Narrative:

First off; I want to say that I believe the blame is to be shared between the structure in which teb was developed around major ny/nj airports (most important - i.e. Mandatory altitudes not on the GS); new york approach ATC and their sops regarding communicating with aircraft as well as the aircrew/operator. This flight started off being a challenge by operating at night; with scattered thunderstorms in the vicinity; operating in the busiest airspace sector in the world dealing with verbally abusive and combatant ATC controllers who from a human factors stand point; do more harm than good. From an aircrew standpoint; we as an operator are very diligent about the use of checklists; adhering to sops; briefing stars & approaches well ahead of time while in cruise phase of flight and verifying proper entries into the FMS. The autopilot and automation was utilized throughout the flight except on takeoff and short final. Even with all of that being true; this mistake still took place and we as an aircrew are partly to blame. The plan was to shoot the RNAV/GPS X 06 into teb. We thoroughly briefed the approach and missed procedures; confirmed routing in the FMS; landing performance numbers and reviewed the likely taxi-in route off the runway into the FBO. Fifteen minutes later; once we were handed off to new york approach; we requested the RNAV/GPS X 06 well ahead of time with ATC to which they replied; 'there's no way you're going to get that; just not gonna happen. Plan ILS 06.' already confused as to how we could be denied an existing precision approach that exists at teb for a reason (which was not notamed out mind you) we made the change and briefed the ILS 06 and loaded the FMS. It's important to mention that we as a department have an SOP that if a waas/lpv GPS approach exists at an airport and visibility and da height are not an issue; request the waas/lpv GPS over the ILS - always. This is due to false captures with ILS procedures; inconsistencies with ILS approaches; maximizing the automation and advanced capabilities of the aircraft as well as the fact that GPS/sbas is the latest technology of nextgen and ilss are being phased out; we want our aircrews to be intimately familiar with what's coming vs. Old technology. By this point; new york approach is task saturated and getting increasingly more annoyed and short on frequency not just with us but other aircraft on the same frequency. Granted; we are in the busiest sector of airspace in the world; at night and large thunderstorms are in the area so managing all of that as a controller is more than difficult; which we as pilots can appreciate. ATC gives us multiple aircraft targets to be looking out for that he is not controlling while we are in and out of IMC at 4;000 feet. New york approach ends up vectoring us well east of the intercept path for the approach as well as keeping us high due to traffic conflicts and states; 'XXX; I believe it'll be a slap down probably.' eventually new york descend us to 2000 ft. And gives us a heading to intercept the ILS 06 localizer. Thereafter; at 2000 ft. 2nm from vings he clears us for the ILS 06 into teb with no mention of 1500 ft. At dandy. According to the faasteam notice describing this very issue it mentions that ATC 'typically' will call 5nm from dandy; cross at 1500; cleared for the ILS 06 approach...this clearance was not issued. When we briefed the ILS 06 approach after we were denied the RNAV/GPS x 06; we did touch on the abnormality that dandy at 1500 ft. Did show mandatory; however this is totally different from the cdfa (continuous descent final approach) which we are habitually trained to do by flight safety every 6 months regardless of approach type. Couple that; with the rest of the challenges mentioned that night; once new york approach cleared us for the approach at 2000 ft.; the approach key was armed on the flight control panel and we descended on the GS causing us to be above 1500' at dandy (somewhere between 1700-1800 ft. Approximately). Once we were assigned to tower frequency and up with teb tower; ATC did remind us that we were supposed to be at dandy at 1500 ft. We landed without incident and no instruction of calling ATC on the ground was given. Nor was there any loss of vertical separation that we could see on TCAS. To be precise; once established on the localizer and at 2000 ft. Past vings we should have descended to 1500 ft. Via the autopilot to meet the mandatory altitude. However; common practice is not to 'dive and drive' so muscle memory and habits from flying the line and recurrent training kicked in. Had we been on the RNAV/GPS 06 approach; our box would have been programmed correctly on LNAV/VNAV with all the appropriate altitudes programmed into the FMS and we would have descended with the autopilot on a cdfa path meeting all required altitudes. That being said; this incident will be reported into our department's sms; the event will be shared with our pilots and remedial training at flight safety is scheduled next month during our recurrent visit. This event speaks to just how dynamic and challenging the teb and surrounding airports in that airspace can be.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate Captain reported missing the mandatory altitude for the final approach fix on the ILS RWY 6 approach at TEB.

Narrative: First off; I want to say that I believe the blame is to be shared between the structure in which TEB was developed around major NY/NJ airports (most important - i.e. mandatory altitudes NOT on the GS); New York Approach ATC and their SOPs regarding communicating with aircraft as well as the aircrew/operator. This flight started off being a challenge by operating at night; with scattered thunderstorms in the vicinity; operating in the busiest airspace sector in the world dealing with verbally abusive and combatant ATC controllers who from a human factors stand point; do more harm than good. From an aircrew standpoint; we as an operator are very diligent about the use of checklists; adhering to SOPs; briefing STARs & approaches well ahead of time while in cruise phase of flight and verifying proper entries into the FMS. The autopilot and automation was utilized throughout the flight except on takeoff and short final. Even with all of that being true; this mistake still took place and we as an aircrew are partly to blame. The plan was to shoot the RNAV/GPS X 06 into TEB. We thoroughly briefed the approach and missed procedures; confirmed routing in the FMS; landing performance numbers and reviewed the likely taxi-in route off the runway into the FBO. Fifteen minutes later; once we were handed off to New York Approach; we requested the RNAV/GPS X 06 well ahead of time with ATC to which they replied; 'There's NO WAY you're going to get that; just not gonna happen. Plan ILS 06.' Already confused as to how we could be denied an existing precision approach that exists at TEB for a reason (which was NOT NOTAMed out mind you) we made the change and briefed the ILS 06 and loaded the FMS. It's important to mention that we as a department have an SOP that if a WAAS/LPV GPS approach exists at an airport and visibility and DA height are not an issue; request the WAAS/LPV GPS over the ILS - ALWAYS. This is due to false captures with ILS procedures; inconsistencies with ILS approaches; maximizing the automation and advanced capabilities of the aircraft as well as the fact that GPS/SBAS is the latest technology of NextGen and ILSs are being phased out; we want our aircrews to be intimately familiar with what's coming vs. old technology. By this point; New York approach is task saturated and getting increasingly more annoyed and short on frequency not just with us but other aircraft on the same frequency. Granted; we are in the busiest sector of airspace in the world; at night and large thunderstorms are in the area so managing all of that as a controller is more than difficult; which we as pilots can appreciate. ATC gives us multiple aircraft targets to be looking out for that he is not controlling while we are in and out of IMC at 4;000 feet. New York Approach ends up vectoring us well east of the intercept path for the approach as well as keeping us high due to traffic conflicts and states; 'XXX; I believe it'll be a SLAP DOWN probably.' Eventually New York descend us to 2000 ft. and gives us a heading to intercept the ILS 06 localizer. Thereafter; at 2000 ft. 2nm from VINGS he clears us for the ILS 06 into TEB with no mention of 1500 ft. at DANDY. According to the FAASTeam Notice describing this very issue it mentions that ATC 'typically' will call 5nm from DANDY; cross at 1500; cleared for the ILS 06 approach...this clearance was not issued. When we briefed the ILS 06 approach after we were denied the RNAV/GPS x 06; we did touch on the abnormality that DANDY at 1500 ft. did show MANDATORY; however this is totally different from the CDFA (continuous descent final approach) which we are habitually trained to do by Flight Safety every 6 months regardless of approach type. Couple that; with the rest of the challenges mentioned that night; once New York Approach cleared us for the approach at 2000 ft.; the approach key was armed on the flight control panel and we descended on the GS causing us to be above 1500' at DANDY (somewhere between 1700-1800 ft. approximately). Once we were assigned to tower frequency and up with TEB Tower; ATC did remind us that we were supposed to be at DANDY at 1500 ft. We landed without incident and no instruction of calling ATC on the ground was given. Nor was there any loss of vertical separation that we could see on TCAS. To be precise; once established on the localizer and at 2000 ft. past VINGS we should have descended to 1500 ft. via the autopilot to meet the MANDATORY altitude. However; common practice is not to 'dive and drive' so muscle memory and habits from flying the line and recurrent training kicked in. Had we been on the RNAV/GPS 06 approach; our box would have been programmed correctly on LNAV/VNAV with all the appropriate altitudes programmed into the FMS and we would have descended with the autopilot on a CDFA path meeting ALL required altitudes. That being said; this incident will be reported into our department's SMS; the event will be shared with our pilots and remedial training at Flight Safety is scheduled next month during our recurrent visit. This event speaks to just how dynamic and challenging the TEB and surrounding airports in that airspace can be.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.