Narrative:

Flight out was 30 min late due to late arriving aircraft. WX and NOTAMS for ZZZ indicated a north landing configuration with instrument approaches to [runway] xxl and xxr. NOTAMS contained a somewhat obscured note among all the CAT2 and CAT3 non-available approaches indicating that the localizer to [runway] xxl may not be available [for two hours]. No reason for the possible localizer non-availability was given. Our scheduled ETA into ZZZ was [before that give time frame]; but as previously stated; we expected to arrive later than that time. The flight to ZZZ was smooth and uneventful. Last ATIS nearing top of descent indicated ILS approaches to [runway] xxl and xxr in use with no indication of any localizer non-availability or FAA flight check aircraft operations affecting any localizers. We planned and briefed the ILS to [runway] xxl; but failed to plan and brief contingencies (mistake). Descent with ZZZ center was uneventful with only one minor delay vector off of the STAR. Handoff to ZZZ approach control occurred as we turned toward zzzzz. Approach gave us an easterly heading with a 'descend to 6000 feet' and an 'expect the ILS to xxl.' this affirmed our approach expectation a 'as briefed.' first officer (pilot monitoring) cleaned up; the FMS with course line to [runway] xxl. We were given a further descent to 4;000 feet and a southeasterly heading and instructed to slow to 160 kts. At the appropriate point we were given a turn toward 020 degrees and instructed to intercept the localizer to [runway] xxl. At this moment in time; this localizer was validly tuned and identified. We were then handed off to final controller. Check-in was difficult due to heavy radio chatter by controller to previous aircraft and with an FAA flight-check aircraft arcing at various distances thru ZZZ TRACON airspace in IMC conditions with a high density inbounds in progress. The presence of this FAA aircraft was a blue threat decrease in the safety situation within the ZZZ TRACON airspace and very bad scheduling judgment. Its presence was not in the NOTAMS nor on the ATIS. The final controller finally acknowledged our check-in just outside of ZZZZZ1 (14nm) and cleared us for the ILS to [runway] xxr. We advised the controller that we were on the localizer to [runway] xxl. The controller then told us that the localizer to [runway] xxl was not available (the signal was still tuned and identified) and that we could either take the ILS to [runway] xxr or have the RNAV to [runway] xxl. We accepted the RNAV clearance to [runway] xxl. First officer proficiently changed the FMS to the RNAV [runway] xxl and briefed differences. Captain switched flight directors off then on; but failed to disconnect the autopilot in conjunction. Our altitude was 3;000 feet; speed 160K; and IMC. The engaged localizer would not and did not release. LNAV was therefore not usable. Attempts to manually deselect the localizer switch were unsuccessful. VNAV was engaged with the autopilot tracking the localizer; but our clearance was for the RNAV only. At this point; a yellow autopilot EICAS alert occurred (a/P still engaged) and the aircraft turned rather abruptly to the right. First officer (pilot monitoring) called the deviation immediately. Captain (pilot flying) immediately disconnected the a/P and manually flew the aircraft back to the course line for [runway] xxl. Captain instructed first officer to tell final control that we could not continue our approach and to vector us to the ILS for [runway] xxr. First officer quickly reset the FMS to [runway] xxr and briefed the differences. Approach and landing to [runway] xxr was uneventful. Advised by ground control after landing to call ZZZ TRACON. Disconnect in effective comm about the situation with the FAA flight check aircraft and its effect on the localizer for [runway] xxl. Clearing us to intercept the (localizer) to [runway] xxl with a situation in play that would stealthily impair the use of that same localizer by causing perturbations to the accuracy of the localizer while giving indications of a good tuned signal to an aircraft using the localizer. Disconnect within the TRACON between the approach control and the final control about what type of approaches were usable and available. Scheduling an FAA flight check aircraft to operate within the TRACON airspace and to affect the localizer to [runway] xxl during IMC conditions with a period of high density inbound traffic!!! (Very bad judgement)do not conduct FAA flight checks in the ZZZ TRACON during high arrival rate times; especially when the WX is IMC! If this is not possible; then issue better communications about the possible threat of the FAA aircraft's presence in ZZZ airspace. Communicate better with [operations control] through the FAA liaison about this threat. Better communication within the TRACON between approach control and final control about what the plan is and what is happening within the airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew reported confusion in regard to the clearance provided by the Final Controller.

Narrative: Flight out was 30 min late due to late arriving aircraft. WX and NOTAMS for ZZZ indicated a north landing configuration with instrument approaches to [Runway] XXL and XXR. NOTAMS contained a somewhat obscured note among all the CAT2 and CAT3 non-available approaches indicating that the localizer to [Runway] XXL may not be available [for two hours]. No reason for the possible localizer non-availability was given. Our scheduled ETA into ZZZ was [before that give time frame]; but as previously stated; we expected to arrive later than that time. The flight to ZZZ was smooth and uneventful. Last ATIS nearing top of descent indicated ILS approaches to [Runway] XXL and XXR in use with no indication of any localizer non-availability or FAA flight check aircraft operations affecting any localizers. We planned and briefed the ILS to [Runway] XXL; but failed to plan and brief contingencies (mistake). Descent with ZZZ Center was uneventful with only one minor delay vector off of the STAR. Handoff to ZZZ Approach Control occurred as we turned toward ZZZZZ. Approach gave us an easterly heading with a 'descend to 6000 feet' and an 'expect the ILS to XXL.' This affirmed our approach expectation a 'as briefed.' First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) cleaned up; the FMS with course line to [Runway] XXL. We were given a further descent to 4;000 feet and a southeasterly heading and instructed to slow to 160 kts. At the appropriate point we were given a turn toward 020 degrees and instructed to intercept the Localizer to [Runway] XXL. At this moment in time; this localizer was validly tuned and identified. We were then handed off to Final Controller. Check-in was difficult due to heavy radio chatter by controller to previous aircraft and with an FAA flight-check aircraft arcing at various distances thru ZZZ TRACON airspace in IMC conditions with a high density inbounds in progress. The presence of this FAA aircraft was a blue threat decrease in the safety situation within the ZZZ TRACON airspace and very bad scheduling judgment. Its presence was not in the NOTAMS nor on the ATIS. The Final Controller finally acknowledged our check-in just outside of ZZZZZ1 (14nm) and cleared us for the ILS to [Runway] XXR. We advised the controller that we were on the localizer to [Runway] XXL. The controller then told us that the localizer to [Runway] XXL was not available (the signal was still tuned and identified) and that we could either take the ILS to [Runway] XXR or have the RNAV to [Runway] XXL. We accepted the RNAV clearance to [Runway] XXL. First Officer proficiently changed the FMS to the RNAV [Runway] XXL and briefed differences. Captain switched Flight Directors OFF then ON; but failed to disconnect the autopilot in conjunction. Our altitude was 3;000 feet; speed 160K; and IMC. The engaged localizer would not and did not release. LNAV was therefore not usable. Attempts to manually deselect the LOC switch were unsuccessful. VNAV was engaged with the autopilot tracking the localizer; but our clearance was for the RNAV only. At this point; a yellow autopilot EICAS alert occurred (A/P still engaged) and the aircraft turned rather abruptly to the right. First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) called the deviation immediately. Captain (Pilot Flying) immediately disconnected the A/P and manually flew the aircraft back to the course line for [Runway] XXL. Captain instructed First Officer to tell Final Control that we could not continue our approach and to vector us to the ILS for [Runway] XXR. First Officer quickly reset the FMS to [Runway] XXR and briefed the differences. Approach and landing to [Runway] XXR was uneventful. Advised by Ground Control after landing to call ZZZ TRACON. Disconnect in effective comm about the situation with the FAA flight check aircraft and its effect on the localizer for [Runway] XXL. Clearing us to intercept the (Localizer) to [Runway] XXL with a situation in play that would stealthily impair the use of that same localizer by causing perturbations to the accuracy of the localizer while giving indications of a good tuned signal to an aircraft using the localizer. Disconnect within the TRACON between the Approach Control and the Final Control about what type of approaches were usable and available. Scheduling an FAA flight check aircraft to operate within the TRACON airspace and to affect the localizer to [Runway] XXL during IMC conditions with a period of high density inbound traffic!!! (VERY BAD JUDGEMENT)Do not conduct FAA flight checks in the ZZZ TRACON during high arrival rate times; especially when the WX is IMC! If this is not possible; then issue better communications about the possible threat of the FAA aircraft's presence in ZZZ airspace. Communicate better with [Operations Control] through the FAA liaison about this threat. Better communication within the TRACON between Approach Control and Final Control about what the plan is and what is happening within the airspace.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.