Narrative:

Sectors 25 and 26 were combined during this time period and I was training a D side. Leading up to the event we handed a citation off to sector 62 at FL270. His northeast bound flight path took him in the proximity of the nashville (bna) westbound departure routes. Our right side runs very large data blocks which makes it a challenge to keep them separated even in low traffic situations. The right side dropped the data block on the citation at our boundary. Bna had released several aircraft headed westbound in quick succession; but only two of them were a potential problem for the citation which we had just handed off. The first [aircraft]; 62 climbed to FL260 (it is very rare that 62 climbs westbound aircraft off of bna). The second aircraft was in trail by approximately 10 miles. The D side sends a data block to 62 and 62 accepts the automated point out. 62 then quick looks us and realizes we are not watching [the citation] anymore. He pvds a data block to us just before [the second aircraft] is checking on out of FL220 for FL230. The data block on the traffic overlapped with another data block making it unreadable. The right side pvds off the data of [the citation] at FL270 without analyzing it and at the same time climbs the [second aircraft] to FL320. As soon as he said FL320 I said quite loudly; 'unable; he has traffic just to the south of him at FL270.' the right side trails off on the rest of his transmission causing the aircraft to level at FL230. The right side then brings up the data block on the citation and evaluates it before issuing another climb clearance to [the second aircraft]. [The second aircraft] was climbing very well; and if the aircraft had not leveled at FL230 for a few hits would have easily climbed into the citation. The climb rate would have made it very difficult to prevent a loss if he had waited for conflict alert to go off before stopping the aircraft.I realize it is against the guidance about automatic point outs; but because of the lack of quality control or management oversight; the SOP in ZME is to pvd a data block to the sector and when the receiving sector accepts the point out he releases the aircraft for higher or lower. Traffic is also done incorrectly; the receiving sector just pvds the traffic to the sector for the controller to accept; and no verbal coordination is accomplished. The right side; whose ability I won't comment on; should have never pvd off the data block without first looking at it. He should have seen the 270 limited data block out there as well; and [the first aircraft] only climbing to FL260 in front of him should have sent up another warning that there was traffic in the area.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZME controller reported correcting a possible loss of separation due to facility SOP PVD procedure. Controller reported this procedure is unsafe and in conflict with national directives.

Narrative: Sectors 25 and 26 were combined during this time period and I was training a D side. Leading up to the event we handed a Citation off to sector 62 at FL270. His northeast bound flight path took him in the proximity of the Nashville (BNA) westbound departure routes. Our R side runs very large data blocks which makes it a challenge to keep them separated even in low traffic situations. The R side dropped the data block on the Citation at our boundary. BNA had released several aircraft headed westbound in quick succession; but only two of them were a potential problem for the Citation which we had just handed off. The first [aircraft]; 62 climbed to FL260 (it is very rare that 62 climbs westbound aircraft off of BNA). The second aircraft was in trail by approximately 10 miles. The D side sends a data block to 62 and 62 accepts the automated point out. 62 then quick looks us and realizes we are not watching [the Citation] anymore. He PVDs a data block to us just before [the second aircraft] is checking on out of FL220 for FL230. The data block on the traffic overlapped with another data block making it unreadable. The R side PVDs off the data of [the Citation] at FL270 without analyzing it and at the same time climbs the [second aircraft] to FL320. As soon as he said FL320 I said quite loudly; 'Unable; he has traffic just to the south of him at FL270.' The R side trails off on the rest of his transmission causing the aircraft to level at FL230. The R side then brings up the data block on the Citation and evaluates it before issuing another climb clearance to [the second aircraft]. [The second aircraft] was climbing very well; and if the aircraft had not leveled at FL230 for a few hits would have easily climbed into the Citation. The climb rate would have made it very difficult to prevent a loss if he had waited for conflict alert to go off before stopping the aircraft.I realize it is against the guidance about automatic point outs; but because of the lack of Quality Control or management oversight; the SOP in ZME is to PVD a data block to the sector and when the receiving sector accepts the point out he releases the aircraft for higher or lower. Traffic is also done incorrectly; the receiving sector just PVDs the traffic to the sector for the controller to accept; and no verbal coordination is accomplished. The R side; whose ability I won't comment on; should have never PVD off the data block without first looking at it. He should have seen the 270 limited data block out there as well; and [the first aircraft] only climbing to FL260 in front of him should have sent up another warning that there was traffic in the area.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.