Narrative:

Pushed back from gate and was instructed by ramp to proceed to spot and contact ground. Called ground and was given taxi instructions to [runway] xxr via [taxi instructions]; cross runway xy. After crossing runway xy; we began running the before takeoff checklist. Approaching taxiway X; the captain saw a crj to our left southbound on [taxiway X] that wasn't giving way. He had to aggressively apply the brakes to stop the aircraft in time. Had he not applied the brakes; a collision would have occurred. We both were certain we had not been given instructions to give way to or follow the crj; nonetheless; I queried ground control to see if we had missed an instruction or were supposed to give way to the crj. The controller replied that we had not been told to give way and that she thought the crj would have been further down the taxiway by the time we got to the intersection. Shortly after this; we got a call from the number 1 flight attendant informing us that the number 4 flight attendant had fallen during the hard braking. The captain asked if she was okay or if we should return to the gate to which the number 1 [flight attendant] replied that he would check on her status. When he called back; he said that she would be okay and she wanted to continue. We then departed and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. During the departure briefing; we had discussed potential threats including it was dark; starting to rain; and possible distractions from the new checklist. It turned out that the new checklist was in fact a distraction and caused more heads down time than normal; but it was not the cause of this event. It is possible that with more heads up time the captain may have seen the traffic slightly sooner and not needed to brake quite as aggressively. The event occurred because the ground controller failed to instruct us to give way to the crj or vice versa and we failed to detect the conflict in time to brake in a normal manner. Contributing was the design of the new checklist which does result in more heads down time for the captain.in the future; I will encourage waiting to run the checklist until we are on a straight section of taxiway with no upcoming turns or intersections and stop if necessary; especially at night or in low visibility.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew reported they had ground conflict with another airplane during taxi to runway.

Narrative: Pushed back from gate and was instructed by ramp to proceed to spot and contact Ground. Called Ground and was given taxi instructions to [Runway] XXR via [taxi instructions]; cross Runway XY. After crossing Runway XY; we began running the before takeoff checklist. Approaching Taxiway X; the Captain saw a CRJ to our left southbound on [taxiway X] that wasn't giving way. He had to aggressively apply the brakes to stop the aircraft in time. Had he not applied the brakes; a collision would have occurred. We both were certain we had not been given instructions to give way to or follow the CRJ; nonetheless; I queried Ground Control to see if we had missed an instruction or were supposed to give way to the CRJ. The Controller replied that we had not been told to give way and that she thought the CRJ would have been further down the taxiway by the time we got to the intersection. Shortly after this; we got a call from the Number 1 Flight Attendant informing us that the Number 4 Flight Attendant had fallen during the hard braking. The Captain asked if she was okay or if we should return to the gate to which the Number 1 [Flight Attendant] replied that he would check on her status. When he called back; he said that she would be okay and she wanted to continue. We then departed and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. During the departure briefing; we had discussed potential threats including it was dark; starting to rain; and possible distractions from the new checklist. It turned out that the new checklist was in fact a distraction and caused more heads down time than normal; but it was not the cause of this event. It is possible that with more heads up time the Captain may have seen the traffic slightly sooner and not needed to brake quite as aggressively. The event occurred because the Ground Controller failed to instruct us to give way to the CRJ or vice versa and we failed to detect the conflict in time to brake in a normal manner. Contributing was the design of the new checklist which does result in more heads down time for the captain.In the future; I will encourage waiting to run the checklist until we are on a straight section of taxiway with no upcoming turns or intersections and stop if necessary; especially at night or in low visibility.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.