Narrative:

I walked up the stairs to the aircraft; and when I tried to lift the door open handle; it resisted. So I immediately looked at the small window for the flashing light which would indicate pressurization; but it was not flashing. I moved the door handle another fraction of an inch and the door exploded open sending me flying over twenty feet landing at nearly the bottom of the stairs.neither the job card nor the amm were followed. Many mechanics in the area did not know that the aircraft was being pressurized and those who did know were unaware that the procedure was being started. The job card should be as rigorous as the fuel tank entry job card; i.e.; foreman should be required to document that he has verified that there are two people in the cockpit (there was only one in this incident). That radio communication has been established between the cockpit and the ground crew (there was no radio communication in this incident and possibly only one radio present). [There should be] a requirement for a barrier to the entry door [to] be present (again; not present in this incident). [We should] require a stamp off assuring that all unnecessary personnel be removed from the aircraft and the immediate work area (many mechanics were milling about the area completely oblivious to the pressurization in progress). The exit slide circuit breakers [should] be confirmed closed prior to any aircraft pressurization being initiated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A maintenance person reported that the aircraft was pressurized when the door was opened; causing the door to explode open sending the mechanic back about 20 feet.

Narrative: I walked up the stairs to the aircraft; and when I tried to lift the door open handle; it resisted. So I immediately looked at the small window for the flashing light which would indicate pressurization; but it was not flashing. I moved the door handle another fraction of an inch and the door exploded open sending me flying over twenty feet landing at nearly the bottom of the stairs.Neither the job card nor the AMM were followed. Many mechanics in the area did not know that the aircraft was being pressurized and those who did know were unaware that the procedure was being started. The job card should be as rigorous as the fuel tank entry job card; i.e.; Foreman should be required to document that he has verified that there are two people in the cockpit (there was only one in this incident). That radio communication has been established between the cockpit and the ground crew (there was no radio communication in this incident and possibly only one radio present). [There should be] a requirement for a barrier to the entry door [to] be present (again; not present in this incident). [We should] require a stamp off assuring that all unnecessary personnel be removed from the aircraft and the immediate work area (many mechanics were milling about the area completely oblivious to the pressurization in progress). The exit slide circuit breakers [should] be confirmed CLOSED prior to any aircraft pressurization being initiated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.