Narrative:

This incident took place at the approach end of runway 18L at dfw under local control. Our flight was an medium large transport a holding short of the runway behind an large transport B. Tower was busy as usual on this night and was issuing takeoff clrncs on the inboard runway (18L) and landing clrncs on the outboard runway (18R). Tower issued a takeoff clearance to the large transport B on the taxiway in front of us and also cleared our flight 'into position and hold' on runway 18L. The clearance was read back in full including full company call sign. Aircraft were landing on the outboard runway and were lined up for several mi on final. As the captain began to cross the hold short line, I looked out of the right window to clear the area of final approach. I saw the lights of an large transport C that appeared to be lined up on our runway (18L). I called for the captain to stop the aircraft. As we came to a stop approximately halfway across the hold line (but well short of the runway), transmitted to the tower that we were holding short. Tower acknowledged and then questioned the large transport C about which runway he was landing on. The large transport C crew verified that tower had in fact cleared them to land on runway 18L, which the tower controller then agreed as he admitted remembering clearing the large transport C to land on runway 18L. The large transport C also had a minor emergency of unknown type, and the fact that emergency equipment was en route added to the controller workload. In my opinion, he just forgot that he had cleared the large transport C to land on runway 18L. In our cockpit, we had heard the large transport C's landing clearance on runway 18L, but assumed that he was several mi out when we received our takeoff clearance. A simple visibility lookout procedure averted disaster, especially if the large transport C wasn't able to execute a go around due to his emergency. I feel that controller workload and the fact that the normal flow of traffic was disrupted due to the emergency and habit patterns led to the controller being unaware of his own actions. It pays to look!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT WITH A CLRNC TO TAXI INTO POSITION AND HOLD STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY WHEN HE OBSERVED AN ACFT ON FINAL TO HIS ASSIGNED RWY.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE AT THE APCH END OF RWY 18L AT DFW UNDER LCL CTL. OUR FLT WAS AN MLG A HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY BEHIND AN LGT B. TWR WAS BUSY AS USUAL ON THIS NIGHT AND WAS ISSUING TKOF CLRNCS ON THE INBOARD RWY (18L) AND LNDG CLRNCS ON THE OUTBOARD RWY (18R). TWR ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC TO THE LGT B ON THE TXWY IN FRONT OF US AND ALSO CLRED OUR FLT 'INTO POS AND HOLD' ON RWY 18L. THE CLRNC WAS READ BACK IN FULL INCLUDING FULL COMPANY CALL SIGN. ACFT WERE LNDG ON THE OUTBOARD RWY AND WERE LINED UP FOR SEVERAL MI ON FINAL. AS THE CAPT BEGAN TO CROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE, I LOOKED OUT OF THE RIGHT WINDOW TO CLR THE AREA OF FINAL APCH. I SAW THE LIGHTS OF AN LGT C THAT APPEARED TO BE LINED UP ON OUR RWY (18L). I CALLED FOR THE CAPT TO STOP THE ACFT. AS WE CAME TO A STOP APPROX HALFWAY ACROSS THE HOLD LINE (BUT WELL SHORT OF THE RWY), XMITTED TO THE TWR THAT WE WERE HOLDING SHORT. TWR ACKNOWLEDGED AND THEN QUESTIONED THE LGT C ABOUT WHICH RWY HE WAS LNDG ON. THE LGT C CREW VERIFIED THAT TWR HAD IN FACT CLRED THEM TO LAND ON RWY 18L, WHICH THE TWR CTLR THEN AGREED AS HE ADMITTED REMEMBERING CLRING THE LGT C TO LAND ON RWY 18L. THE LGT C ALSO HAD A MINOR EMER OF UNKNOWN TYPE, AND THE FACT THAT EMER EQUIP WAS ENRTE ADDED TO THE CTLR WORKLOAD. IN MY OPINION, HE JUST FORGOT THAT HE HAD CLRED THE LGT C TO LAND ON RWY 18L. IN OUR COCKPIT, WE HAD HEARD THE LGT C'S LNDG CLRNC ON RWY 18L, BUT ASSUMED THAT HE WAS SEVERAL MI OUT WHEN WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC. A SIMPLE VIS LOOKOUT PROC AVERTED DISASTER, ESPECIALLY IF THE LGT C WASN'T ABLE TO EXECUTE A GAR DUE TO HIS EMER. I FEEL THAT CTLR WORKLOAD AND THE FACT THAT THE NORMAL FLOW OF TFC WAS DISRUPTED DUE TO THE EMER AND HABIT PATTERNS LED TO THE CTLR BEING UNAWARE OF HIS OWN ACTIONS. IT PAYS TO LOOK!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.