Narrative:

Since I had not flown in about 5 weeks; I chose to go out early before heat had become oppressively hot. I departed ZZZ in my be 35. I proceeded northeast (northeast) to the practice area and climbed to 3;000 ft. MSL for steep turns; slow flight; and stalls. After completing these maneuvers I returned to ZZZ for a few full stop landings and take-offs. I entered the traffic pattern for runway xx and completed four take-off and landings to a full stop. I decided to do one more spot landing on the numbers. After takeoff; two corporate jets reported that they were inbound for landing on unicom. I announced that I would extend my downwind leg to let both land ahead of me. My normal SOP (standard operating procedure) is extend the landing gear opposite my point of intended touchdown and I don't normally extend wing flaps. I continued downwind until I could see that both the other aircraft had landed and cleared the runway and then turned the base leg. By this time I had wing flaps set at 20 degrees down. When extending the landing gear; my habit is to verify both the green light for the main gear and the mechanical indication for the nose gear and call 'gear down and locked' audibly. I repeat this again on final approach. As usual I performed the checklist while on downwind leg and checking for the other traffic's position. However; in retrospect; I must have thought in the back of my mind that I extended the gear when in fact it was the flaps. I recall my 'gear down; locked' on the downwind leg and on short final. My mind was so intent on touching down on 'the numbers' that I had tunnel vision. I'm sure that I looked at both gear indication on final but; only saw what I expected to see; not what was apparent. I recall just before touchdown that the thought that the sight picture wasn't normal - I was lower than normal. As soon as I realized this the stall warning horn blared. At that instant I heard the propeller hit the surface and saw and obviously struck the propeller blade ahead. My next thought was to attempt to keep the aircraft on the runway. The cabin began to fill with smoke from the burning/scraping paint on the belly. The aircraft quickly came to rest. I quickly shut off fuel; master switch and mixture and exited the aircraft unhurt except for terminal injuries to my pride and probably terminal damage to my beautiful aircraft. Perhaps a more thorough application of checklist would have been preventative as would more regency of flying. Complacency and familiarity are certainly suspect. After over 50 years as a pilot and nearly 18;000 flying hours; I can testify that regardless of experience; this type of accident can happen to anyone. An additional thought is that distractions from the normal require additional vigilance and situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE35 pilot reported gear up landing.

Narrative: Since I had not flown in about 5 weeks; I chose to go out early before heat had become oppressively hot. I departed ZZZ in my BE 35. I proceeded NE (northeast) to the practice area and climbed to 3;000 ft. MSL for steep turns; slow flight; and stalls. After completing these maneuvers I returned to ZZZ for a few full stop landings and take-offs. I entered the traffic pattern for Runway XX and completed four take-off and landings to a full stop. I decided to do one more spot landing on the numbers. After takeoff; two corporate jets reported that they were inbound for landing on UNICOM. I announced that I would extend my downwind leg to let both land ahead of me. My normal SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) is extend the landing gear opposite my point of intended touchdown and I don't normally extend wing flaps. I continued downwind until I could see that both the other aircraft had landed and cleared the runway and then turned the base leg. By this time I had wing flaps set at 20 degrees down. When extending the landing gear; my habit is to verify both the green light for the main gear and the mechanical indication for the nose gear and call 'gear down and locked' audibly. I repeat this again on final approach. As usual I performed the checklist while on downwind leg and checking for the other traffic's position. However; in retrospect; I must have thought in the back of my mind that I extended the gear when in fact it was the flaps. I recall my 'gear down; locked' on the downwind leg and on short final. My mind was so intent on touching down on 'the numbers' that I had tunnel vision. I'm sure that I looked at both gear indication on final but; only saw what I expected to see; not what was apparent. I recall just before touchdown that the thought that the sight picture wasn't normal - I was lower than normal. As soon as I realized this the stall warning horn blared. At that instant I heard the propeller hit the surface and saw and obviously struck the propeller blade ahead. My next thought was to attempt to keep the aircraft on the runway. The cabin began to fill with smoke from the burning/scraping paint on the belly. The aircraft quickly came to rest. I quickly shut off fuel; master switch and mixture and exited the aircraft unhurt except for terminal injuries to my pride and probably terminal damage to my beautiful aircraft. Perhaps a more thorough application of checklist would have been preventative as would more regency of flying. Complacency and familiarity are certainly suspect. After over 50 years as a pilot and nearly 18;000 flying hours; I can testify that regardless of experience; this type of accident can happen to anyone. An additional thought is that distractions from the normal require additional vigilance and situational awareness.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.