Narrative:

I was working local control (local control) during this event. Runway 20/23 were in use. Minutes prior to the event; aircraft Z had twice attempted to land runway 20; but had to go around due to a tailwind on final. However; our equipment indicated that the north and south field winds were consistently displaying winds that favored the current configuration. Aircraft X was holding short of runway 20 with aircraft Y (not on my frequency) on an 8 mile final. I cleared aircraft X for takeoff and issued the traffic on final. My cc (cab coordinator) then received a call from hcf that aircraft Y was on a visual approach and would be entering a right downwind for runway 2. Our cc informed him that aircraft X was passed the hold short bar and was taxiing onto the runway. While my cc was on the line with hcf; aircraft Y checked in. Initially; I did not hear that he had been issued a right downwind for runway 2. I thought he had requested it. I told him unable; because aircraft X was departing. I told him to 'say intentions.' he responded with uncertainty about landing runway 20; because of the previous pilot report from aircraft Z. I gave him the current north and south field winds and asked if he could continue for runway 20. He seemed hesitant; but agreed to give it a shot. Aircraft X made a slow turn onto the runway and proceeded to inform aircraft Z of what information he had on the winds and nearby windsock. Aircraft Y was on a 3 mile final. Aircraft X departs without incident and is well off the departure end by the time aircraft Y lands. Aircraft Y exited the runway and no separation was lost. My concerns: runway 20/23 operations are rare here at phog. There are a lot more traps on this configuration and it requires a lot more careful planning with departing aircraft. Part of the reason for this is because we have a very small range of headings we can issue due to the mountain ranges on either side of the airport. The winds were swirling at the time and aircraft were having to go around or land long due to this. Hcf never coordinated an opposite direction approach for aircraft Y until they had already switched communications to us. They did not ask if we were about to depart anyone and then coordinate an opposite direction approach for aircraft Y. With aircraft X; a heavy departing; wake turbulence would become an issue when trying to get aircraft Y in for right traffic to runway 2. Aircraft Y would have to extend their downwind at 1500 feet; while aircraft X starts a climbing left turn above them at 2100 feet; unless taken off the SID (sweep 2 departure).we did not have a lot of time to act and come up with a safe plan. I was unaware that aircraft Y was on a right downwind for runway 2 until he was 7 miles north of the airport and checked in with me. I tried to convince him to stick with runway 20; because the winds displayed by my equipment favored that runway; and also because aircraft X heavy was departing.had there been proper coordination by hcf; we could have held aircraft X short of runway 20 and accommodated aircraft Y's request to land on runway 2. Aircraft X had a slow takeoff roll because they were trying to assist aircraft Y's approach to runway 20 by informing them of their experience of the field conditions. This caused a possible compression issue to exist. In the event aircraft Y had to go around; there could be a loss of wake turbulence separation with a [smaller aircraft] following a heavy aircraft with limited vectors available to separate the two aircraft.my recommendations: hcf should be familiar with the LOA (letter of agreement) concerning opposite direction operations. We rarely deal with such operations and things happen quickly in these instances. Hcf should improve their coordination with our facility and seek the approval of doing something out of the ordinary; rather than issue the aircraft abnormal instructions; switch them to us; and then inform us what the aircraft will be doing; with little time for us to fix it. Overall; an imminent situation was created due to the lack of proper coordination; but luckily avoided due to the pilots being willing to accept runway 20. When it comes to safety; we should be working hard for the pilots; and not the other way around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Maui Tower Controllers reported resolving a head-on conflict caused by untimely coordination from HCF.

Narrative: I was working LC (Local Control) during this event. RWY 20/23 were in use. Minutes prior to the event; Aircraft Z had twice attempted to land RWY 20; but had to go around due to a tailwind on final. However; our equipment indicated that the north and south field winds were consistently displaying winds that favored the current configuration. Aircraft X was holding short of RWY 20 with Aircraft Y (not on my frequency) on an 8 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff and issued the traffic on final. My CC (Cab Coordinator) then received a call from HCF that Aircraft Y was on a visual approach and would be entering a right downwind for RWY 2. Our CC informed him that Aircraft X was passed the hold short bar and was taxiing onto the runway. While my CC was on the line with HCF; Aircraft Y checked in. Initially; I did not hear that he had been issued a right downwind for RWY 2. I thought he had requested it. I told him unable; because Aircraft X was departing. I told him to 'Say intentions.' He responded with uncertainty about landing RWY 20; because of the previous pilot report from Aircraft Z. I gave him the current north and south field winds and asked if he could continue for RWY 20. He seemed hesitant; but agreed to give it a shot. Aircraft X made a slow turn onto the runway and proceeded to inform Aircraft Z of what information he had on the winds and nearby windsock. Aircraft Y was on a 3 mile final. Aircraft X departs without incident and is well off the departure end by the time Aircraft Y lands. Aircraft Y exited the runway and no separation was lost. My concerns: RWY 20/23 operations are rare here at PHOG. There are a lot more traps on this configuration and it requires a lot more careful planning with departing aircraft. Part of the reason for this is because we have a very small range of headings we can issue due to the mountain ranges on either side of the airport. The winds were swirling at the time and aircraft were having to go around or land long due to this. HCF never coordinated an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y until they had already switched communications to us. They did not ask if we were about to depart anyone and then coordinate an opposite direction approach for Aircraft Y. With Aircraft X; a heavy departing; wake turbulence would become an issue when trying to get Aircraft Y in for right traffic to RWY 2. Aircraft Y would have to extend their downwind at 1500 feet; while Aircraft X starts a climbing left turn above them at 2100 feet; unless taken off the SID (Sweep 2 Departure).We did not have a lot of time to act and come up with a safe plan. I was unaware that Aircraft Y was on a right downwind for RWY 2 until he was 7 miles north of the airport and checked in with me. I tried to convince him to stick with RWY 20; because the winds displayed by my equipment favored that runway; and also because Aircraft X heavy was departing.Had there been proper coordination by HCF; we could have held Aircraft X short of RWY 20 and accommodated Aircraft Y's request to land on RWY 2. Aircraft X had a slow takeoff roll because they were trying to assist Aircraft Y's approach to RWY 20 by informing them of their experience of the field conditions. This caused a possible compression issue to exist. In the event Aircraft Y had to go around; there could be a loss of wake turbulence separation with a [smaller aircraft] following a heavy aircraft with limited vectors available to separate the two aircraft.My recommendations: HCF should be familiar with the LOA (Letter of Agreement) concerning opposite direction operations. We rarely deal with such operations and things happen quickly in these instances. HCF should improve their coordination with our facility and seek the approval of doing something out of the ordinary; rather than issue the aircraft abnormal instructions; switch them to us; and then inform us what the aircraft will be doing; with little time for us to fix it. Overall; an imminent situation was created due to the lack of proper coordination; but luckily avoided due to the pilots being willing to accept RWY 20. When it comes to safety; we should be working hard for the pilots; and not the other way around.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.