Narrative:

We were [departing] clt. A heavy aircraft took off immediately before us on 36C in clt [along the same route]. Tower gave us a 'caution wake turbulence' when they gave us the lineup and wait. After the heavy departed; tower crossed a couple of aircraft downfield before giving us takeoff clearance (my estimate was about 2 minutes after issuing the takeoff clearance for the heavy). We briefed cont ign on for possible wake and noted where the heavy lifted off. We were able to rotate before his rotation point and turned slightly upwind of him. Initial climbout was uneventful and we selected continuous ignition off at approximately 12;000 feet as we felt the wake turbulence threat was over. We were keeping an eye on the heavy that we were following on the TCAS. As we passed through FL175; the heavy was approximately 10 NM in front of us and 3800 feet above us (with a slightly quartering headwind of 40 knots). We suddenly encountered severe wake turbulence. I immediately turned on continuous ignition. The autopilot disconnected itself and the airplane went through a series of rather violent pitch and roll oscillations. I assumed manual control and had difficulties controlling the flight path of the aircraft. My initial reaction was to change altitude to get out of the wake; but without knowing the climb rate of the other aircraft; I was unable to determine if we could out climb it. I made the decision that the quickest and safest way to exit the wake was to make a slight turn to the left (upwind) to get out of the flight path of the heavy. As I did this; I told the first officer (first officer) to let center know we were deviating left for severe wake turbulence. After a few seconds on the new heading; we exited the wake turbulence. The controller did not hear us/understand us the first call; so we had to make additional calls to her to tell her what was going on. She did not sound happy with us and snapped at us for deviating without 'asking first.' we simply did not have time to ask nor did we have time to explain the situation. I exercised my PIC authority to deviation for what in my mind was an emergency situation (aircraft out of control). By the time we were able to converse with ATC; the situation was over; so we did not officially declare an emergency. I also had the TCAS on abv/blw modes and saw no potential traffic conflicts. We stayed on the offset heading for a few more miles until we were comfortable with the spacing and then continued on our flight. After the situation stabilized; I had my first officer call the flight attendant's to make sure everyone was ok. They reported there were no injuries but that the flight deck door had come unlocked and opened during the event (it was locked prior to the wake encounter). We re-secured the flight deck door and I made a PA to the passengers explaining the encounter in an attempt to calm their nerves. We continued without further incident. Inadequate spacing between us and a heavy aircraft on the same route. Increase spacing requirements between medium/heavy aircraft; even in the enroute environment. ZTL controllers did not caution us about the wake from the heavy; nor did they try to give us any additional spacing even after the severe wake encounter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 flight crew reported encountering severe wake turbulence 10 nm in trail of a wide body transport aircraft climbing through FL175 departing CLT. Reporter recommended increased separation.

Narrative: We were [departing] CLT. A Heavy aircraft took off immediately before us on 36C in CLT [along the same route]. Tower gave us a 'caution wake turbulence' when they gave us the lineup and wait. After the Heavy departed; Tower crossed a couple of aircraft downfield before giving us takeoff clearance (my estimate was about 2 minutes after issuing the takeoff clearance for the Heavy). We briefed CONT IGN on for possible wake and noted where the Heavy lifted off. We were able to rotate before his rotation point and turned slightly upwind of him. Initial climbout was uneventful and we selected continuous ignition OFF at approximately 12;000 feet as we felt the wake turbulence threat was over. We were keeping an eye on the Heavy that we were following on the TCAS. As we passed through FL175; the Heavy was approximately 10 NM in front of us and 3800 feet above us (with a slightly quartering headwind of 40 knots). We suddenly encountered severe wake turbulence. I immediately turned on continuous ignition. The autopilot disconnected itself and the airplane went through a series of rather violent pitch and roll oscillations. I assumed manual control and had difficulties controlling the flight path of the aircraft. My initial reaction was to change altitude to get out of the wake; but without knowing the climb rate of the other aircraft; I was unable to determine if we could out climb it. I made the decision that the quickest and safest way to exit the wake was to make a slight turn to the left (upwind) to get out of the flight path of the heavy. As I did this; I told the First Officer (FO) to let Center know we were deviating left for severe wake turbulence. After a few seconds on the new heading; we exited the wake turbulence. The Controller did not hear us/understand us the first call; so we had to make additional calls to her to tell her what was going on. She did not sound happy with us and snapped at us for deviating without 'asking first.' We simply did not have time to ask nor did we have time to explain the situation. I exercised my PIC authority to deviation for what in my mind was an emergency situation (aircraft out of control). By the time we were able to converse with ATC; the situation was over; so we did not officially declare an emergency. I also had the TCAS on ABV/BLW modes and saw no potential traffic conflicts. We stayed on the offset heading for a few more miles until we were comfortable with the spacing and then continued on our flight. After the situation stabilized; I had my FO call the FA's to make sure everyone was ok. They reported there were no injuries but that the flight deck door had come unlocked and opened during the event (it was locked prior to the wake encounter). We re-secured the flight deck door and I made a PA to the passengers explaining the encounter in an attempt to calm their nerves. We continued without further incident. Inadequate spacing between us and a Heavy aircraft on the same route. Increase spacing requirements between medium/heavy aircraft; even in the enroute environment. ZTL Controllers did not caution us about the wake from the heavy; nor did they try to give us any additional spacing even after the severe wake encounter.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.