Narrative:

This was a first leg in a first pairing with an lds (large display screen) aircraft. This was my third leg in an lds and the ca's third leg as well. The flight progressed uneventfully during taxi; takeoff and encountered. During arrival; we set up for the ILS at ZZZ (ca was PF [captain was pilot flying]). Due to both; the ca's and my own unfamiliarity with the lds; that was a large part of the focus. In addition to the lds there were several procedures that the ca and I had discussed prior to flight and enroute; regarding recent changes to [company] procedures; which would later contribute to missing things due to changes in habit patterns.the approach was flown uneventfully; and as we came down final; I continued to do a safety check to ensure both the gear and flaps were correctly set (flaps 25 per the new procedures). Because off the different call outs and speeds involved with the lds and the new focus on different landing flap settings; things got missed. As the ca had called for gear down and flaps 20; I was focused on ensuring he set the appropriate speeds in the MCP (mode control panel); and forgot to arm the speed brakes. We continued to configure to flaps 25 and land from the approach. Again; due to the call outs that were out of our habit patterns; (the ca would normally call out flaps 30; landing checklist); as the ca called for flaps 25; he neglected to call for the landing checklist. As I was focused on the correct lds procedures being followed; I missed that he had not called for and we did not accomplish the landing checklist. As we touched down; the speed brake did not come up; and I made the call; as such. At that moment; I realized that we had not run a landing checklist. The ca extended the speed brakes and stopped the aircraft at the pre-briefed exit point. We debriefed the events that led up to us both missing the completion of the landing checklist.in hind sight; with this being the first pairing together; early in the morning on aircraft that we were unfamiliar with and procedures that neither of us had performed; extreme vigilance to avoid a mistake should have been taken. A more thorough cross check by both pilots could have possibly prevented the mistake and being that it was the first time for either of us to shoot the approach; we should have talked more thoroughly about the procedural changes and the CRM changes that would go along with them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 First Officer reported landing without completing the landing checklist due to new approach/landing procedures and first flight pairing of flight crew.

Narrative: This was a first leg in a first pairing with an LDS (Large Display Screen) aircraft. This was my third leg in an LDS and the CA's third leg as well. The flight progressed uneventfully during taxi; takeoff and encountered. During arrival; we set up for the ILS at ZZZ (CA was PF [Captain was Pilot Flying]). Due to both; the CA's and my own unfamiliarity with the LDS; that was a large part of the focus. In addition to the LDS there were several procedures that the CA and I had discussed prior to flight and enroute; regarding recent changes to [company] procedures; which would later contribute to missing things due to changes in habit patterns.The approach was flown uneventfully; and as we came down final; I continued to do a safety check to ensure both the gear and flaps were correctly set (flaps 25 per the new procedures). Because off the different call outs and speeds involved with the LDS and the new focus on different landing flap settings; things got missed. As the CA had called for gear down and flaps 20; I was focused on ensuring he set the appropriate speeds in the MCP (Mode Control Panel); and forgot to arm the speed brakes. We continued to configure to flaps 25 and land from the approach. Again; due to the call outs that were out of our habit patterns; (the CA would normally call out flaps 30; landing checklist); as the CA called for flaps 25; he neglected to call for the Landing Checklist. As I was focused on the correct LDS procedures being followed; I missed that he had not called for and we did not accomplish the Landing Checklist. As we touched down; the speed brake did not come up; and I made the call; as such. At that moment; I realized that we had not run a Landing Checklist. The CA extended the speed brakes and stopped the aircraft at the pre-briefed exit point. We debriefed the events that led up to us both missing the completion of the landing checklist.In hind sight; with this being the first pairing together; early in the morning on aircraft that we were unfamiliar with and procedures that neither of us had performed; extreme vigilance to avoid a mistake should have been taken. A more thorough cross check by both pilots could have possibly prevented the mistake and being that it was the first time for either of us to shoot the approach; we should have talked more thoroughly about the procedural changes and the CRM changes that would go along with them.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.