Narrative:

We were on a scheduled route from dca to isp operating an mdt equipped with TCAS. After being vectored to final (runway 33L isp) by ny TRACON, we were then handed over to isp tower. While on final, there was a TCAS TA, but the first officer and I were unable to locate the traffic visually. Descending out of 1300', 3-4 mi out, we received a TCAS RA ('climb, climb now,' with a 1500-2000 positive vertical speed on vsi/TR). The first officer saw the traffic out his side window and called the tower that we were climbing out due to a TCAS alert. By the time TCAS advised, 'clear of conflict,' we were no longer in a position to land and had to go around. Ny approach vectored us around the pattern and landed west/O further incident. On taxi (next leg), the ground controller (isp) relayed a message from the supervisor in ny TRACON that TCAS was not to be used within 10 mi of the airport! This is contrary to our operations procedures that TCAS cannot be disabled! The incident encountered was a near miss, and had it not been for TCAS, could have had disastrous results. The aircraft was in control of isp tower and I believe was supposed to be on final to the parallel runway, but somehow was in our path to 33L. We had overtaken an aircraft in control of tower and someone should have seen this before we received an RA from TCAS. This only proves that TCAS should be mandatory for operations within 10 mi of an airport (contrary to ATC belief).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MDT HAD A CLOSE CALL WITH ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH TO THE WRONG RWY. TCAS II RA SAVED A POSSIBLE MIDAIR COLLISION.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A SCHEDULED RTE FROM DCA TO ISP OPERATING AN MDT EQUIPPED WITH TCAS. AFTER BEING VECTORED TO FINAL (RWY 33L ISP) BY NY TRACON, WE WERE THEN HANDED OVER TO ISP TWR. WHILE ON FINAL, THERE WAS A TCAS TA, BUT THE F/O AND I WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE TFC VISUALLY. DSNDING OUT OF 1300', 3-4 MI OUT, WE RECEIVED A TCAS RA ('CLB, CLB NOW,' WITH A 1500-2000 POSITIVE VERT SPD ON VSI/TR). THE F/O SAW THE TFC OUT HIS SIDE WINDOW AND CALLED THE TWR THAT WE WERE CLBING OUT DUE TO A TCAS ALERT. BY THE TIME TCAS ADVISED, 'CLR OF CONFLICT,' WE WERE NO LONGER IN A POS TO LAND AND HAD TO GO AROUND. NY APCH VECTORED US AROUND THE PATTERN AND LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. ON TAXI (NEXT LEG), THE GND CTLR (ISP) RELAYED A MESSAGE FROM THE SUPVR IN NY TRACON THAT TCAS WAS NOT TO BE USED WITHIN 10 MI OF THE ARPT! THIS IS CONTRARY TO OUR OPS PROCS THAT TCAS CANNOT BE DISABLED! THE INCIDENT ENCOUNTERED WAS A NEAR MISS, AND HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR TCAS, COULD HAVE HAD DISASTROUS RESULTS. THE ACFT WAS IN CTL OF ISP TWR AND I BELIEVE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ON FINAL TO THE PARALLEL RWY, BUT SOMEHOW WAS IN OUR PATH TO 33L. WE HAD OVERTAKEN AN ACFT IN CTL OF TWR AND SOMEONE SHOULD HAVE SEEN THIS BEFORE WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM TCAS. THIS ONLY PROVES THAT TCAS SHOULD BE MANDATORY FOR OPS WITHIN 10 MI OF AN ARPT (CONTRARY TO ATC BELIEF).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.