Narrative:

Leg 3 of 3. During the cockpit preflight; a distraction took me away from the flight deck for a total of perhaps 5 minutes. The pilot flying continued with the preparation for the next and final leg of a 3 leg trip pairing. After I returned to my seat; I checked the entries in the CDU/FMS prior to push back and verified the route; constraints; etc. The pilot flying briefed the departure and as training was taking place; there was emphasis on the delivery of the briefing 'off the glass.' threats and errors were addressed; fatigue being mentioned and the mitigation was to exercise heightened awareness; adherence to SOP; etc. Pushback and engine start was normal. Taxi out and checklist use was accomplished normally; and without delay we were cleared onto runway xxl; as had been briefed by the pilot flying. The departure was via the zzzzz RNAV departure. Taking the runway; I was heads up maneuvering the aircraft into position and verbally confirmed the runway as being runway xxl. The pilot flying confirmed the runway from the outside and from the inside (navigation display). I gave the pilot flying the controls prior to takeoff and we started the takeoff roll. At the 80 knots call; I glanced at the navigation display and noticed the runway symbol was not perfectly lined up with our aircraft symbol but was off to the side. I called V1 and rotate. LNAV became active and I was immediately able to determine that we were in fact paralleling our course to the first waypoint and the FMS departure runway was in fact xxr. The runways being very close and the zzzzz being a common departure procedure for both runways did not result in excessive lateral deviations with the first fix being 7.0 DME from the departure ends. The initial climb out was normal with a hand off to departure control; nothing was mentioned from ATC and the departure was continued normally with the flight concluding safely and uneventfully. There was no conflict and I was well aware of the situation as soon as it became obvious what had happened.this was the perfect example of the holes in the swiss cheese lining up. A minor distraction early in the game resulting in an error being introduced and despite several checks and opportunities for the mistake to be discovered; it was not! I missed the error during my check of the route and the programming of the FMS done by the pilot flying. The pilot flying briefed the correct runway to include performance; despite having the wrong runway in the FMS; once again during the pre-departure briefing prior to takeoff and finally the last and final check as we took the runway for takeoff. As hard as we tried not to make any mistakes; we still made a mistake. Thankfully; the mistake we made was not of a high threat and did not result in an undesirable aircraft state nor were there other secondary consequences. However; it uncovers the human flaw in the process when expectation bias; along with fatigue and unfamiliarity is part of the equation; this being the first time the new first officer had been in this theater. We are safeguarded by SOP's; checklists; training and experience; and checks and balances. As humans; we will make mistakes. This was a big wake up call for the entire crew; none of who caught the error and only until the enroute climb was it mentioned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 Captain reported the ND was paralleling the course after takeoff due to programming of the wrong runway.

Narrative: Leg 3 of 3. During the cockpit preflight; a distraction took me away from the flight deck for a total of perhaps 5 minutes. The pilot flying continued with the preparation for the next and final leg of a 3 leg trip pairing. After I returned to my seat; I checked the entries in the CDU/FMS prior to push back and verified the route; constraints; etc. The pilot flying briefed the departure and as training was taking place; there was emphasis on the delivery of the briefing 'off the glass.' Threats and errors were addressed; fatigue being mentioned and the mitigation was to exercise heightened awareness; adherence to SOP; etc. Pushback and engine start was normal. Taxi out and checklist use was accomplished normally; and without delay we were cleared onto Runway XXL; as had been briefed by the pilot flying. The departure was via the ZZZZZ RNAV Departure. Taking the runway; I was heads up maneuvering the aircraft into position and verbally confirmed the runway as being Runway XXL. The pilot flying confirmed the runway from the outside and from the inside (navigation display). I gave the pilot flying the controls prior to takeoff and we started the takeoff roll. At the 80 knots call; I glanced at the navigation display and noticed the runway symbol was not perfectly lined up with our aircraft symbol but was off to the side. I called V1 and rotate. LNAV became active and I was immediately able to determine that we were in fact paralleling our course to the first waypoint and the FMS departure runway was in fact XXR. The runways being very close and the ZZZZZ being a common departure procedure for both runways did not result in excessive lateral deviations with the first fix being 7.0 DME from the departure ends. The initial climb out was normal with a hand off to Departure Control; nothing was mentioned from ATC and the departure was continued normally with the flight concluding safely and uneventfully. There was no conflict and I was well aware of the situation as soon as it became obvious what had happened.This was the perfect example of the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up. A minor distraction early in the game resulting in an error being introduced and despite several checks and opportunities for the mistake to be discovered; it was not! I missed the error during my check of the route and the programming of the FMS done by the pilot flying. The pilot flying briefed the correct runway to include performance; despite having the wrong runway in the FMS; once again during the pre-departure briefing prior to takeoff and finally the last and final check as we took the runway for takeoff. As hard as we tried not to make any mistakes; we still made a mistake. Thankfully; the mistake we made was not of a high threat and did not result in an undesirable aircraft state nor were there other secondary consequences. However; it uncovers the human flaw in the process when expectation bias; along with fatigue and unfamiliarity is part of the equation; this being the first time the new First Officer had been in this theater. We are safeguarded by SOP's; checklists; training and experience; and checks and balances. As humans; we will make mistakes. This was a big wake up call for the entire crew; none of who caught the error and only until the enroute climb was it mentioned.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.