Narrative:

At the end of pushback from the gate; the tug driver directed 'set brakes.' I set the brakes; confirmed the brakes were set on the ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitor) and triple indicator and replied 'brakes set.' upon looking outside over the first officer's shoulder; I realized that we had not been pushed back as far as ramp control had requested. I told the tug driver to 'standby' and not to disconnect the interphone or tow bar. I then consulted with and confirmed with the first officer that we should be pushed back a bit farther. I then told the tug driver we would need to be pushed back farther. I did not mean to indicate we were ready for the pushback; only that we would; indeed; need to go back farther. He began to push the aircraft again without requesting or ensuring the brakes be released again. The tow bar broke; but caused no aircraft damage. Maintenance inspected the aircraft and the information was noted in the aml (aircraft maintenance log). We continued on to ZZZ1.the pushback entered a nonstandard situation when I set the brake as requested; and said to standby. Usually; only one of those options is used. We either set the brakes or reply to standby. But in this case; since I did not notice our exact position until after setting the brake; I both set the brake and replied to standby and not disconnect. Although correct; given the circumstances; this nonstandard sequence of events precipitated the error. Our operations manual does not have a clear procedure on terminology when re-initiating a push that has been interrupted by setting the brakes.from the pilot's perspective; the situation is dependent on the push crew and/or the flight deck crew recognizing that the brakes are set and coordinating a re-release outside of the normal flow of a normal pushback. Additionally; the tug driver and I had a clear miscommunication when I informed him that we needed to be pushed back farther. My intent was not to indicate we were ready to push at that moment; I just intended to inform him of what would be needed and why I had him remain connected. Again; the lack of specific guidance and verbiage for this situation contributed to the miscommunication.I believe a simple procedure/wording could be developed that requires the tug driver to repeat the initial litany requesting brake release prior to all restarts of a pushback after the pushback has been stopped for any reason. Perhaps that is already a requirement; but it is not specifically referenced in the operations manual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew reported a communication error during pushback that resulted in a broken tow bar and a delay.

Narrative: At the end of pushback from the gate; the tug driver directed 'Set Brakes.' I set the brakes; confirmed the brakes were set on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) and triple indicator and replied 'Brakes Set.' Upon looking outside over the First Officer's shoulder; I realized that we had not been pushed back as far as Ramp Control had requested. I told the tug driver to 'Standby' and not to disconnect the interphone or tow bar. I then consulted with and confirmed with the First Officer that we should be pushed back a bit farther. I then told the tug driver we would need to be pushed back farther. I did not mean to indicate we were ready for the pushback; only that we would; indeed; need to go back farther. He began to push the aircraft again without requesting or ensuring the brakes be released again. The tow bar broke; but caused no aircraft damage. Maintenance inspected the aircraft and the information was noted in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log). We continued on to ZZZ1.The pushback entered a nonstandard situation when I set the brake as requested; and said to standby. Usually; only one of those options is used. We either set the brakes or reply to standby. But in this case; since I did not notice our exact position until after setting the brake; I both set the brake and replied to standby and not disconnect. Although correct; given the circumstances; this nonstandard sequence of events precipitated the error. Our Operations Manual does not have a clear procedure on terminology when re-initiating a push that has been interrupted by setting the brakes.From the pilot's perspective; the situation is dependent on the push crew and/or the flight deck crew recognizing that the brakes are set and coordinating a re-release outside of the normal flow of a normal pushback. Additionally; the tug driver and I had a clear miscommunication when I informed him that we needed to be pushed back farther. My intent was not to indicate we were ready to push at that moment; I just intended to inform him of what would be needed and why I had him remain connected. Again; the lack of specific guidance and verbiage for this situation contributed to the miscommunication.I believe a simple procedure/wording could be developed that requires the tug driver to repeat the initial litany requesting brake release prior to all restarts of a pushback after the pushback has been stopped for any reason. Perhaps that is already a requirement; but it is not specifically referenced in the Operations Manual.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.