Narrative:

On descent to ord clearance was received to descend to 7000'. The first officer failed to set the altitude alert. When I questioned him about the altitude being 7000' he agreed and then set the altitude alert. Upon passing 8000' approach control pointed out traffic at 7000' 12 O'clock and 1 mile. When first officer advised that we were cleared to 7000' approach control said we were only cleared to 8000'. Descent was arrested at 7740' and climb initiated back to 8000'. Contributing factors include the work load in the cockpit combined with the inexperience levels of the first officer and F/east. The first officer is a retired air force pilot who has admitted having flown little in the proceeding 3 years. I believe that his previous flying has not given him much experience at flying into high density airports. His radio procedures are weak and when things get busy he has a difficult time communicating with ATC and keeping a situational awareness of the aircraft. When given a clearance that includes 3 items (ie, altitude, heading, and airspeed), he will invariably be unable to read back the clearance correctly. The F/east is also new and does only what is required at his panel. He does not monitor the pilots adequately and subsequently overlooks most mistakes the pilots might make. This causes a breakdown in the checks and balance that good crew coordination provides. Both the first officer and F/east have 6 months experience in their seats. Because of this lack of assistance provided, my job as captain is considerably more difficult than when flying with more experienced and ambitious crewmembers. My attention is divided more than normal because of my lack of confidence in my crew which leads to a much higher workload placed upon myself. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: participated in the boeing study. Was very upset with the first officer and second officer in so far as the input into operating the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT OVERSHOOT RESULTING IN LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.

Narrative: ON DSCNT TO ORD CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO DSND TO 7000'. THE F/O FAILED TO SET THE ALT ALERT. WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE ALT BEING 7000' HE AGREED AND THEN SET THE ALT ALERT. UPON PASSING 8000' APCH CTL POINTED OUT TFC AT 7000' 12 O'CLOCK AND 1 MILE. WHEN F/O ADVISED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 7000' APCH CTL SAID WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 8000'. DSNT WAS ARRESTED AT 7740' AND CLB INITIATED BACK TO 8000'. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE THE WORK LOAD IN THE COCKPIT COMBINED WITH THE INEXPERIENCE LEVELS OF THE F/O AND F/E. THE F/O IS A RETIRED AIR FORCE PLT WHO HAS ADMITTED HAVING FLOWN LITTLE IN THE PROCEEDING 3 YEARS. I BELIEVE THAT HIS PREVIOUS FLYING HAS NOT GIVEN HIM MUCH EXPERIENCE AT FLYING INTO HIGH DENSITY ARPTS. HIS RADIO PROCEDURES ARE WEAK AND WHEN THINGS GET BUSY HE HAS A DIFFICULT TIME COMMUNICATING WITH ATC AND KEEPING A SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE ACFT. WHEN GIVEN A CLRNC THAT INCLUDES 3 ITEMS (IE, ALT, HDG, AND AIRSPD), HE WILL INVARIABLY BE UNABLE TO READ BACK THE CLRNC CORRECTLY. THE F/E IS ALSO NEW AND DOES ONLY WHAT IS REQUIRED AT HIS PANEL. HE DOES NOT MONITOR THE PLTS ADEQUATELY AND SUBSEQUENTLY OVERLOOKS MOST MISTAKES THE PLTS MIGHT MAKE. THIS CAUSES A BREAKDOWN IN THE CHKS AND BAL THAT GOOD CREW COORD PROVIDES. BOTH THE F/O AND F/E HAVE 6 MONTHS EXPERIENCE IN THEIR SEATS. BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED, MY JOB AS CAPT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT THAN WHEN FLYING WITH MORE EXPERIENCED AND AMBITIOUS CREWMEMBERS. MY ATTN IS DIVIDED MORE THAN NORMAL BECAUSE OF MY LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN MY CREW WHICH LEADS TO A MUCH HIGHER WORKLOAD PLACED UPON MYSELF. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: PARTICIPATED IN THE BOEING STUDY. WAS VERY UPSET WITH THE F/O AND S/O IN SO FAR AS THE INPUT INTO OPERATING THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.