Narrative:

We departed daa at XX27L, flew runway heading, and were told to contact departure about the time we passed through 700' MSL. Upon initial contact on 118.95, we were given a left turn and a further climb and ended up at 4000' and a heading of 180 degrees. The controller started to give us a right turn, but retracted it by telling us to disregard the turn and to continue on to the south for a little while longer. Shotly thereafter, we were given a turn to 350 degrees and a climb to 8000'. The controller was saturated. I saw that we were approaching dulles (later verified by looking at the airport diagram) and mentally questioned why we were not already talking to dulles approach. At about the time that we passed over dulles, the controller told us that we were cleared direct to ldn, and to contact dulles approach on 126.65. Upon initial contact with dulles approach, the controller asked for our position. That caught me by surprise, but I told her that we were on the ldn 085 degree right at 34 DME. She told us to identify and advised us of opp direction traffic, 'an air carrier medium large transport Y at 8000 and he's turning right to avoid you', or something to that effect. The medium large transport Y was level at our altitude and estimated to be at one to one and one-half mi at the 12 O'clock position, just starting his turn to the right. As he continued the right turn, the controller asked us if we had the traffic in sight. I 'rogered' the traffic and the controller told us to maintain visibility sep from the traffic. By the time that call estimated that he was inside one mi from us. As the traffic was no longer a threat to us, we continued on our course, to avoid further traffic conflicts. The dulles controller then explained that we had been told to contact dulles on 134.2. Before we left the frequency, we were asked if we had been xferred to that frequency by washington. When I told her yes, she said that the air carrier medium large transport Y was also being worked by washington and that this never should have happened. We then switched to dulles approach control on 134.2 and were given a further climb. Information received from the kansas city department of the army regional representative's office, in fri, sept, 90, indicates that investigation revealed that an operational error occurred. The conflict alert was activated, due to the conflict between mlt X and medium large transport Y. It occurred seven mi west of the armel VORTAC at 8000', when the two aircraft passed within 1.7 mi horizontally and 100' vertically. I feel that if an error was committed, it was due to several factors. For starters, the washington controller was absolutely inundated with traffic (saturated). No one could have gotten a word in. A mistake was made by giving us the wrong frequency. I also feel that we were turned over to dulles approach control much later than would be normal. In addition, there shouldn't have been eastbound traffic at 8000', if the intention was to turn us into the path of the other aircraft, as we were at the proper altitude for the direction of flight. In closing, if the intent was for dulles approach to climb us upon initial contact, the distances/closure rates of the two aircraft were entirely too close for safe operations. Had we been handed off to the proper controller at the same time that we were haded off to the wrong one, there wasn't sufficient time for us to climb and be at least 1000' above the opp direction traffic, in other words, there was too much coordination required and too little time in which to accomplish it, as we should have been talking to dulles approach control long before we were.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLT GIVEN WRONG FREQ FOR FLT OVER IAD AND HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION WITH AN ACR MLG. APPARENT TRACON TRACON INTERFAC COORD ERROR.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED DAA AT XX27L, FLEW RWY HDG, AND WERE TOLD TO CONTACT DEP ABOUT THE TIME WE PASSED THROUGH 700' MSL. UPON INITIAL CONTACT ON 118.95, WE WERE GIVEN A L TURN AND A FURTHER CLB AND ENDED UP AT 4000' AND A HDG OF 180 DEGS. THE CTLR STARTED TO GIVE US A R TURN, BUT RETRACTED IT BY TELLING US TO DISREGARD THE TURN AND TO CONTINUE ON TO THE S FOR A LITTLE WHILE LONGER. SHOTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 350 DEGS AND A CLB TO 8000'. THE CTLR WAS SATURATED. I SAW THAT WE WERE APCHING DULLES (LATER VERIFIED BY LOOKING AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM) AND MENTALLY QUESTIONED WHY WE WERE NOT ALREADY TALKING TO DULLES APCH. AT ABOUT THE TIME THAT WE PASSED OVER DULLES, THE CTLR TOLD US THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO LDN, AND TO CONTACT DULLES APCH ON 126.65. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DULLES APCH, THE CTLR ASKED FOR OUR POS. THAT CAUGHT ME BY SURPRISE, BUT I TOLD HER THAT WE WERE ON THE LDN 085 DEG R AT 34 DME. SHE TOLD US TO IDENT AND ADVISED US OF OPP DIRECTION TFC, 'AN ACR MLG Y AT 8000 AND HE'S TURNING R TO AVOID YOU', OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. THE MLG Y WAS LEVEL AT OUR ALT AND ESTIMATED TO BE AT ONE TO ONE AND ONE-HALF MI AT THE 12 O'CLOCK POS, JUST STARTING HIS TURN TO THE R. AS HE CONTINUED THE R TURN, THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. I 'ROGERED' THE TFC AND THE CTLR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN VIS SEP FROM THE TFC. BY THE TIME THAT CALL ESTIMATED THAT HE WAS INSIDE ONE MI FROM US. AS THE TFC WAS NO LONGER A THREAT TO US, WE CONTINUED ON OUR COURSE, TO AVOID FURTHER TFC CONFLICTS. THE DULLES CTLR THEN EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD TO CONTACT DULLES ON 134.2. BEFORE WE L THE FREQ, WE WERE ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN XFERRED TO THAT FREQ BY WASHINGTON. WHEN I TOLD HER YES, SHE SAID THAT THE ACR MLG Y WAS ALSO BEING WORKED BY WASHINGTON AND THAT THIS NEVER SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED. WE THEN SWITCHED TO DULLES APCH CTL ON 134.2 AND WERE GIVEN A FURTHER CLB. INFO RECEIVED FROM THE KANSAS CITY DEPT OF THE ARMY REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OFFICE, IN FRI, SEPT, 90, INDICATES THAT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT AN OPERATIONAL ERROR OCCURRED. THE CONFLICT ALERT WAS ACTIVATED, DUE TO THE CONFLICT BTWN MLT X AND MLG Y. IT OCCURRED SEVEN MI W OF THE ARMEL VORTAC AT 8000', WHEN THE TWO ACFT PASSED WITHIN 1.7 MI HORIZLY AND 100' VERTICALLY. I FEEL THAT IF AN ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS. FOR STARTERS, THE WASHINGTON CTLR WAS ABSOLUTELY INUNDATED WITH TFC (SATURATED). NO ONE COULD HAVE GOTTEN A WORD IN. A MISTAKE WAS MADE BY GIVING US THE WRONG FREQ. I ALSO FEEL THAT WE WERE TURNED OVER TO DULLES APCH CTL MUCH LATER THAN WOULD BE NORMAL. IN ADDITION, THERE SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN EBND TFC AT 8000', IF THE INTENTION WAS TO TURN US INTO THE PATH OF THE OTHER ACFT, AS WE WERE AT THE PROPER ALT FOR THE DIRECTION OF FLT. IN CLOSING, IF THE INTENT WAS FOR DULLES APCH TO CLB US UPON INITIAL CONTACT, THE DISTANCES/CLOSURE RATES OF THE TWO ACFT WERE ENTIRELY TOO CLOSE FOR SAFE OPS. HAD WE BEEN HANDED OFF TO THE PROPER CTLR AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE WERE HADED OFF TO THE WRONG ONE, THERE WASN'T SUFFICIENT TIME FOR US TO CLB AND BE AT LEAST 1000' ABOVE THE OPP DIRECTION TFC, IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WAS TOO MUCH COORD REQUIRED AND TOO LITTLE TIME IN WHICH TO ACCOMPLISH IT, AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TALKING TO DULLES APCH CTL LONG BEFORE WE WERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.