Narrative:

The field was IFR. 600 foot ceiling landing ILS approaches. I was working the cab coordinator position. Aircraft X checked in at approximately 6 mile final. Local control told the aircraft to expect landing clearance on short final for traffic that would depart. I was intrigued by this statement; since the field was IFR; and the 7110.65 dictates the requirement of 2 miles; increasing to 3 for same runway separation in IFR conditions. I would have reminded local control that we were IFR; except that I overheard the controller they relieved remind them of the field conditions a few moments earlier. Also; the fog hanging from the approach end of the runway up to the runways intersection was a clear reminder. I keyed up the local control frequency to monitor the situation. As I did so; the supervisor asked me about granting IFR clearance to a helicopter that had called the tower to activate a flight plan. I explained to him that the field was IFR; we had a number of IFR departures waiting in line and that arrivals were on the ILS so northbound on the river was not an option; and perhaps the helicopter could pick up his IFR with a different tower to the south; out of our airspace; as there was nothing we could do for him at the moment. The supervisor suggested stopping departures for the helicopter. I returned to monitoring local control. A moment later; the supervisor handed me a clearance strip for the helicopter and instructed me to call TRACON to coordinate an IFR departure plan for him. I ceased monitoring local control and dialed TRACON on the sequence line. I began discussing the helicopter IFR departure request. A moment later; the supervisor tapped me on the shoulder to tell me we had a go-around. I looked up to see an aircraft X over the runway; past a taxiway close to the runway surface. I am not sure if the aircraft ever touched ground; if it was in ground effect; or was a few feet above the runway. The departure; aircraft Y; was barely off the departure end of the runway. Perhaps there was 3;000 feet between the two planes. I stopped discussing the IFR helicopter request and began coordinating the go-around with TRACON. The local controller was slow to respond; seemed dazed and confused and stumbled to find words while doing little to reestablish separation between the two aircraft at a critical time. With some difficulty; I was able to coordinate between local control and TRACON a 070 heading and climb to 3000 for aircraft X. The local controller transmitted an instruction to turn right heading 180; without first stating a callsign; then stated the wrong callsign; presumable for aircraft Y. It wasn't until later; when I replayed the audio; that I realized the full extent of poor judgment; sloppy phraseology and complete lack of control displayed by the local controller. It has been days since this near midair collision and I still feel uneasy about the danger that was introduced into the NAS. I believe the training process needs to be held to a higher standard; and that corners are being cut in the training process that are leading to unsafe conditions and putting the flying public at risk.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGA Tower Cab Coordinator reported the Local Controller allowed a NMAC or Critical Ground conflict between an arrival going around and a departure.

Narrative: The field was IFR. 600 foot ceiling landing ILS approaches. I was working the Cab Coordinator position. Aircraft X checked in at approximately 6 mile final. Local Control told the aircraft to expect landing clearance on short final for traffic that would depart. I was intrigued by this statement; since the field was IFR; and the 7110.65 dictates the requirement of 2 miles; increasing to 3 for same runway separation in IFR conditions. I would have reminded Local Control that we were IFR; except that I overheard the controller they relieved remind them of the field conditions a few moments earlier. Also; the fog hanging from the approach end of the runway up to the runways intersection was a clear reminder. I keyed up the Local Control frequency to monitor the situation. As I did so; the Supervisor asked me about granting IFR clearance to a helicopter that had called the Tower to activate a flight plan. I explained to him that the field was IFR; we had a number of IFR departures waiting in line and that arrivals were on the ILS so northbound on the river was not an option; and perhaps the helicopter could pick up his IFR with a different Tower to the south; out of our airspace; as there was nothing we could do for him at the moment. The Supervisor suggested stopping departures for the helicopter. I returned to monitoring local control. A moment later; the Supervisor handed me a clearance strip for the helicopter and instructed me to call TRACON to coordinate an IFR departure plan for him. I ceased monitoring Local Control and dialed TRACON on the sequence line. I began discussing the helicopter IFR departure request. A moment later; the Supervisor tapped me on the shoulder to tell me we had a go-around. I looked up to see an Aircraft X over the runway; past a taxiway close to the runway surface. I am not sure if the aircraft ever touched ground; if it was in ground effect; or was a few feet above the runway. The departure; Aircraft Y; was barely off the departure end of the runway. Perhaps there was 3;000 feet between the two planes. I stopped discussing the IFR helicopter request and began coordinating the go-around with TRACON. The Local Controller was slow to respond; seemed dazed and confused and stumbled to find words while doing little to reestablish separation between the two aircraft at a critical time. With some difficulty; I was able to coordinate between Local Control and TRACON a 070 heading and climb to 3000 for Aircraft X. The Local Controller transmitted an instruction to turn right heading 180; without first stating a callsign; then stated the wrong callsign; presumable for Aircraft Y. It wasn't until later; when I replayed the audio; that I realized the full extent of poor judgment; sloppy phraseology and complete lack of control displayed by the local controller. It has been days since this NMAC and I still feel uneasy about the danger that was introduced into the NAS. I believe the training process needs to be held to a higher standard; and that corners are being cut in the training process that are leading to unsafe conditions and putting the flying public at risk.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.