Narrative:

At mso a hydraulic leak was suspected under #1 engine. I consulted with maintenance control and it was determined that the aircraft was safe for flight to geg, but not as scheduled by way of fca. Dispatch agreed and the flight rerted to geg. This was precautionary to preclude a hydraulic failure, and be as safe as possible. A mechanic could check the aircraft in geg if this developed further. 2 passenger for fca were reboarded with the passenger going to geg. The man sat in 1E and asked many questions. I explained to him, and by way of a passenger announcement to the others, that we had a fluid loss and in talking to maintenance control it was best that the plane be flown to geg. We were sorry for the inconvenience to fca passenger. 20 mins from geg the hydraulic pressure began to destabilize. In 5 mins went erratic and hydraulic lights began flashing. We briefed our hydraulic failure procedures at the first sigh of problem. By the time we got to the landing pattern the hydraulic lights were steady and pressure 0. Upon gear down, nothing happened, so we did the hydraulic failure/manual landing gear extension procedures as briefed. We had the crash trucks rolled out, briefed the passenger, landed and taxied in uneventfully.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER A GND CHECK OF THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM BY THE PIC AND A CONFERENCE WITH MAINTENANCE CTL AT HEADQUARTERS, AN LTT DEPARTS FOR A MAJOR MAINTENANCE BASE WITH PASSENGERS. ACFT WAS THOUGHT TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND WAS RELEASED BY DISPATCH. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILED AND EMERGENCY LNDG MADE AT DESTINATION.

Narrative: AT MSO A HYD LEAK WAS SUSPECTED UNDER #1 ENG. I CONSULTED WITH MAINT CTL AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT WAS SAFE FOR FLT TO GEG, BUT NOT AS SCHEDULED BY WAY OF FCA. DISPATCH AGREED AND THE FLT RERTED TO GEG. THIS WAS PRECAUTIONARY TO PRECLUDE A HYD FAILURE, AND BE AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE. A MECH COULD CHK THE ACFT IN GEG IF THIS DEVELOPED FURTHER. 2 PAX FOR FCA WERE REBOARDED WITH THE PAX GOING TO GEG. THE MAN SAT IN 1E AND ASKED MANY QUESTIONS. I EXPLAINED TO HIM, AND BY WAY OF A PAX ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE OTHERS, THAT WE HAD A FLUID LOSS AND IN TALKING TO MAINT CTL IT WAS BEST THAT THE PLANE BE FLOWN TO GEG. WE WERE SORRY FOR THE INCONVENIENCE TO FCA PAX. 20 MINS FROM GEG THE HYD PRESSURE BEGAN TO DESTABILIZE. IN 5 MINS WENT ERRATIC AND HYD LIGHTS BEGAN FLASHING. WE BRIEFED OUR HYD FAILURE PROCS AT THE FIRST SIGH OF PROB. BY THE TIME WE GOT TO THE LNDG PATTERN THE HYD LIGHTS WERE STEADY AND PRESSURE 0. UPON GEAR DOWN, NOTHING HAPPENED, SO WE DID THE HYD FAILURE/MANUAL LNDG GEAR EXTENSION PROCS AS BRIEFED. WE HAD THE CRASH TRUCKS ROLLED OUT, BRIEFED THE PAX, LANDED AND TAXIED IN UNEVENTFULLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.