Narrative:

Normal takeoff and initial climbout. The captain was flying without the autopilot until 15;000 feet when six status message alerts appeared on the EICAS. Weather was clear skies; smooth climbout; unlimited visibility. The captain engaged the autopilot and requested the international relief officer captain remain on the flight deck to assist the crew to determine what the problems were and if they were related. Center cleared [us] to FL230 and then FL330. Climbing through approximately FL260 [international relief officer] captain remarked the wing anti-ice was indicating on. The switches were in auto and the flight in clear skies. The captain moved the switch to off and then back to automatic and the lights extinguished.the captain then took responsibility for flying the aircraft and the radios while instructing the first officer and [international relief officer] captain to assess the problems and determine if any non-normal checklists should be complied with and their input to the problem. On level off at FL330 just west of zzzzz more EICAS status messages appeared just after center released the flight into oceanic airspace and terminated radar service. The captain stated to the crew that with more EICAS status messages appearing he was uncomfortable heading west over the pacific with the increasing problems. The entire crew agreed and the captain then relinquished the radios to the first officer and requested he re-initiate contact with center and request a hold at zzzzz at FL330 to deal with the increasing system failures. The aircraft entered a standard hold at zzzzz at FL330 and speed 280 knots indicated.the captain then transferred the aircraft and radios to the first officer; asked the international relief officer to backup the first officer and contacted dispatch for support. Dispatch linked maintenance control and the duty manager captain on the call. The problems were explained in detail and now numbered over 12 system failures including atru failure; generator system 1 inop; engine starter L1 inop; equipment supply aft fan 1 failure; aft ee cooling failure; recirculating fan upper failure; hydraulic pump C1 failure; one or 2 28VDC motor failure; lavatory/galley fan 1 failure; hydraulic common motor controller failure; cargo bulk heater 1 failure; mc cac L1 common motor start controller failure; brake power unit internal failure; cargo bulk heater 2 failure and possibly more. The captain remarked he was uncomfortable flying the aircraft with the copious problems and asked input from the crew. Both agreed. Maintenance control stated there was no ability to fix any of the issues and agreed the aircraft should return to ZZZ. Duty manager agreed.the captain had [the international relief officer] captain request the purser come to the cockpit to brief the return to ZZZ. The issues with the aircraft the plan to return to ZZZ. The captain requested [the purser] brief his crew and start securing the cabin. He was informed fully of the nature of the problem; evacuation prep was not necessary and how much time until touchdown which was approximately 40 minutes. The captain turned the seat belt sign on and made an announcement to the passengers explaining the aircraft was returning to ZZZ and why. The captain stated they would orbit two more times to run the fuel dump checklist and initiate the dumping of 71;200 pounds of fuel to be below 425;000 pounds landing weight. The position; altitude; winds and time were notated for the beginning and end of the fuel dump and given to dispatch.center was contacted that [we] would return to ZZZ. The flight was given clearance to ZZZZZ1 then the STAR. On the final turn prior to leaving the hold the second cac appeared to fail as there was no cabin airflow and the cockpit was silent. AC system 1 and dc system 1 also failed. The captain asked the first officer to pull up the status page to see if the cabin was climbing. There was a slight bump but held steady at 6;000 feet. There was no decompression and no oxygen masks released in the cabin. The captain requested the first officer contact center; [request] immediate descent to 10;000 feet and ask for direct ZZZ whichwas given. On initiation with [TRACON] the first officer requested the first responder equipment to standby.in the descent the captain briefed the crew about the possible loss of nose wheel steering; braking; flaps and flight controls. The cabin was secure at 10;000 feet and the captain requested the fas to take their jump seats. [International relief officer] captain was briefed to make a PA after landing on the status of the aircraft and to alert the crew and passengers that all was ok and to remain in their seats if no landing emergency ensued. The crew planned on landing on xxr and stay on the runway if nose wheel steering was inoperative. This was not the case the secondary valve opened and the nose wheel steering worked.[TRACON] vectored the flight for a right downwind and base for a visual to xxr. The captain was flying with the autopilot off on the turn to base. The landing was stabilized and uneventful. The breaking and nose wheel steering were normal. However the forward left break assembly reached 400 degrees and climbing according to the fire department due to the loss of the other brakes. The aircraft taxied to gate under ships power. The ramp and fire personnel were warned about possible hot brakes. No other problems were encountered with a normal shutdown.the aircraft landed well below 425;000 pounds. Approximately; 420;000 pounds. All check lists were complied with throughout the flight. Upon landing the captain was informed that a passenger had stated they were hit by a piece of the 4L door. The captain and crew could not confirm that. Also; the captain and crew were informed that some fas complained of hypoxia and said there was a decompression. There was no decompression. However; there was a lack of normal airflow in the aircraft. There were no deviations from normal and non-normal sops; the boeing 787 flight manual; the [company] fom; and the fars to my knowledge.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B787 flight crew reported that up to 12 messages appeared on EICAS indicating a massive electrical failure.

Narrative: Normal takeoff and initial climbout. The Captain was flying without the autopilot until 15;000 feet when six status message alerts appeared on the EICAS. Weather was clear skies; smooth climbout; unlimited visibility. The Captain engaged the autopilot and requested the IRO Captain remain on the flight deck to assist the crew to determine what the problems were and if they were related. Center cleared [us] to FL230 and then FL330. Climbing through approximately FL260 [IRO] Captain remarked the wing anti-ice was indicating on. The switches were in auto and the flight in clear skies. The Captain moved the switch to off and then back to AUTO and the lights extinguished.The Captain then took responsibility for flying the aircraft and the radios while instructing the FO and [IRO] Captain to assess the problems and determine if any non-normal checklists should be complied with and their input to the problem. On level off at FL330 just west of ZZZZZ more EICAS status messages appeared just after Center released the flight into oceanic airspace and terminated radar service. The Captain stated to the crew that with more EICAS status messages appearing he was uncomfortable heading west over the Pacific with the increasing problems. The entire crew agreed and the Captain then relinquished the radios to the FO and requested he re-initiate contact with Center and request a hold at ZZZZZ at FL330 to deal with the increasing system failures. The aircraft entered a standard hold at ZZZZZ at FL330 and speed 280 knots indicated.The Captain then transferred the aircraft and radios to the FO; asked the IRO to backup the FO and contacted Dispatch for support. Dispatch linked Maintenance Control and the Duty Manager Captain on the call. The problems were explained in detail and now numbered over 12 system failures including ATRU failure; Generator System 1 inop; Engine Starter L1 inop; Equipment Supply Aft Fan 1 Failure; AFT EE Cooling Failure; Recirculating Fan Upper Failure; Hydraulic Pump C1 Failure; One or 2 28VDC Motor Failure; Lavatory/Galley Fan 1 Failure; Hydraulic Common Motor Controller Failure; Cargo Bulk Heater 1 Failure; MC CAC L1 Common Motor Start Controller Failure; Brake Power Unit Internal Failure; Cargo Bulk Heater 2 Failure and possibly more. The Captain remarked he was uncomfortable flying the aircraft with the copious problems and asked input from the crew. Both agreed. Maintenance Control stated there was no ability to fix any of the issues and agreed the aircraft should return to ZZZ. Duty Manager agreed.The Captain had [the IRO] Captain request the Purser come to the cockpit to brief the return to ZZZ. The issues with the aircraft the plan to return to ZZZ. The Captain requested [the Purser] brief his crew and start securing the cabin. He was informed fully of the nature of the problem; evacuation prep was not necessary and how much time until touchdown which was approximately 40 minutes. The Captain turned the seat belt sign on and made an announcement to the passengers explaining the aircraft was returning to ZZZ and why. The Captain stated they would orbit two more times to run the fuel dump checklist and initiate the dumping of 71;200 pounds of fuel to be below 425;000 pounds landing weight. The position; altitude; winds and time were notated for the beginning and end of the fuel dump and given to Dispatch.Center was contacted that [we] would return to ZZZ. The flight was given clearance to ZZZZZ1 then the STAR. On the final turn prior to leaving the hold the second CAC appeared to fail as there was no cabin airflow and the cockpit was silent. AC System 1 and DC System 1 also failed. The Captain asked the FO to pull up the status page to see if the cabin was climbing. There was a slight bump but held steady at 6;000 feet. There was no decompression and no oxygen masks released in the cabin. The Captain requested the FO contact Center; [request] immediate descent to 10;000 feet and ask for direct ZZZ whichwas given. On initiation with [TRACON] the FO requested the first responder equipment to standby.In the descent the Captain briefed the crew about the possible loss of nose wheel steering; braking; flaps and flight controls. The cabin was secure at 10;000 feet and the Captain requested the FAs to take their jump seats. [IRO] Captain was briefed to make a PA after landing on the status of the aircraft and to alert the crew and passengers that all was ok and to remain in their seats if no landing emergency ensued. The crew planned on landing on XXR and stay on the runway if nose wheel steering was inoperative. This was not the case the secondary valve opened and the nose wheel steering worked.[TRACON] vectored the flight for a right downwind and base for a visual to XXR. The Captain was flying with the autopilot off on the turn to base. The landing was stabilized and uneventful. The breaking and nose wheel steering were normal. However the forward left break assembly reached 400 degrees and climbing according to the fire department due to the loss of the other brakes. The aircraft taxied to gate under ships power. The ramp and fire personnel were warned about possible hot brakes. No other problems were encountered with a normal shutdown.The aircraft landed well below 425;000 pounds. Approximately; 420;000 pounds. All check lists were complied with throughout the flight. Upon landing the Captain was informed that a passenger had stated they were hit by a piece of the 4L door. The Captain and crew could not confirm that. Also; the Captain and crew were informed that some FAs complained of hypoxia and said there was a decompression. There was no decompression. However; there was a lack of normal airflow in the aircraft. There were no deviations from Normal and Non-Normal SOPs; the Boeing 787 Flight Manual; the [Company] FOM; and the FARs to my knowledge.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.