Narrative:

I was PF, with non-stop service from madison, wi, to chicago O'hare on 1/91. The aircraft being utilized, had been hangared on the evening of X jan. Upon arrival at the hangar at xx:20 on X january, I performed a routine walk around inspection of the aircraft. Finding no discrepancies, the captain and I reviewed the maintenance log and accepted the aircraft. Once the aircraft was removed from the hangar, we performed routine preliminary and originating checklists as specified in the gom. We then proceeded with engine starts and taxied to the gate for boarding. (It is important to note that a thorough exterior inspection while at the hangar, and a subsequent inspection at the gate yielded no signs of any ice on the aircraft). With boarding complete, we again started engines, proceeded with after start and pretaxi checklists, received our taxi clearance, and taxied to runway 36 for departure. During taxi, we accomplished our taxi checklist and contacted the tower for takeoff clearance. The tower cleared us for kof on runway 36, issuing an instruction to turn right to 040 degree after departure. The captain taxied the aircraft into position while I completed our required runway checklist. With the checklist complete, I confirmed the wind direction and initial heading with the captain and advanced the power levers for takeoff. The captain made standard speed calls and I rotated normally at the prescribed speed. At our acceleration altitude of 400' AGL, I began to lower the nose and noticed what felt to be a severe out of trim condition. A quick visibility scan verified that the trims were properly set, yet the aircraft demonstrated a strong pitch-up tendency. I placed both hands on the control column and advised the captain of my difficulty with pitch control. He assisted me on the controls, and as we levelled the nose, we trimmed the nose to 'full down' on the pitch trim indicator. The aircraft was still demonstrating pitch-up tendencies. At 3000' MSL, we notified departure control. Advised them of our flight control problem, and requested an immediate return to the airport. We were given radar vectors for the ILS 36 final approach course. Upon reducing power, we noticed that the aircraft became easier to control at slower airspds. We requested that emergency equipment be standing by for our arrival and procedure to prepare for the approach. As we contined slowing and configuring for the approach, the aircraft became increasingly easier to control. The ILS approach proceeded west/O incident and I performed a normal on runway 36. Rollout and subsequent taxi to the gate was normal. The passengers were deplaned. The captain and I performed as complete a visibility inspection of the empennage as is possible from ground level, and found no abnormalities. We did notice, however, that the aircraft accumulated moderate mixed ice on the departure from and return to the airport. No precipitation was occurring at this time on the ground, nor had any occurred all morning. Approximately 4 hours after landing, company maintenance personnel arrived in madison to inspect the aircraft. Using a deicing truck with extending boom, they performed a visibility inspection of the horizontal stabilizer upper surface, which is approximately 25' above the ground. They reported finding approximately 1' of ice on the upper surface on the right hand side horizontal stabilizer. Noting no mechanical discrepancy, maintenance attributed the pitch control problem to the presence of ice on the horizontal stabilizer. If the ice was indeed present prior to the departure of flight, its location (aft of the leading edge and forward of the trailing edge) on the horizontal stabilizer upper surface would have made it impossible to see from the ground on a routine walk-around inspection. There was no evidence to indicate the presence of any ice on the aircraft during the walk-around. There is a possibility that there was residual ice on the horizontal stabilizer from the previous night; yet with nothing to indicate its presence elsewhere on the aircraft, there was no logical reason to suspect its existence. This situation is interesting in that deicing procedures were not utilized prior to departure of flight due to the absolute absence of any visible ice on the aircraft. The company is currently exploring ways to incorporate a procedure for inspecting the upper side of the horizontal stabilizer when conditions do not otherwise dictate the obvious need for a deice. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Company policy if the aircraft is hangared and conditions have been such a chance of moisture accumulating on the tail, the aircraft tail area must be inspected by use of cherry picker. Only persons checked out on what to look for or flight crew member can authorize the aircraft to be released for flight west/O deicing. If the aircraft is outside, it is automatic that deicing will be accomplished. Aci for the airline was advised of the procedure and concurred. At the time of the incident, his walk-around revealed no areas of moisture and during the control check the cable actuated controls felt normal. He did confirm there was snow on the aircraft when it was put in the hangar. When the control locks are on the elevator is raised which would provide a neat valley for water to accumulate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON TKOF ELEVATOR VERY HARD TO MOVE. RETURN LAND. EMERGENCY.

Narrative: I WAS PF, WITH NON-STOP SVC FROM MADISON, WI, TO CHICAGO O'HARE ON 1/91. THE ACFT BEING UTILIZED, HAD BEEN HANGARED ON THE EVENING OF X JAN. UPON ARR AT THE HANGAR AT XX:20 ON X JANUARY, I PERFORMED A ROUTINE WALK AROUND INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. FINDING NO DISCREPANCIES, THE CAPT AND I REVIEWED THE MAINT LOG AND ACCEPTED THE ACFT. ONCE THE ACFT WAS REMOVED FROM THE HANGAR, WE PERFORMED ROUTINE PRELIMINARY AND ORIGINATING CHKLISTS AS SPECIFIED IN THE GOM. WE THEN PROCEEDED WITH ENG STARTS AND TAXIED TO THE GATE FOR BOARDING. (IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT A THOROUGH EXTERIOR INSPECTION WHILE AT THE HANGAR, AND A SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION AT THE GATE YIELDED NO SIGNS OF ANY ICE ON THE ACFT). WITH BOARDING COMPLETE, WE AGAIN STARTED ENGS, PROCEEDED WITH AFTER START AND PRETAXI CHKLISTS, RECEIVED OUR TAXI CLRNC, AND TAXIED TO RWY 36 FOR DEP. DURING TAXI, WE ACCOMPLISHED OUR TAXI CHKLIST AND CONTACTED THE TWR FOR TKOF CLRNC. THE TWR CLRED US FOR KOF ON RWY 36, ISSUING AN INSTRUCTION TO TURN R TO 040 DEG AFTER DEP. THE CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT INTO POS WHILE I COMPLETED OUR REQUIRED RWY CHKLIST. WITH THE CHKLIST COMPLETE, I CONFIRMED THE WIND DIRECTION AND INITIAL HDG WITH THE CAPT AND ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS FOR TKOF. THE CAPT MADE STANDARD SPD CALLS AND I ROTATED NORMALLY AT THE PRESCRIBED SPD. AT OUR ACCELERATION ALT OF 400' AGL, I BEGAN TO LOWER THE NOSE AND NOTICED WHAT FELT TO BE A SEVERE OUT OF TRIM CONDITION. A QUICK VIS SCAN VERIFIED THAT THE TRIMS WERE PROPERLY SET, YET THE ACFT DEMONSTRATED A STRONG PITCH-UP TENDENCY. I PLACED BOTH HANDS ON THE CTL COLUMN AND ADVISED THE CAPT OF MY DIFFICULTY WITH PITCH CTL. HE ASSISTED ME ON THE CTLS, AND AS WE LEVELLED THE NOSE, WE TRIMMED THE NOSE TO 'FULL DOWN' ON THE PITCH TRIM INDICATOR. THE ACFT WAS STILL DEMONSTRATING PITCH-UP TENDENCIES. AT 3000' MSL, WE NOTIFIED DEP CTL. ADVISED THEM OF OUR FLT CTL PROB, AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO THE ARPT. WE WERE GIVEN RADAR VECTORS FOR THE ILS 36 FINAL APCH COURSE. UPON REDUCING PWR, WE NOTICED THAT THE ACFT BECAME EASIER TO CTL AT SLOWER AIRSPDS. WE REQUESTED THAT EMER EQUIP BE STANDING BY FOR OUR ARR AND PROC TO PREPARE FOR THE APCH. AS WE CONTINED SLOWING AND CONFIGURING FOR THE APCH, THE ACFT BECAME INCREASINGLY EASIER TO CTL. THE ILS APCH PROCEEDED W/O INCIDENT AND I PERFORMED A NORMAL ON RWY 36. ROLLOUT AND SUBSEQUENT TAXI TO THE GATE WAS NORMAL. THE PAXS WERE DEPLANED. THE CAPT AND I PERFORMED AS COMPLETE A VIS INSPECTION OF THE EMPENNAGE AS IS POSSIBLE FROM GND LEVEL, AND FOUND NO ABNORMALITIES. WE DID NOTICE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ACFT ACCUMULATED MODERATE MIXED ICE ON THE DEP FROM AND RETURN TO THE ARPT. NO PRECIPITATION WAS OCCURRING AT THIS TIME ON THE GND, NOR HAD ANY OCCURRED ALL MORNING. APPROX 4 HRS AFTER LNDG, COMPANY MAINT PERSONNEL ARRIVED IN MADISON TO INSPECT THE ACFT. USING A DEICING TRUCK WITH EXTENDING BOOM, THEY PERFORMED A VIS INSPECTION OF THE HORIZ STABILIZER UPPER SURFACE, WHICH IS APPROX 25' ABOVE THE GND. THEY RPTED FINDING APPROX 1' OF ICE ON THE UPPER SURFACE ON THE R HAND SIDE HORIZ STABILIZER. NOTING NO MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY, MAINT ATTRIBUTED THE PITCH CTL PROB TO THE PRESENCE OF ICE ON THE HORIZ STABILIZER. IF THE ICE WAS INDEED PRESENT PRIOR TO THE DEP OF FLT, ITS LOCATION (AFT OF THE LEADING EDGE AND FORWARD OF THE TRAILING EDGE) ON THE HORIZ STABILIZER UPPER SURFACE WOULD HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE FROM THE GND ON A ROUTINE WALK-AROUND INSPECTION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF ANY ICE ON THE ACFT DURING THE WALK-AROUND. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WAS RESIDUAL ICE ON THE HORIZ STABILIZER FROM THE PREVIOUS NIGHT; YET WITH NOTHING TO INDICATE ITS PRESENCE ELSEWHERE ON THE ACFT, THERE WAS NO LOGICAL REASON TO SUSPECT ITS EXISTENCE. THIS SITUATION IS INTERESTING IN THAT DEICING PROCS WERE NOT UTILIZED PRIOR TO DEP OF FLT DUE TO THE ABSOLUTE ABSENCE OF ANY VISIBLE ICE ON THE ACFT. THE COMPANY IS CURRENTLY EXPLORING WAYS TO INCORPORATE A PROC FOR INSPECTING THE UPPER SIDE OF THE HORIZ STABILIZER WHEN CONDITIONS DO NOT OTHERWISE DICTATE THE OBVIOUS NEED FOR A DEICE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. COMPANY POLICY IF THE ACFT IS HANGARED AND CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SUCH A CHANCE OF MOISTURE ACCUMULATING ON THE TAIL, THE ACFT TAIL AREA MUST BE INSPECTED BY USE OF CHERRY PICKER. ONLY PERSONS CHKED OUT ON WHAT TO LOOK FOR OR FLT CREW MEMBER CAN AUTHORIZE THE ACFT TO BE RELEASED FOR FLT W/O DEICING. IF THE ACFT IS OUTSIDE, IT IS AUTOMATIC THAT DEICING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED. ACI FOR THE AIRLINE WAS ADVISED OF THE PROC AND CONCURRED. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, HIS WALK-AROUND REVEALED NO AREAS OF MOISTURE AND DURING THE CTL CHK THE CABLE ACTUATED CTLS FELT NORMAL. HE DID CONFIRM THERE WAS SNOW ON THE ACFT WHEN IT WAS PUT IN THE HANGAR. WHEN THE CTL LOCKS ARE ON THE ELEVATOR IS RAISED WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A NEAT VALLEY FOR WATER TO ACCUMULATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.