Narrative:

We received an EICAS message 'spoilers' about 5.5 hours into the flight. I was the pilot flying and first officer (first officer) was the pilot monitoring. We ran the checklist and then contacted dispatch and had them connect us with [maintenance]. We advised them that the airplane had a slight vibration; but everything else seemed to be normal. We looked at the schematic and it showed that one of the spoilers was in fact malfunctioning. The checklist advised us not to raise the flaps upon landing. [Maintenance] also reminded us of that fact; as well as advising us that the flaps would be locked out after extension to prevent the flaps from damaging the malfunctioning spoiler when they came back up. This fact concerned me because if I had to do a go-around upon landing there would be a problem. The go-around for 2 engines is flaps 20; but for single engine it is flaps 5. Since we usually land with 30 flaps; this could put us in an unsafe configuration. [Maintenance] advised me that they would look further into it and get back to me. When they called back; they confirmed that the flaps would be locked down after their extension. He further stated that the spoiler should be locked down either all the way; or possibly 1 inch up (which was causing the slight vibration); and there was no real issue that would cause us not to continue the flight. The first officer and I discussed it and agreed. About this time; it was time for the other two first officer's to come back off of break; and for us to go back for our rest. Upon their return; we briefed them on the situation and to let me know of any changes. Before I returned to the cockpit; I told the passengers that we had a minor problem. And because of this; they would be noticing me going to the back and looking at wing from the passenger's window and not to be concerned (I delayed going back until it had gotten light outside for me to get a better view). It should be noted that prior to me going back on break; I advised the lead flight attendant of the situation; and that there wasn't going to be any need for any prep or special arrangements. Approximately 1 hour before our arrival [the first officer] and I returned to the cockpit and took our seats. Upon our return; the entire cockpit crew discussed our options and developed a plan of action. I advised them that it was my intention to land the airplane using flaps 20 to minimize the effects if we did in fact have to do a go-around. We advised ATC of our status; and that we would not be requiring any special assistance. We prepared by checking our landing distance for flaps 20 in the flight manual and briefed the approach. We made a non-eventful approach and landing and were met with a convoy of fire equipment. We taxied to the gate and were debriefed.the crew was outstanding. The flight attendants were professional and cooperative and were helpful in all respects. I would like to commend the other members of the cockpit crew. They were involved; cooperative; knowledgeable and professional. Each had input and valued insight; along with suggestions and information. They were very engaged and played a part in the safe landing of our flight. I could not have asked for a better cockpit crew. Our training; and the concept of crew participation; along with the vast experience of my fellow pilots were instrumental in bringing some normalcy into an otherwise non-normal situation. If there was a weak spot in this scenario; it would be that was no guidance; or anything in the book (including the checklist) that advises us about the loss of the ability to raise the flaps in this situation. The checklist simply says not to raise the flaps after landing; not that we are unable to. In fact; when I questioned [maintenance] about the go-around factor; I was told that no one had ever asked him that before. We had about 7 hours to evaluate the circumstances and to look at our options; another crew may not have that luxury.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B787 Captain reported being concerned about the implications of an EICAS 'Spoilers' message; including the inability to retract the flaps after they were extended.

Narrative: We received an EICAS message 'Spoilers' about 5.5 hours into the flight. I was the pilot flying and FO (First Officer) was the Pilot Monitoring. We ran the checklist and then contacted Dispatch and had them connect us with [Maintenance]. We advised them that the airplane had a slight vibration; but everything else seemed to be normal. We looked at the schematic and it showed that one of the spoilers was in fact malfunctioning. The checklist advised us not to raise the flaps upon landing. [Maintenance] also reminded us of that fact; as well as advising us that the flaps would be locked out after extension to prevent the flaps from damaging the malfunctioning spoiler when they came back up. This fact concerned me because if I had to do a go-around upon landing there would be a problem. The go-around for 2 engines is flaps 20; but for single engine it is flaps 5. Since we usually land with 30 flaps; this could put us in an unsafe configuration. [Maintenance] advised me that they would look further into it and get back to me. When they called back; they confirmed that the flaps would be locked down after their extension. He further stated that the spoiler should be locked down either all the way; or possibly 1 inch up (which was causing the slight vibration); and there was no real issue that would cause us not to continue the flight. The FO and I discussed it and agreed. About this time; it was time for the other two FO's to come back off of break; and for us to go back for our rest. Upon their return; we briefed them on the situation and to let me know of any changes. Before I returned to the cockpit; I told the passengers that we had a minor problem. And because of this; they would be noticing me going to the back and looking at wing from the passenger's window and not to be concerned (I delayed going back until it had gotten light outside for me to get a better view). It should be noted that prior to me going back on break; I advised the Lead Flight Attendant of the situation; and that there wasn't going to be any need for any prep or special arrangements. Approximately 1 hour before our arrival [the FO] and I returned to the cockpit and took our seats. Upon our return; the entire cockpit crew discussed our options and developed a plan of action. I advised them that it was my intention to land the airplane using flaps 20 to minimize the effects if we did in fact have to do a go-around. We advised ATC of our status; and that we would not be requiring any special assistance. We prepared by checking our landing distance for flaps 20 in the Flight Manual and briefed the approach. We made a non-eventful approach and landing and were met with a convoy of fire equipment. We taxied to the gate and were debriefed.The crew was outstanding. The Flight Attendants were professional and cooperative and were helpful in all respects. I would like to commend the other members of the cockpit crew. They were involved; cooperative; knowledgeable and professional. Each had input and valued insight; along with suggestions and information. They were very engaged and played a part in the safe landing of our flight. I could not have asked for a better cockpit crew. Our training; and the concept of crew participation; along with the vast experience of my fellow pilots were instrumental in bringing some normalcy into an otherwise non-normal situation. If there was a weak spot in this scenario; it would be that was no guidance; or anything in the book (including the checklist) that advises us about the loss of the ability to raise the flaps in this situation. The checklist simply says not to raise the flaps after landing; not that we are unable to. In fact; when I questioned [Maintenance] about the go-around factor; I was told that no one had ever asked him that before. We had about 7 hours to evaluate the circumstances and to look at our options; another crew may not have that luxury.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.