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ZNY center controller reported they were not advised their sector was decombined and the atop sector was being worked by a different controller.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1590553 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201810 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZNY.ARTCC |
| State Reference | NY |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
| Flight Phase | Climb Cruise Descent |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Enroute |
| Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
| Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I assumed a radar position under normal operations. Management decided to split the sector without advising me or any of the other controllers on the shift. They made it seem as if the change was only going to be to the atop (advanced technologies oceanic procedures) channel. This resulted in numerous issues in the atop sectors. My sector was split out via a high and low sector. The low sector 31;000 feet and below remained my control. The high sector 32;000 feet and above became an atop sector. At the time; I had low level aircraft only in the sector so it was unnoticed. After some time I began to see limited data blocks in my sector which I wasn't talking to; had no flight information and had no control over. I called the atop sector to see who the aircraft were. The controller seemed extremely busy so I hung up; walked over and saw the unsafe situation this caused. The way the atop was configured and the channel change resulted in numerous nordo aircraft as well as numerous aircraft actively in the non radar sector without conflict probe analysis. Management had no answers. This wasn't supposed to be done until the next day. They put both the controllers and flying public at risk. Management needs to communicate better and become knowledgeable about the systems that they're supposed to be in charge of.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZNY Center Controller reported they were not advised their sector was decombined and the ATOP Sector was being worked by a different Controller.
Narrative: I assumed a radar position under normal operations. Management decided to split the sector without advising me or any of the other controllers on the shift. They made it seem as if the change was only going to be to the ATOP (Advanced Technologies Oceanic Procedures) channel. This resulted in numerous issues in the ATOP sectors. My sector was split out via a high and low sector. The low sector 31;000 feet and below remained my control. The high sector 32;000 feet and above became an ATOP sector. At the time; I had low level aircraft only in the sector so it was unnoticed. After some time I began to see limited data blocks in my sector which I wasn't talking to; had no flight information and had no control over. I called the ATOP sector to see who the aircraft were. The Controller seemed extremely busy so I hung up; walked over and saw the unsafe situation this caused. The way the ATOP was configured and the channel change resulted in numerous Nordo aircraft as well as numerous aircraft actively in the non radar sector without conflict probe analysis. Management had no answers. This wasn't supposed to be done until the next day. They put both the controllers and flying public at risk. Management needs to communicate better and become knowledgeable about the systems that they're supposed to be in charge of.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.