Narrative:

After the flight had been pushed out ramp lead called inquiring why he was getting a weight message wanting to know if the flight was overweight; because [load plan application] would not let him finalize. After looking at the [load plan]; I noticed the hazmat in pit 4; told the ramp he had hazmat in pit 4 with only 10 bags. His response was first there is no hazmat onboard the flight. I then told him there was; and item 2 was hazmat. The ramp lead thought I was referring to the aog (aircraft on ground parts); he said the aog is not hazmat. I then asked him to look at his paperwork and questioned him if he did in fact load item 2; a 100 pound quick pack; he said yes he loaded the quick pack but he didn't know the quick pack was dangerous goods. The ramp lead who is now in charge of planning out the flight again failed to properly identify dangerous goods while they were planning the flight. The ramp lead did not have a paper copy of the [load plan] and was totally dependent on the scanner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Load Planner reported a communications breakdown with Ramp Lead regarding Hazmat shipment incorrectly configured for air shipment. Hazmat shipment was corrected.

Narrative: After the flight had been pushed out Ramp Lead called inquiring why he was getting a weight message wanting to know if the flight was overweight; because [load plan application] would not let him finalize. After looking at the [load plan]; I noticed the Hazmat in Pit 4; told the ramp he had Hazmat in Pit 4 with only 10 bags. His response was first there is no Hazmat onboard the flight. I then told him there was; and item 2 was Hazmat. The Ramp Lead thought I was referring to the AOG (Aircraft on Ground parts); he said the AOG is not Hazmat. I then asked him to look at his paperwork and questioned him if he did in fact load item 2; a 100 pound quick pack; he said yes he loaded the quick pack but he didn't know the quick pack was Dangerous Goods. The Ramp Lead who is now in charge of planning out the flight again failed to properly identify Dangerous Goods while they were planning the flight. The Ramp Lead did not have a paper copy of the [load plan] and was totally dependent on the scanner.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.