Narrative:

The dtw morning shift reports with 3 dispatchers in the early morning and 2 more 30 mins later. There are other dispatchers who operate here, but these 5 people are responsible for 90% of the operations. When the first shift arrived, the reported WX was 1/4 mi visibility, with heavy snow, and a surface temperature of 33 degrees F. It had been snowing for most of the early morning and was gradually improving. The airport had closed runway 3L-21R for snow removal. Runway 9-27 was closed. The only operations were on 3C-21C and 3R-21L. Over the next few hours there were numerous takeoffs and lndgs on these runways. We were hampered in our efforts to conduct a safe operation with a lack of information given to us. The company detroit control center gave us erroneous information. The wayne county snow removal desk would hang up on us. As it turned out, the planners in our office didn't pass on the information they had received, and maintenance control in minneapolis located in a different bldg, but still were only a phone call away. There were a total of 3 aircraft damaged landing in slush, 1 of which was damaged substantially. All 3 were taken to the maintenance hangar for repair. There was 1 aircraft which had an engine flameout on landing. Our restrictions are 1/2' for takeoff and 1' for landing. With the amount of aircraft damage that took place, these limitations were obviously exceeded. We finally found out about the damaged aircraft approximately 2 hours after they landed. The role of the dispatcher in air carrier operations is to exercise proper operational control to ensure safety. This did not happen. What has to happen to get this critical information into the proper hands? It is impossible for the dispatchers to take the necessary steps to ensure safety if this information is withheld from us or not relayed to us in a timely manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR DISPATCHER CLAIMS THAT DISPATCH INABILITY TO OBTAIN UP TO DATE WX INFORMATION LED DIRECTLY TO DAMAGE TO A # OF ACFT DUE SNOW CONDITIONS.

Narrative: THE DTW MORNING SHIFT RPTS WITH 3 DISPATCHERS IN THE EARLY MORNING AND 2 MORE 30 MINS LATER. THERE ARE OTHER DISPATCHERS WHO OPERATE HERE, BUT THESE 5 PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR 90% OF THE OPS. WHEN THE FIRST SHIFT ARRIVED, THE RPTED WX WAS 1/4 MI VISIBILITY, WITH HEAVY SNOW, AND A SURFACE TEMP OF 33 DEGS F. IT HAD BEEN SNOWING FOR MOST OF THE EARLY MORNING AND WAS GRADUALLY IMPROVING. THE ARPT HAD CLOSED RWY 3L-21R FOR SNOW REMOVAL. RWY 9-27 WAS CLOSED. THE ONLY OPS WERE ON 3C-21C AND 3R-21L. OVER THE NEXT FEW HRS THERE WERE NUMEROUS TKOFS AND LNDGS ON THESE RWYS. WE WERE HAMPERED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONDUCT A SAFE OPERATION WITH A LACK OF INFO GIVEN TO US. THE COMPANY DETROIT CTL CENTER GAVE US ERRONEOUS INFO. THE WAYNE COUNTY SNOW REMOVAL DESK WOULD HANG UP ON US. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE PLANNERS IN OUR OFFICE DIDN'T PASS ON THE INFO THEY HAD RECEIVED, AND MAINT CTL IN MINNEAPOLIS LOCATED IN A DIFFERENT BLDG, BUT STILL WERE ONLY A PHONE CALL AWAY. THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 3 ACFT DAMAGED LNDG IN SLUSH, 1 OF WHICH WAS DAMAGED SUBSTANTIALLY. ALL 3 WERE TAKEN TO THE MAINT HANGAR FOR REPAIR. THERE WAS 1 ACFT WHICH HAD AN ENG FLAMEOUT ON LNDG. OUR RESTRICTIONS ARE 1/2' FOR TKOF AND 1' FOR LNDG. WITH THE AMOUNT OF ACFT DAMAGE THAT TOOK PLACE, THESE LIMITATIONS WERE OBVIOUSLY EXCEEDED. WE FINALLY FOUND OUT ABOUT THE DAMAGED ACFT APPROX 2 HRS AFTER THEY LANDED. THE ROLE OF THE DISPATCHER IN ACR OPS IS TO EXERCISE PROPER OPERATIONAL CTL TO ENSURE SAFETY. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN TO GET THIS CRITICAL INFO INTO THE PROPER HANDS? IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DISPATCHERS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE SAFETY IF THIS INFO IS WITHHELD FROM US OR NOT RELAYED TO US IN A TIMELY MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.