Narrative:

While I was providing OJT on ground control; I recognized an aircraft in a strange location on the radar screen. Aircraft Y had been doing practice approaches and was 20 miles north of the airport. The aircraft had previously done the VOR approach; standard tower assigned climb out is a 360 heading and 3;000 feet. As the aircraft was almost 20 miles north of the airport; I would assume the controller got tunnel vision; as normal; and forgot about the aircraft. Later we were called and informed they were '2 sectors'. Aircraft Y was now 10 west of the airport on the VOR approach planned low/missed approach. After listening; I noticed the sector has not been split yet; and the controller continued giving clearances. It appeared that the controller did not have a plan and was doing knee jerk reactions (clearances). Another aircraft checked on; aircraft X from another TRACON at 4;000 feet. When the controller descended this aircraft to 3;000 feet; it would become a conflict with another IFR aircraft that just did a practice approach at now going southwest-bound at 3;000 feet. The controller would have then had to turn him onto the intersecting runway RNAV approach; or give this aircraft a bunch of strange; un-needed vectors to keep IFR separation; because he boxed himself in by going to 3;000 feet; and for sequencing with aircraft Y. Needless to say; I had trained this controller a few times during his training; and it never went well. My personal observations will be noted at the end.noting that he had already switched aircraft X to the tower without giving any type of instruction to keep IFR separation then clearing aircraft Y for the RNAV approach; I only could assume that the aircraft X approach clearance was yet another knee jerk reaction. I used the clearance delivery voice line to call the arrival sector. I said 'just to make sure you know; you have two on approach. I cannot recall his response. About 10-20 seconds later another controller repeated about 2 on approach to the intersecting runways at the same time. Immediately following; I heard the controller cancel his approach clearance; but he talked so fast; I do not believe the aircraft understood what he said. In his rush to 'fix' the situation; he repeated it and then issued a turn to a 080 heading; without an altitude to maintain.two new controllers had just arrived in the tower to relieve ground and local control. One of them who heard most of it; noticed aircraft X; level at 2;000 feet for about a minute; and inside of another TRACON's airspace; and asked if he heard the radar controllers give an altitude to maintain; to which we answered we did not hear it. We then contacted one of the radar controllers and alerted them of the situation. One of the radar controllers climbed the aircraft. Most instructors here felt that this controller was unsafe; and his rapid unclear speech rate; and his overall knee jerk reactions to situations were not of the level of a certified controller; and recommended to not certify him on his last sector. His instructor who was just selected as a front line manager has multiple times said; 'I cannot train him'. I am unsure as to why his new supervisor performed a certification skill check on little to no traffic and certified him. My recommendation is due to this controller's inability to formulate a plan under moderate traffic; and inability to handle any situation that has a moderate complexity; to never allow him to work a combined sector; and to require direct supervision from a flm (front line manager). He also does not have the abilities to assess and execute necessary tasks utilizing priority of duties under general supervision. Please review his position relief briefing during this incident; as his ability to retain short term information; plan formulation; making necessary transmission and task executing using priority of duties is subpar at best.the reason for requiring a flm to provide direct supervision; is [that the controller in question] has physically and verbally intimidated another employee correcting his mistakes; on multiple occasions. The other employees were not flms.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MDT Tower Ground Controller observed on the Tower Radar display that the Radar Approach Controller had cleared two aircraft for simultaneous approaches to intersecting runways.

Narrative: While I was providing OJT on Ground Control; I recognized an aircraft in a strange location on the radar screen. Aircraft Y had been doing practice approaches and was 20 miles north of the airport. The aircraft had previously done the VOR approach; standard tower assigned climb out is a 360 heading and 3;000 feet. As the aircraft was almost 20 miles north of the airport; I would assume the controller got tunnel vision; as normal; and forgot about the aircraft. Later we were called and informed they were '2 sectors'. Aircraft Y was now 10 west of the airport on the VOR approach planned low/missed approach. After listening; I noticed the sector has not been split yet; and the controller continued giving clearances. It appeared that the Controller did not have a plan and was doing knee jerk reactions (clearances). Another aircraft checked on; Aircraft X from another TRACON at 4;000 feet. When the controller descended this aircraft to 3;000 feet; it would become a conflict with another IFR aircraft that just did a practice approach at now going southwest-bound at 3;000 feet. The controller would have then had to turn him onto the intersecting runway RNAV approach; or give this aircraft a bunch of strange; un-needed vectors to keep IFR separation; because he boxed himself in by going to 3;000 feet; and for sequencing with Aircraft Y. Needless to say; I had trained this Controller a few times during his training; and it never went well. My personal observations will be noted at the end.Noting that he had already switched Aircraft X to the tower without giving any type of instruction to keep IFR separation then clearing Aircraft Y for the RNAV Approach; I only could assume that the Aircraft X Approach clearance was yet another knee jerk reaction. I used the Clearance Delivery Voice Line to call the Arrival sector. I said 'just to make sure you know; you have two on approach. I cannot recall his response. About 10-20 seconds later another Controller repeated about 2 on approach to the intersecting runways at the same time. Immediately following; I heard the controller cancel his approach clearance; but he talked so fast; I do not believe the aircraft understood what he said. In his rush to 'fix' the situation; he repeated it and then issued a turn to a 080 heading; without an altitude to maintain.Two new Controllers had just arrived in the Tower to relieve ground and Local Control. One of them who heard most of it; noticed Aircraft X; level at 2;000 feet for about a minute; and inside of another TRACON's airspace; and asked if he heard the Radar controllers give an altitude to maintain; to which we answered we did not hear it. We then contacted one of the Radar controllers and alerted them of the situation. One of the Radar Controllers climbed the aircraft. Most Instructors here felt that this controller was unsafe; and his rapid unclear speech rate; and his overall knee jerk reactions to situations were not of the level of a certified controller; and recommended to not certify him on his last sector. His Instructor who was just selected as a Front Line Manager has multiple times said; 'I cannot train him'. I am unsure as to why his new supervisor performed a certification skill check on little to no traffic and certified him. My recommendation is due to this Controller's inability to formulate a plan under moderate traffic; and inability to handle any situation that has a moderate complexity; to never allow him to work a combined sector; and to require direct supervision from a FLM (Front Line Manager). He also does not have the abilities to assess and execute necessary tasks utilizing Priority of Duties under general supervision. Please review his position relief briefing during this incident; as his ability to retain short term information; plan formulation; making necessary transmission and task executing using Priority of Duties is subpar at best.The reason for requiring a FLM to provide Direct Supervision; is [that the controller in question] has physically and verbally intimidated another employee correcting his mistakes; on multiple occasions. The other employees were not FLMs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.