Narrative:

Our flight was set to leave ZZZ; however due to weather moving over the field we delayed until the front passed and then we were able to push back. Due to the weather; priority was given to inbound aircraft that had been holding due to the storm moving over ZZZ. Due to this weather/departure delay; a line of aircraft formed. This put us about 15-20 aircraft deep in line for departure. We sat in line for departure for over 1 hour. As we got close to our [minimum fuel] of 13.3 we contacted dispatch and had them remove our [hold fuel] allowing us to have a new [minimum fuel] of 12.8.we then departed ZZZ; and began our way to iah. Enroute to iah we encountered the line of weather my dispatcher told me about via telephone at the gate prior to departure. The line was the trailing edge of the same system that passed over ZZZ earlier. Before our ground delay on ZZZ; the line of WX had gaps in it and we had been filed through one of those areas. Many aircraft had already gone through the gaps. However; due to our 1 hr plus delay; by the time we got to the gap along our filed route we found that the line had intensified and solidified. Some aircraft were able to top the line; however due to our weight we could not. We therefore continued further southwest along the base of the line looking for a gap to cross through. During this time we were in contact with dispatch and ATC for potential routes through the line. We continued approximately 150nm southwest along the line looking for a gap. We didn't find a gap and my first officer (first officer) and I decided the best course was to continue another 100 miles southwest to the end of the WX line and then direct cve. I began to become concerned of our fuel situation as efoa (estimated fuel on arrival) at this time was showing 3.8 and we were still deviating for the WX. I ACARS'd dispatch and advised them to begin thinking of a possible gas diversion. He copied and provided us with 2 burn plots at .77 & .80 from [present position]. We were still deviating for the line.when we cleared the line we made our turn to cve; and our efoa was 3.1 (or 400lbs from our reserve.) we both found this 'buffer' quite concerning. We were still about an hour from iah at this time. We were above our [reserve fuel]; and iah was a clear path. I decided that a fuel diversion was not required and we continued to iah.it was at this time I declared min fuel with ATC to ensure no undue delay for our arrival to iah. ATC cleared us direct to iah. I notified dispatch and they copied. Dispatch said it should be clear from there to iah. We pulled the aircraft back to .77M; which was our best efoa burn that we could ascertain at that time.we were then handed off approximately 2 times over the next 10 minutes. We continued to monitor our efoa; which was hovering around 3.3 direct to iah. The next controller we were handed off to said we were no longer able [to continue] direct to the field as we currently were doing. And that we had to be put back on the arrival. We plugged in the arrival and efoa became approximately 2.9. This was extremely close to our [reserve fuel] and beyond any comfort buffer we previously had. I told ATC we would like to continue direct to the field as we were previously doing. [After notifying him of the situation in full; we] were cleared direct to iah. Our plan was to stay as high as possible as long as possible. By staying at cruise and .77M our efoa came up to approximately 3.3. We planned for a straight in approach to 15R. We descended; and landed uneventfully. Our fuel on landing/arrival at iah was 3.3 (500lbs) above [reserve fuel] or 1;100lbs below planned landing fuel.in my aviation career this closest I have ever come to dipping into [reserve fuel]. The decision I made was based upon the multitude of factors/threats we had already encountered that night during the flight; and the possible ones not yet seen at iah (i.e. A possible go-around; vectors; holding; or any unforeseen delay.)the fas (flight attendants) were informed of our emergency status; but as fuel was still above [reserve fuel] (albeit slightly); I felt there was no need inform the passengers. That would have only caused undue worry; for a situation that ended legally and uneventfully. No passengers deplaning had any idea what had occurred and many thanked us for the 'smooth flight' and the 'incredible light show' from the storm.kudos to the professionalism of my crew; specifically that of my first officer. As this was his first [emergency situation]; I must say he acted above the level expected of [company] pilots and I am glad I had him on the flight deck for this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported a low fuel situation due to weather diversions.

Narrative: Our flight was set to leave ZZZ; however due to weather moving over the field we delayed until the front passed and then we were able to push back. Due to the weather; priority was given to inbound aircraft that had been holding due to the storm moving over ZZZ. Due to this weather/departure delay; a line of aircraft formed. This put us about 15-20 aircraft deep in line for departure. We sat in line for departure for over 1 hour. As we got close to our [minimum fuel] of 13.3 we contacted dispatch and had them remove our [hold fuel] allowing us to have a new [minimum fuel] of 12.8.We then departed ZZZ; and began our way to IAH. Enroute to IAH we encountered the line of weather my dispatcher told me about via telephone at the gate prior to departure. The line was the trailing edge of the same system that passed over ZZZ earlier. Before our ground delay on ZZZ; the line of WX had gaps in it and we had been filed through one of those areas. Many aircraft had already gone through the gaps. However; due to our 1 hr plus delay; by the time we got to the gap along our filed route we found that the line had intensified and solidified. Some aircraft were able to top the line; however due to our weight we could not. We therefore continued further SW along the base of the line looking for a gap to cross through. During this time we were in contact with dispatch and ATC for potential routes through the line. We continued approximately 150nm SW along the line looking for a gap. We didn't find a gap and my FO (First Officer) and I decided the best course was to continue another 100 miles SW to the end of the WX line and then direct CVE. I began to become concerned of our fuel situation as EFOA (Estimated Fuel On Arrival) at this time was showing 3.8 and we were still deviating for the WX. I ACARS'd Dispatch and advised them to begin thinking of a possible gas diversion. He copied and provided us with 2 burn plots at .77 & .80 from [present position]. We were still deviating for the line.When we cleared the line we made our turn to CVE; and our EFOA was 3.1 (or 400lbs from our reserve.) We both found this 'buffer' quite concerning. We were still about an hour from IAH at this time. We were above our [reserve fuel]; and IAH was a clear path. I decided that a fuel diversion was not required and we continued to IAH.It was at this time I declared MIN FUEL with ATC to ensure no undue delay for our arrival to IAH. ATC cleared us direct to IAH. I notified Dispatch and they copied. Dispatch said it should be clear from there to IAH. We pulled the aircraft back to .77M; which was our best EFOA burn that we could ascertain at that time.We were then handed off approximately 2 times over the next 10 minutes. We continued to monitor our EFOA; which was hovering around 3.3 direct to IAH. The next controller we were handed off to said we were no longer able [to continue] direct to the field as we currently were doing. And that we had to be put back on the arrival. We plugged in the arrival and EFOA became approximately 2.9. This was extremely close to our [reserve fuel] and beyond any comfort buffer we previously had. I told ATC we would like to continue direct to the field as we were previously doing. [After notifying him of the situation in full; we] were cleared direct to IAH. Our plan was to stay as high as possible as long as possible. By staying at cruise and .77M our EFOA came up to approximately 3.3. We planned for a straight in approach to 15R. We descended; and landed uneventfully. Our fuel on landing/arrival at IAH was 3.3 (500lbs) above [reserve fuel] or 1;100lbs below planned landing fuel.In my aviation career this closest I have ever come to dipping into [reserve fuel]. The decision I made was based upon the multitude of factors/threats we had already encountered that night during the flight; and the possible ones not yet seen at IAH (i.e. a possible go-around; vectors; holding; or any unforeseen delay.)The FAs (Flight Attendants) were informed of our emergency status; but as fuel was still above [reserve fuel] (albeit slightly); I felt there was no need inform the passengers. That would have only caused undue worry; for a situation that ended legally and uneventfully. No passengers deplaning had any idea what had occurred and many thanked us for the 'smooth flight' and the 'incredible light show' from the storm.Kudos to the professionalism of my crew; specifically that of my FO. As this was his first [emergency situation]; I must say he acted above the level expected of [Company] pilots and I am glad I had him on the flight deck for this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.