Narrative:

Myself and a friend; who happens to be an experienced IFR pilot; departed on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ for personal purposes. I was acting as PIC for this IFR flight down to ZZZ. Prior to departure; we conducted a thorough weather briefing with FSS; and a thorough preflight and run-up of the aircraft. We found no detectable abnormalities with the aircraft. After takeoff; we entered IMC conditions at about 700 feet MSL; we proceeded to fly direct zzzzz and started a climb to 2;000 feet as per our IFR flight plan. After establishing communication and subsequent radar contact with approach control; we were told to climb to 3;000 feet and proceed direct to ZZZ VOR. Soon after; approach control handed us off to [the next sector] we made the request for vectors. About 8 miles from ZZZ VOR; we began to have radio issues contacting ATC. We realized something was wrong when we were approaching the fap and we were not cleared for the approach. In response to our position and lack of clearance; I attempted to contact both [ATC sectors] and failed on each occasion. Soon after my failure to contact either controlling facility I attempted to contact both of them on my second radio.after attempting to use the second radio; the light screens on both radios went dark and the CDI for both radio one and two stopped indicating course deviation information. At this point; we squawked 7600. After recycling electrical equipment and examining the load meter which did not show a discharge; we quickly changed the transponder code to 7700 indicating we were in an emergency situation. Nearing the localizer; I instructed [the other pilot] to fly runway heading for ZZZ at 2;500 feet while I attempted to reach ZZZ1 [military base] on my cell phone through the clearance delivery line. After getting in contact with [the local military base] clearance delivery I announced my intentions to proceed direct [ZZZ1] and requested a precision radar approach. I believed this was the safest course of action. I was informed that the PAR (precision approach radar) was unavailable for that runway and that I would need to take another runway. Although not optimal given the gusty crosswind conditions at the surface; I believed it to be the safest option to proceed. Initially; [the military controller] asked me if I could continue the approach into ZZZ at which point I indicated that I had no equipment available with which to shoot any approach other than a precision radar approach. On the way back to ZZZ1; we lost cellular reception multiple times. I began to worry that shooting the precision approach radar may be in jeopardy as I might not be able to re-establish contact with [the military controller]. This made the emergency even more dire and I began to question whether or not we would be able to complete the approach. My cell phone had minimal charge and [the other pilot] was struggling to hand fly the aircraft. To add to our struggles; the directional gyro on the aircraft was beginning to act sluggish and bind in turns despite no apparent issue with vacuum suction. The turn and slip indicator was also inoperative at this point. [The military controller] requested we climb to 3;000 feet. I advised them we required 2500 feet or less to maintain cell phone contact; which they acknowledged. Out of an abundance of caution; I lowered the gear via the normal method about 15 miles south of ZZZ1. I watched the gear position indicator show a green light indicating that the gear was down and locked. I advised ATC that I would be turning off all non-essential electrical equipment in the aircraft. Given the surface conditions and moderate turbulence that we were encountering; I took over the controls. I advised the approach controller that he would have to talk to [the other pilot] and he would relay his instructions to me. As the approach proceeded; I found it exceedingly difficult to comply with the radar controllers instructions given the conditions and sub-functional directional gyro. At some point on the approach; I saw [the other pilot] actuating the rheostat for the gear position light which first clued me in to the fact that the light was no longer illuminated green. When we initially put the gear down; we verified that there was increased drag on the airframe; we heard and felt the gear come down as well as saw a green light. This felt like any other normal gear extension.at this point in time; given the fact that the light was no longer illuminated while flying the approach; I asked [the other pilot] to verify out his window via the side mirror that the front nose wheel was down; which he confirmed. We coordinated with ATC in order to ensure they could visually check the gear for us on short final which they did. After ATC advised us that our gear appeared down; [the other pilot] removed the panel uncovering the emergency gear extension mechanism and checked the mechanical position indicators of the gear; which he deemed to be down and locked. The gear was in the position he was familiar with when the aircraft was sitting on a runway or taxiway indicating gear was down and locked. During this approach; it was necessary for [the other pilot] to hold the cell phone tightly to my ear so I could hear the controllers instructions. Eventually we broke out of the clouds at 500 feet and we saw the runway at ZZZ1. I prepared for landing with a 26 knot direct crosswind. We both discussed our gear situation and determined with near certainty that the gear was locked. After a smooth touchdown and short rollout the right main collapsed soon followed by the left main gear and nose gear and the aircraft sustained damage as it veered right. Immediately after the gear collapsed and the props struck the runway; I pulled the throttles and then mixtures to the idle position and [the other pilot] turned the fuel selectors off. We immediately exited the aircraft and emergency vehicles and personnel were ready and waiting to help us.given the widespread low IFR conditions the loss of all navigation instruments due to electrical malfunction and the diminishing charge on my cell phone which was my only link to ATC; we felt landing at [the local military base] was the safest course of action available to us at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA-30 pilot reported the loss of air-ground communications and other electrical equipment led to a diversion to a local military base with Precision Approach Radar guidance via cellphone service.

Narrative: Myself and a friend; who happens to be an experienced IFR pilot; departed on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ for personal purposes. I was acting as PIC for this IFR flight down to ZZZ. Prior to departure; we conducted a thorough weather briefing with FSS; and a thorough preflight and run-up of the aircraft. We found no detectable abnormalities with the aircraft. After takeoff; we entered IMC conditions at about 700 feet MSL; we proceeded to fly direct ZZZZZ and started a climb to 2;000 feet as per our IFR flight plan. After establishing communication and subsequent radar contact with Approach Control; we were told to climb to 3;000 feet and proceed direct to ZZZ VOR. Soon after; Approach Control handed us off to [the next sector] we made the request for vectors. About 8 miles from ZZZ VOR; we began to have radio issues contacting ATC. We realized something was wrong when we were approaching the FAP and we were not cleared for the approach. In response to our position and lack of clearance; I attempted to contact both [ATC sectors] and failed on each occasion. Soon after my failure to contact either controlling facility I attempted to contact both of them on my second radio.After attempting to use the second radio; the light screens on both radios went dark and the CDI for both radio one and two stopped indicating course deviation information. At this point; we squawked 7600. After recycling electrical equipment and examining the load meter which did not show a discharge; we quickly changed the transponder code to 7700 indicating we were in an emergency situation. Nearing the localizer; I instructed [the other pilot] to fly runway heading for ZZZ at 2;500 feet while I attempted to reach ZZZ1 [military base] on my cell phone through the clearance delivery line. After getting in contact with [the local military base] clearance delivery I announced my intentions to proceed direct [ZZZ1] and requested a precision radar approach. I believed this was the safest course of action. I was informed that the PAR (Precision Approach Radar) was unavailable for that runway and that I would need to take another runway. Although not optimal given the gusty crosswind conditions at the surface; I believed it to be the safest option to proceed. Initially; [the military controller] asked me if I could continue the approach into ZZZ at which point I indicated that I had no equipment available with which to shoot any approach other than a precision radar approach. On the way back to ZZZ1; we lost cellular reception multiple times. I began to worry that shooting the Precision Approach Radar may be in jeopardy as I might not be able to re-establish contact with [the military controller]. This made the emergency even more dire and I began to question whether or not we would be able to complete the approach. My cell phone had minimal charge and [the other pilot] was struggling to hand fly the aircraft. To add to our struggles; the directional gyro on the aircraft was beginning to act sluggish and bind in turns despite no apparent issue with vacuum suction. The turn and slip indicator was also inoperative at this point. [The military controller] requested we climb to 3;000 feet. I advised them we required 2500 feet or less to maintain cell phone contact; which they acknowledged. Out of an abundance of caution; I lowered the gear via the normal method about 15 miles south of ZZZ1. I watched the gear position indicator show a green light indicating that the gear was down and locked. I advised ATC that I would be turning off all non-essential electrical equipment in the aircraft. Given the surface conditions and moderate turbulence that we were encountering; I took over the controls. I advised the Approach Controller that he would have to talk to [the other pilot] and he would relay his instructions to me. As the approach proceeded; I found it exceedingly difficult to comply with the Radar Controllers instructions given the conditions and sub-functional directional gyro. At some point on the approach; I saw [the other pilot] actuating the rheostat for the gear position light which first clued me in to the fact that the light was no longer illuminated green. When we initially put the gear down; we verified that there was increased drag on the airframe; we heard and felt the gear come down as well as saw a green light. This felt like any other normal gear extension.At this point in time; given the fact that the light was no longer illuminated while flying the approach; I asked [the other pilot] to verify out his window via the side mirror that the front nose wheel was down; which he confirmed. We coordinated with ATC in order to ensure they could visually check the gear for us on short final which they did. After ATC advised us that our gear appeared down; [the other pilot] removed the panel uncovering the emergency gear extension mechanism and checked the mechanical position indicators of the gear; which he deemed to be down and locked. The gear was in the position he was familiar with when the aircraft was sitting on a runway or taxiway indicating gear was down and locked. During this approach; it was necessary for [the other pilot] to hold the cell phone tightly to my ear so I could hear the controllers instructions. Eventually we broke out of the clouds at 500 feet and we saw the runway at ZZZ1. I prepared for landing with a 26 knot direct crosswind. We both discussed our gear situation and determined with near certainty that the gear was locked. After a smooth touchdown and short rollout the right main collapsed soon followed by the left main gear and nose gear and the aircraft sustained damage as it veered right. Immediately after the gear collapsed and the props struck the runway; I pulled the throttles and then mixtures to the idle position and [the other pilot] turned the fuel selectors off. We immediately exited the aircraft and emergency vehicles and personnel were ready and waiting to help us.Given the widespread low IFR conditions the loss of all navigation instruments due to electrical malfunction and the diminishing charge on my cell phone which was my only link to ATC; we felt landing at [the local military base] was the safest course of action available to us at the time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.