Narrative:

When I assumed the sector there was a large line of moderate to extreme precipitation in the middle and north part of the sector. I believe the departure sectors had been running 2 streams previously; and I was informed that we were going to 1 stream of departures. The aircraft heading west were deviating south of the line; but still north of the arrivals that were being worked in the southwest corridor. The departing aircraft were given to me on headings; with speeds assigned that were very close to the arrival sector boundaries. I was told we were supposed to be getting 10 miles in trail from TRACON. That never happened. We informed our tmu (traffic management unit) that we needed 15 miles in trail from the TRACON. That never happened. The departing aircraft were handed off to me at between 7 and 9 miles in trail from what I could tell. My D side (assist position) and I absolutely missed several point outs; and the point outs that were approved were most likely done automatically; meaning that the interims in the datablock at the time of approval did not represent the altitude the planes were eventually climbed to. I was so busy I am not sure any coordination was done with the sectors receiving the point outs to inform those controllers the planes would be climbed further clearing traffic.at some point; the arrival sectors stopped approving these point outs because the aircraft were deviating too far to the south for their arrivals. Both myself; my D side at the time (and I believe the controller at another departure sector) told the supervisor that the traffic flow no longer worked and that we needed to be shut off. We never once received 15 miles in trail; and we had asked for that much earlier than asking to be shut off. I was told by the supervisor that we were shut off; only to have 7 or 8 more departures come out of approach. At this point the aircraft were so far south that not only did the arrival sectors not want to approve point outs; I'm not even sure all the point outs were made appropriately. These also were only maybe 7-8 miles in tail; not 15. This entire situation was extremely unsafe; and very indicative of how center tmu and TRACON tmu are reluctant to listen to the controllers and be proactive about preventing unsafe situations. This has been going on for years. I have spoken to the supervisor at the time of the incident and requested that this situation be examined.tmu needs to recognize that controllers are requesting restrictions are doing so from a safety viewpoint. Reluctance to give controllers what they need is a safety issue. Communication in these matters need to be clear; and those that disregard legitimate requests should be held accountable. This happens entirely too often; and either the agency cares about safety; or it doesn't.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZTL Controller reported the Traffic Management Coordinators were not complying with requests during a busy period with weather deviations causing them to miss several point outs to adjacent sectors.

Narrative: When I assumed the sector there was a large line of moderate to extreme precipitation in the middle and north part of the sector. I believe the departure sectors had been running 2 streams previously; and I was informed that we were going to 1 stream of departures. The aircraft heading west were deviating south of the line; but still north of the arrivals that were being worked in the southwest corridor. The departing aircraft were given to me on headings; with speeds assigned that were very close to the arrival sector boundaries. I was told we were supposed to be getting 10 miles in trail from TRACON. That never happened. We informed our TMU (Traffic Management Unit) that we needed 15 miles in trail from the TRACON. That never happened. The departing aircraft were handed off to me at between 7 and 9 miles in trail from what I could tell. My D Side (Assist position) and I absolutely missed SEVERAL point outs; and the point outs that were approved were most likely done automatically; meaning that the interims in the datablock at the time of approval did not represent the altitude the planes were eventually climbed to. I was so busy I am not sure any coordination was done with the sectors receiving the point outs to inform those controllers the planes would be climbed further clearing traffic.At some point; the arrival sectors stopped approving these point outs because the aircraft were deviating too far to the south for their arrivals. Both myself; my D Side at the time (and I believe the controller at another Departure sector) told the supervisor that the traffic flow no longer worked and that we needed to be shut off. We never once received 15 miles in trail; and we had asked for that much earlier than asking to be shut off. I was told by the Supervisor that we were shut off; only to have 7 or 8 more departures come out of Approach. At this point the aircraft were so far south that not only did the arrival sectors not want to approve point outs; I'm not even sure all the point outs were made appropriately. These also were only maybe 7-8 miles in tail; not 15. This entire situation was extremely unsafe; and very indicative of how Center TMU and TRACON TMU are reluctant to listen to the controllers and be proactive about preventing unsafe situations. This has been going on for years. I have spoken to the Supervisor at the time of the incident and requested that this situation be examined.TMU needs to recognize that controllers are requesting restrictions are doing so from a safety viewpoint. Reluctance to give controllers what they need is a safety issue. Communication in these matters need to be clear; and those that disregard legitimate requests should be held accountable. This happens entirely too often; and either the agency cares about safety; or it doesn't.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.