Narrative:

At cruise altitude; approximately 100 NM from top of descent; we received a master caution warning and noted the hydraulic light was displayed on first officer annunciator panel. We looked at the hydraulic panel on the forward overhead panel and noted engine 1 low pressure light was illuminated. We then looked at our multi function display system on lower display unit and noted quantity in the hydraulic a system read 21%. I was pilot flying at the time first officer the incident. The ca told me to continue my flying duties and to take over communications while he referenced the QRH. The ca followed checklist for hydraulic pump low pressure which led us to turning off the engine 1 hydraulic pump switch. We continued to monitor the quantity and noted that it was continuing to decrease at a decent rate. The ca informed me of his intentions to [advise ATC] before the situation deteriorated and I agreed with his assessment. We [advised] ATC and flew direct to ZZZ. The ca notified dispatch of our situation and briefed flight attendants. In anticipation of possibly losing system a we reviewed the 'loss of system a' QRH checklist. The ca asked dispatch to also provide us with a value for the non-normal landing distance to check against his calculation and the values agreed. All of these actions were just preparation in case we lost system a. Eventually our quantity indicated 0%; but we still had good pressure in the system with no other warning or caution lights. Once communications had been completed and QRH checklists run and reviewed; the ca again took over ATC communications. We briefed the approach and again reviewed our plan if we lost system a. Except for indicating no quantity in system a; we had a normal descent and approach. We lowered gear and flaps earlier than we would normally considering the possibility that the increased demand on the system could lead to a loss of pressure. When we lowered the gear; we noted quantity increased to 20%; where it stayed for the entirety of flight. We had an uneventful landing and taxi in to the gate. We debriefed with local maintenance. We also debriefed our performance. We felt we maintained safety; managed the emergency well; followed standard procedures; communicated and considered possibilities if the situation deteriorated and how we would handle those situations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported Hydraulic System A quantity malfunction during cruise.

Narrative: At cruise altitude; approximately 100 NM from top of descent; we received a Master Caution Warning and noted the HYD light was displayed on FO annunciator panel. We looked at the Hydraulic Panel on the Forward Overhead Panel and noted ENG 1 LOW PRESSURE light was illuminated. We then looked at our Multi Function Display SYS on Lower Display Unit and noted quantity in the Hydraulic A system read 21%. I was pilot flying at the time FO the incident. The CA told me to continue my flying duties and to take over communications while he referenced the QRH. The CA followed checklist for Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure which led us to turning off the ENG 1 Hydraulic Pump switch. We continued to monitor the quantity and noted that it was continuing to decrease at a decent rate. The CA informed me of his intentions to [advise ATC] before the situation deteriorated and I agreed with his assessment. We [advised] ATC and flew direct to ZZZ. The CA notified dispatch of our situation and briefed flight attendants. In anticipation of possibly losing system A we reviewed the 'LOSS OF SYSTEM A' QRH checklist. The CA asked Dispatch to also provide us with a value for the non-normal landing distance to check against his calculation and the values agreed. All of these actions were just preparation in case we lost system A. Eventually our quantity indicated 0%; but we still had good pressure in the system with no other warning or caution lights. Once communications had been completed and QRH checklists run and reviewed; the CA again took over ATC communications. We briefed the approach and again reviewed our plan if we lost system A. Except for indicating no quantity in system A; we had a normal descent and approach. We lowered gear and flaps earlier than we would normally considering the possibility that the increased demand on the system could lead to a loss of pressure. When we lowered the gear; we noted quantity increased to 20%; where it stayed for the entirety of flight. We had an uneventful landing and taxi in to the gate. We debriefed with local maintenance. We also debriefed our performance. We felt we maintained safety; managed the emergency well; followed standard procedures; communicated and considered possibilities if the situation deteriorated and how we would handle those situations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.