Narrative:

Rushing to enter the hold in the FMS while we were almost on top of the fix caused us to enter the hold improperly; thus turn to the unprotected side. A high altitude stall almost occurred due to both of us failing to notice the airspeed degradation while dealing with the hold. While enroute to [destination airport] at FL360 during cruise; a few miles prior to reaching fix ZZZ the controller informed us that [destination airport] is seriously slowing down flow and he requested we hold at ZZZ. While I keyed the radio and started to state that I was not sure we could enter it in time; my captain spoke on the radio as well and told them he thought we had time to still set it up. We rushed to set up the hold; we were told to hold at ZZZ 090 radial right turns; leg distance our preference and that he did not at that moment have an estimated critical fuel. This is what we entered in haste and we confirmed. A few seconds after confirming we hit the fix and the aircraft started turning left. This is when we realized we had set up the hold incorrectly as we needed to enter in the reciprocal 270 inbound. We informed the controller and he stated it was fine; and correct it on our next inbound turn. When we were given the hold; the captain reduced thrust to allow us a little more time to enter the hold into the FMS; however once we noticed that we were heading the wrong way both of us failed to notice the aircraft slow below green line and near stall speed. We did catch it before any onset of stall occurred and power was increased to climb power; a higher power setting not being required at that time due to increasing airspeed. However; I would say that we were about 8 knots above stall speed (red tape) when speed degradation stopped; and slowly increased back to proper cruise speeds over the next few minutes. We should have declined holding at that fix and instead requested a fix or point further down the route where we could have time to properly setup the hold and confirm everything instead of being rushed with just a few seconds of data entry. This would not have required us to pull any power; and quite possibly prevented a possible high altitude stall. As pilot monitoring I should have remained vigilant in monitoring the airspeed as I was aware power was pulled to help us enter the hold in the FMS in time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew reported entering holding with the wrong direction of turns and did not notice their airspeed reducing to near stall speed.

Narrative: Rushing to enter the hold in the FMS while we were almost on top of the fix caused us to enter the hold improperly; thus turn to the unprotected side. A high altitude stall almost occurred due to both of us failing to notice the airspeed degradation while dealing with the hold. While enroute to [destination airport] at FL360 during cruise; a few miles prior to reaching fix ZZZ the controller informed us that [destination airport] is seriously slowing down flow and he requested we hold at ZZZ. While I keyed the radio and started to state that I was not sure we could enter it in time; my Captain spoke on the radio as well and told them he thought we had time to still set it up. We rushed to set up the hold; we were told to hold at ZZZ 090 radial right turns; leg distance our preference and that he did not at that moment have an Estimated Critical Fuel. This is what we entered in haste and we confirmed. A few seconds after confirming we hit the fix and the aircraft started turning left. This is when we realized we had set up the hold incorrectly as we needed to enter in the reciprocal 270 inbound. We informed the controller and he stated it was fine; and correct it on our next inbound turn. When we were given the hold; the Captain reduced thrust to allow us a little more time to enter the hold into the FMS; however once we noticed that we were heading the wrong way both of us failed to notice the aircraft slow below green line and near stall speed. We did catch it before any onset of stall occurred and power was increased to climb power; a higher power setting not being required at that time due to increasing airspeed. However; I would say that we were about 8 knots above stall speed (red tape) when speed degradation stopped; and slowly increased back to proper cruise speeds over the next few minutes. We should have declined holding at that fix and instead requested a fix or point further down the route where we could have time to properly setup the hold and confirm everything instead of being rushed with just a few seconds of data entry. This would not have required us to pull any power; and quite possibly prevented a possible high altitude stall. As pilot monitoring I should have remained vigilant in monitoring the airspeed as I was aware power was pulled to help us enter the hold in the FMS in time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.