Narrative:

Weather had impacted the houston area and aircraft were attempting to navigate around to get to the terminal area. Our flm (front line manager) had already left for the evening leaving 3 sectors open with weather and deviations impacting all of them. The only management personnel in facility was the midnight watch flm that was trying his best to manage all the complex traffic that was inbound and outbound from houston and surrounding facilities.we had asked numerous times for a route to get aircraft into houston and were never given an answer. Using the weather radar; I had instructed several aircraft headed eastbound to deviate north of course and when able direct tnv...iah. The next sector (78) had accepted several of these aircraft without complaint. Then they called my d-side and told him that they were not accepting any more arrival aircraft. This was news to us; as they appeared to have the only viable route to the houston terminal area. The flm came to my sector and instructed us to hold the four current iah arrivals that we had and any more that we had coming.aircraft Y had flashed to sector 78 and this was one that needed to be held in my sector. I instructed my d-side to call them (sector 78) and point out aircraft Y turning back and holding in our airspace. Aircraft Y was at FL330. I instructed the aircraft to fly I believe a 300 heading to get them back to a high altitude holding waypoint. Sector 78 approved the point out to my d-side. At this time; I saw no traffic at FL330 or climbing/descending through FL330 that would be a factor with aircraft Y. Sector 78 then flashed aircraft X east of aircraft Y who had been level at FL340 (iah departure to the west) now descending to FL320 for unknown reasons through aircraft Y. I accepted the handoff on aircraft X; assuming that sector 78 would ensure the aircraft was either turned behind aircraft Y that they had taken the point out on or ensured the aircraft were vertically separated. When aircraft X checked on; I issued the aircraft direct elp and noticing his rate of descent; then issued a further turn to the north in an attempt to keep separation. Aircraft X then informed me he was responding to a RA and descending. Aircraft Y also responded to an RA and climbed. Neither were timely enough and separation was lost.the 78 controller apparently told the flm in charge that he expected aircraft Y to turn more quickly. Aircraft simply don't turn on a time at high altitude.better communication between tmu/flm and controllers. We should have been told earlier that houston arrivals needed to be held so that it wasn't a last minute scramble to keep them from sector 78's airspace. The aus specialty (which includes sector 78) had combined up early in preparation for the midnight shift. This was premature in my opinion; since the weather was still in the airspace and they were going to need to be prepared for inbound and outbound aircraft from the houston terminal area.this weather event was forecast for several days and we should have had plans in place in a more timely manner. This seems to be an on-going problem with ZHU and a lack of preparedness for these types of weather systems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Three ZHU Controllers reported a loss of separation event. Controllers reported factors were high volume; weather; and no traffic management program in effect.

Narrative: Weather had impacted the Houston area and aircraft were attempting to navigate around to get to the terminal area. Our FLM (Front Line Manager) had already left for the evening leaving 3 sectors open with weather and deviations impacting all of them. The only management personnel in facility was the midnight watch FLM that was trying his best to manage all the complex traffic that was inbound and outbound from Houston and surrounding facilities.We had asked numerous times for a route to get aircraft into Houston and were never given an answer. Using the weather radar; I had instructed several aircraft headed eastbound to deviate north of course and when able direct TNV...IAH. The next sector (78) had accepted several of these aircraft without complaint. Then they called my D-side and told him that they were not accepting any more arrival aircraft. This was news to us; as they appeared to have the only viable route to the Houston terminal area. The FLM came to my sector and instructed us to hold the four current IAH arrivals that we had and any more that we had coming.Aircraft Y had flashed to sector 78 and this was one that needed to be held in my sector. I instructed my D-side to call them (sector 78) and point out Aircraft Y turning back and holding in our airspace. Aircraft Y was at FL330. I instructed the aircraft to fly I believe a 300 heading to get them back to a high altitude holding waypoint. Sector 78 approved the point out to my D-side. At this time; I saw no traffic at FL330 or climbing/descending through FL330 that would be a factor with Aircraft Y. Sector 78 then flashed Aircraft X east of Aircraft Y who had been level at FL340 (IAH departure to the west) now descending to FL320 for unknown reasons through Aircraft Y. I accepted the handoff on Aircraft X; assuming that sector 78 would ensure the aircraft was either turned behind Aircraft Y that they had taken the point out on or ensured the aircraft were vertically separated. When Aircraft X checked on; I issued the aircraft direct ELP and noticing his rate of descent; then issued a further turn to the north in an attempt to keep separation. Aircraft X then informed me he was responding to a RA and descending. Aircraft Y also responded to an RA and climbed. Neither were timely enough and separation was lost.The 78 controller apparently told the FLM in charge that he expected Aircraft Y to turn more quickly. Aircraft simply don't turn on a time at high altitude.Better communication between TMU/FLM and controllers. We should have been told earlier that Houston arrivals needed to be held so that it wasn't a last minute scramble to keep them from sector 78's airspace. The AUS specialty (which includes sector 78) had combined up early in preparation for the midnight shift. This was premature in my opinion; since the weather was still in the airspace and they were going to need to be prepared for inbound and outbound aircraft from the Houston terminal area.This weather event was forecast for several days and we should have had plans in place in a more timely manner. This seems to be an on-going problem with ZHU and a lack of preparedness for these types of weather systems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.