but were able to gain control of the aircraft. We returned to 27L for a normal landing. This occurred because we think the aircraft that crossed increased power when he saw us on short final; which disturbed the air from the jet blast that caused us to roll. He wasn't fully past the hold short line until we were below 200 feet. We were both aware a go around was a very real possibility because of the aircraft on the runway but was not needed. After rolling; the captain did the right thing and called go around. After liftoff we are unsure why we lost both ailerons. My theory is the aircraft went into abnormal mode as we were in direct mode (use manual pitch trim) until about 1000 feet where it switched to alternate mode. We were not aware the elac failed; which maintenance told us later. It did pop up briefly on the ECAM after landing the second time but went away. We worked well together and although everything wasn't perfect; I think we handled the situation in a good manner. It was split second decisions and calling out the problems as we went. The captain said that when I yelled out loud that we lost autopilot; auto thrust; ailerons that it made him realize what was available and focus on heading; altitude; and speed and ignore all of the other interference. We transferred controls so I flew and handled the radio while he did the checklists and communication. The startle factor was definitely present; but muscle memory took over. The training a few times ago for rejected landings after touching down was vital in the good outcome we had. The a flight attendant stated that she was confused with the new procedures about a precautionary landing and thought we would say remain seated three times. I believe we sometimes get too deep in the procedures that all of us miss the big picture of what we are trying to accomplish. With all of the changes we have had; it's easy to become confused and have different expectations during a true emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A-321 First Officer reported executing a go-around following a low-altitude upset; probably related to jet blast or wake from an aircraft landing on a crossing runway.

Narrative: We were making a visual approach to 27R in clear VFR conditions with light winds down the runway. When we were less than 1000 feet [AGL]; we saw an Airbus crossing at the end of the runway and both commented that was tight for us. It was tight but he was safely off the runway when we arrived at the runway. In the flare; the aircraft rolled hard left. The Captain applied opposite aileron and partially recovered. We ballooned during the maneuver and elected to go around. While spooling the engines (IAE); we hit the runway and rolled a few hundred feet before lifting off again. Once we began the climb we had all sorts of bells and whistles and I called out that we lost both of our ailerons and were in a degraded law. We had our hands full but were able to gain control of the aircraft. We returned to 27L for a normal landing. This occurred because we think the aircraft that crossed increased power when he saw us on short final; which disturbed the air from the jet blast that caused us to roll. He wasn't fully past the hold short line until we were below 200 feet. We were both aware a go around was a very real possibility because of the aircraft on the runway but was not needed. After rolling; the Captain did the right thing and called go around. After liftoff we are unsure why we lost both ailerons. My theory is the aircraft went into abnormal mode as we were in direct mode (use manual pitch trim) until about 1000 feet where it switched to alternate mode. We were not aware the ELAC failed; which Maintenance told us later. It did pop up briefly on the ECAM after landing the second time but went away. We worked well together and although everything wasn't perfect; I think we handled the situation in a good manner. It was split second decisions and calling out the problems as we went. The Captain said that when I yelled out loud that we lost autopilot; auto thrust; ailerons that it made him realize what was available and focus on heading; altitude; and speed and ignore all of the other interference. We transferred controls so I flew and handled the radio while he did the checklists and communication. The startle factor was definitely present; but muscle memory took over. The training a few times ago for rejected landings after touching down was vital in the good outcome we had. The A Flight Attendant stated that she was confused with the new procedures about a precautionary landing and thought we would say remain seated three times. I believe we sometimes get too deep in the procedures that all of us miss the big picture of what we are trying to accomplish. With all of the changes we have had; it's easy to become confused and have different expectations during a true emergency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.